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CHINA, THE UNITED STATES AND 
THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 





Books by 




G. ZAY WOOD 


1. 


China, the United States and the Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance. 


2. 


The Chino-Japanese Treaties of May 25, 1915. 


3. 


The Twenty-one Demands. 


4. 


China, Japan and the Shantung Question. 



China, the United States 

AND THE 

Anglo- Japanese AlUance 

G. Zay Wood 

Formerly Editor of " The Far Eastern Republic," 

President of The Chinese Political Science Association, Curtis 

Fellow in International Law and Diplomacy, 

Columbia University, etc. 




New York Chicago 

Fleming H. Revell Company 

London and Edinburgh 



Copyright, 1921, by 
FLEMING H. REVELL COMPANY 






-^iv> 



Printed in the United States of America 



OEC 12 1921 

©aA653508 



New York: 158 Fifth Avenue 
Chicago : 17 North Wabash Ave. 
London: 21 Paternoster Square 
Edinburgh: 75 Princes Street 



TO 

HIS EXCELLENCY SAO-KE ALFRED SZE 

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the 

Republic of China to the United States of 

America, 

This Book is respectfully 

Dedicated 



FOREWORD 

IN view of the great interest which has been 
aroused by the conference on limitation of 
armaments and on the questions relating to the 
Pacific and to the Far East, no apology is needed 
for the appearance of this book on The Anglo- 
Japanese alliance, which is admittedly one of the 
most important questions yet to be solved. The 
alliance has, because of its very nature, an intimate 
bearing upon the question of limitation of arma- 
ments, and a still closer connection with the prob- 
lems affecting the Pacific and the Far East. It is 
almost axiomatic to say that no agreement can be 
reached upon limitation of armaments without set- 
tling first the Pacific and Far Eastern problems, 
and that no settlement can be arrived at in regard 
to these problems, unless the Anglo- Japanese al- 
liance is definitely disposed of. The continuance 
or discontinuance of the alliance will, therefore, 
contribute in no small degree to the success or 
failure of the armament conference at Washington. 
The design of this treatise, as its name implies, 
is to give a short account of the history of the 
alliance, and to show the reasons, from the Chinese 
and American points of view, why it should not be 

vii 



viii FOREWORD ' 

renewed. No attempt is made to be exihaustive in 
treatment. 

The author begs to acknowledge his indebtedness 
to his friends who have lent him assistance in the 
gathering of the material, and to the Editor of 
China Review for permission to reproduce here 
part of an article which has previously appeared 
in its columns. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER ^^^^ 

I. Introduction H 

II. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902 . 25 

III. The Second Anglo- Japanese Alliance, 

1905 53 

IV. The Third Anglo- Japanese Alliance, 

1911 64 

V. The United States and the Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance . . . .79 
VI. China and the Anglo-Japanese Al- 
liance 110 

VII. Conclusion 133 

Appendices 

(a) Text of the Anglo-Japanese Al- 

liance, January 30, 1902 . . 143 

(b) Lord Lansdowne's Despatch to Sir 

C. MacDonald .... 146 

(c) Text of the Anglo-Japanese Al- 

liance, August 12, 1905 . .150 

(d) Lord Lansdowne's Despatch to Sir 

C. Hardinge ..... 154 

(e) Text of the Anglo-Japanese Al- 

liance, July 13, 1911 . . . 157 

(f) Memorandum Presented to Sir 

Beilby Alston, British Min- 
ister at Peking, July, 1920 . 160 



CONTENTS 

FAGS 

(g) London-China Association's Let^ 

TER TO THE BRITISH FOREIGN OF- 
FICE, June 21, 1921 ... 170 
(h) Chinese Official Statement to 

THE Press, June 6, 1920 . .174 



CHINA, THE UNITED STATES, 

AND THE 

ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 



INTRODUCTION 

THERE is nothing in the sphere of interna- 
tional politics at present that merits more 
attention or deserves more careful study 
than the future of the Anglo- Japanese alliance^ — 2i 
subject upon which the Imperial Conference of the 
Premiers of the British Dominions has dwelt dur- 
ing its sessions in London, but about which no de- 
cision has since been reached, not only because of 
the serious difference of views held by the states- 
men from the Dominions, but also because of the 
vigorous opposition coming from China and the 
United States. 

First concluded in 1902, revised and renewed in 
1905, and again in 1911, the alliance has now 
reached its stipulated term of ten years. In virtue 
of the self -extending clause found in the treaty, the 
alliance will, however, remain binding until one 
year after it is denounced by either of the high 

11 



12 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

contracting parties. In July, 1920, Japan and 
Great Britain, when considering the future of the 
alliance, sent a joint communication to the Secre- 
tary of the League of Nations, in which the hope 
was expressed that, if the alliance were to continue, 
it would be so revised and modified as not to be 
in conflict with the spirit of the Covenant of the 
League. 

Whether this communication was due to the de- 
sire of the contracting Powers to comply with the 
letter as well as the spirit of the Covenant of the 
League, or it was merely an attempt on their part 
to dodge the issue which they should have then 
faced with courage and decision, it is useless to 
inquire. Great Britain has since made it known 
that the renewal or non-renewal of the alliance de- 
pends largely, if not entirely, upon the pleasure of 
her Dominions. Japan, on the other hand, anxious 
as she has been for the continuance of the alliance 
in one form or another, has resorted to all legiti- 
mate means of diplomacy to realise her ambition. 
She sent her Crown Prince to England on a state 
visit at an estimated cost of $2,000,000, and what- 
ever ostensible reasons may have been given, the 
real purpose of the visit was to stimulate whatever 
little enthusiasm there was in England for the con- 
tinuance of the * Anglo- Japanese alliance and to 
pave the way for its renewal. It has been said, of 
course, that the visit ivas a friendly one, and that 
it was designed to improve and to strengthen Anglo- 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 13 

Japanese friendship. But it is unnecessary to add 
that, to the Japanese people and Government ahke, 
"friendship" with Great Britain is almost synony- 
mous with the continuance of the alliance, for in 
their eyes nothing could be more unfriendly on the 
part of Great Britain than to dissolve the partner- 
ship that has lasted nearly twenty years. 

The Imperial Conference of the Premiers of the 
British Dominions met in London, June 20, and 
lasted to August 5, 192L Among the subjects dis- 
cussed at the Conference was the future of the 
Anglo- Japanese alliance, which, in view of its vital 
bearing upon the problem of Imperial defence, upon 
the Anglo-American relationship, and upon the 
British policy in the Far East, outstripped in im- 
portance all the other questions on the Conference 
agenda. Unfortunately, the statesmen upon whom 
the British Government has depended for a deci- 
sion as to the future of the alliance, have held dif- 
ferent views on the subject, and consequently failed 
to reach a definite conclusion. Mr. Arthur Meighen, 
the Prime Minister of Canada, strongly opposed 
the renewal of the alliance on the ground that it 
has served its purpose, that it is no longer in har- 
mony with the new international spirit, and that 
its continuance is harmful to the cordial relations 
between Canada and the United States. This view 
was ably supported by General Smuts from. South 
Africa who insisted that the question of the re- 
newal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance must be 



14 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

subordinated to the consideration of the absolute 
necessity, as an essential and cardinal principle of 
British foreign policy, of maintaining a cordial 
understanding and co-operation between the British 
Empire and the United States. Even India db- 
jected to the renewal of the alliance, as His High- 
ness the Maharajah of Kutch, the representative 
of the Indian princes at the Imperial Conference, 
resented the idea that it would ever be found neces- 
sary to call on Japanese troops to defend India 
against outside attack. On the other hand, Premier 
Hughes of Australia, who was supported in his con- 
tentions by Premier Massey of New Zealand, urged 
the renewal of the alliance which, he declared, was 
the best and cheapest means of protecting Aus- 
tralia as it provided a strong check upon Japan. 

This divergence of views is largely responsible 
for the failure of the Imperial Conference to reach 
a definite decision as to the continuance or discon- 
tinuance of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The Brit- 
ish Government, while disposed to drop the com- 
bination altogether in deference to the wishes of 
Canada, South Africa and India, was, however, 
unwilling to take any step that would have the ap- 
pearance of throwing over an ally of some twenty 
years. To temporise once again, Japan and Great 
Britain sent another joint communication to the 
Secretary of the League of Nations, in which they 
agreed that, while the alliance remains in force, 
the procedure prescribed by the Covenant of the 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 15 

League shall be adopted and shall prevail over that 
prescribed by the alliance, in case where the one is 
inconsistent with the other. This communication 
is dated July 7, 1921, and no action has been taken 
since. As it stands now, the Anglo-Japanese al- 
liance remains in force until one full year after it 
is denounced by either of the high contracting 
parties. 

What is to be done with the alliance? Will it 
be revised and renewed? Should it be renewed at 
all? These questions are easy to ask, but difficult 
to answer. It requires sufficient knowledge of the 
history of the alliance and a close acquaintance 
*with the public sentiments in Japan, Great Britain, 
China and the United States to answer them cor- 
rectly. Students of international politics frequently 
find it unwise, if not unsafe, to anticipate events 
before they occur. It is not the object of this book 
to predict what will or will not happen to the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance in the future. Its purpose 
is to show, with facts widely known and with argu- 
ments generally recognised, why the alliance should 
not be renewed at all, in any form and under any 
circumstances. 

As has been pointed out at the beginning, there 
is nothing in the field of international politics at 
present that deserves more attention than the future 
of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Aside from the 
contracting Powers themselves who are naturally 
most concerned with the renewal or non-renewal 



16 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

of the alliance, there are two other Powers whose 
interest in the matter is second only to that of 
Japan and Great Britain, and whose views ought 
to be taken into careful consideration in deciding 
the future of the alliance. These two Powers are 
China and the United States, who are greatly in- 
terested in the subject, each for her own reasons. 

About the attitude of the United States towards 
the renewal of the alliance, enough has been said 
and written. It has been generally, but correctly, 
assumed that the sentiment in this country is en- 
tirely against its renewal for the simple reason that, 
in the absence of a plain provision to the contrary, 
the alliance may be directed against the United 
States in case of American- Japanese difficulties, 
that it may be seized upon as a convenient instru- 
ment to force the Japanese immigration question, 
that it may so complicate the Pacific situation as to 
make limitation of armaments impossible, and that 
it may be used by Japan as a shield behind which 
to work out her designs in China. The Premiers 
of Canada and of South Africa have declared pub- 
licly, and in unmistakable language, that they would 
never consent to the renewal of the alliance in terms 
which may prove offensive to the United States.* 

*In a speech to the South African Assembly on May 20, 
shortly before his departure for the Imperial Conference of 
Dominion Premiers in London, General Smuts made the fol- 
lowing striking remark apropos of the renewal of the Anglo- 
Japanese alliance: "There is no doubt that the position all 
over the world has changed vitally and fundamentally since 
1902, when the treaty was concluded. Conditions have 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 17 

Even Premier Hughes of Australia, who sees in 
the continuation of the alliance security for the 
British dominions in the Pacific, and therefore 
favours its renev^al, has made it quite plain that the 
policy of "white Australia" must be insisted upon 
and that the new terms must be satisfactory to the 
United States. In other words, from the stand- 
point of the Dominion Premiers, the attitude of 
the United States is a pivotal fact in the considera- 
tion of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. 
They prefer co-operation with America to the con- 
tinuation of the political partnership with Japan, 
and they are apparently willing and ready to sacri- 
fice the alliance for the sake of the friendship of 



changed completely, and I suppose if it was a question of 
entering into a new treaty to-day there would be little hesi- 
tation as to what conclusions the British Empire would come 
to ; but it is the case of a treaty which was concluded many 
years ago, and which was renewed several times, and either 
the renewal or continuation of which now must raise very 
great questions indeed. I have said world conditions have 
altered. Since the treaty was entered into, Russia has dis- 
appeared as a trade power, and Germany also, for the time 
being. The position of Japan in the East has altered com- 
pletely. She has a great position now in China, Siberia, and 
other parts, too. From a larger point of view also there is 
no doubt that since 1902 the friction between Japan and the 
western states of America has also increased, so that from all 
these points of view honourable members (referring to the 
members of the South African Assembly) will be able to see 
how very intricate the whole question is. What I would say 
in regard to the renewal of this treaty is that, to my mind, 
the paramount consideration that we ought to keep before us in 
the future, and in the very difficult times lying ahead of the 
world, is that it is essential, so far as possible, to secure 
understanding and co-operation between the British Empire 
and the United States. I consider that the second essential 
and cardinal principle of our foreign policy. In the first 



18 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES j 

the United States, with whose policy in regard to | 
Japanese immigration they are in perfect accord. I| 
Now, on the other hand, comparatively little ofi 
nothing has been said or heard about the positions 
of the Chinese Government and the attitude of the;! 
Chinese towards this question of the renewal oiv 
the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Not that the Chinese?^ 
public opinion is inarticulate on the matter, not that 
the Chinese Government is indifferent to the future 
of the alliance or unconcerned with international 
problems having direct bearing upon its own inter- 
ests, but that the voice of China, even in interna- 
tional matters concerning herself, is like a cry in 
the wilderness, unheard and unheeded. During 



place, as I have said, I consider it necessary not to go in for 
any policy of antagonism on the Continent of Europe, but for 
a policy of peace; and in the second place I think, from a 
world point of view, the essential policy for the British 
Empire is to work with America to secure her co-operation, 
and m that way to go forward in the very difficult world 
task that lies before our Government." 1 

Mr. Arthur Meighen, before his departure for the Imperial ■ 
Conference, declared in the Canadian House of Commons: 1 
The alliance is a subject of great and definite moment, and j 
if there is one dominion to which, more than another, the i 
question of the renewal is of importance, it is to the Dominion i^ 
of Canada. I say that with particular reference to the rela- i 
tionship this Dominion bears, and must always bear, as a I 
portion of the British Empire, standing— if I may say it— '^ 
between Great Britain, on the one hand, and the United ; 
States, on the other. I need not enlarge upon how serious, t 
or even how momentous, is the deliberation that must take ■ 
place as regards the question of the renewal of that treaty. ! 
The importance of it arises from the United States therein, \ 
and the interest of Great Britain and Australia and of other j 
parts of the Empire; but the importance of it to us arises ' 
m a v^nr great degree, out of the very great interest of the i 
United States m the renewal or non-renewal thereof." 3 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 19 

I the last two years, when the discussion on the 
I Anglo-Japanese alliance has monopolised the col- 
umns of the newspapers in the Far East, the Chi- 
nese Government has made known, time and again, 
its position towards the continuation of the alliance. 
It has protested against the renewal of the alliance 
without China being consulted in the negotiation. 
But the British Government has not seen fit to 
make a formal reply to the protest, and at one time 
it has even refused to make public in England the 
text of the Chinese protest, while the same has been 
given out by the Chinese Foreign Office and widely 
published in China. The statesmen from the Brit- 
ish Dominions, as we have seen, have waxed elo- 
quent as to the need of co-operation with the United 
States and the necessity of taking American senti- 
ment into account in the renewal of the Anglo- 
Japanese alliance. Not a word, however, has fallen 
from their lips about China, whose interest in the 
matter has apparently never entered into their con- 
sideration. General Smuts, the South African 
statesman who sees the shifting of the centre of 
world politics to the Pacific, speaks of the alliance 
in terms of Japan, Great Britain and the United 
States, and does not seem to have noticed China 
on the map. Lloyd George, in expressing his hope 
for a Pacific understanding in the House of Com- 
mons, referred to China only when he was poig- 
nantly reminded of the existence of such a country 
in the Far East ! 



20 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

That China, like the United States, is greatly 
interested in the future of the alliance there can be. 
no doubt. Like the United States, she objects to; 
the renewal of the alliance, though largely for dif- 
ferent reasons. China objects to its renewal on, 
the ground that it has often sacrificed her sovereign 
rights and interests which it is designed to safe- 
guard, that it has frequently been used as a screen 
to cover attacks upon her integrity and independ- 
ence which it undertakes nominally to protect, that 
it is diametrically opposed in spirit, if not in let- 
ter, to the principles of the Open Door which it 
professes to be among its objects to maintain, and 
that it is responsible for the outbreak of two wars 
in the Far East, although its avowed object is the 
maintenance of peace. The questions of armament, 
of immigration, and of the future British-Ameri- 
can relations, that have influenced the opinion in 
the United States, do not enter into China's con- 
sideration. The interests of the United States in 
the future of the alliance grow out of the possi- 
bilities of danger that a renewal of the alliance 
would involve; they are largely indirect. The in- 
terests of China are those which are plainly stated 
in the alliance treaty; they are direct. While the 
opposition in the United States has apparently in- 
fluenced the opinion of the Dominion statesmen at 
the Imperial Conference and consequently deferred 
action by the British Government on the continua- 
tion of the alliance, it is not known to what extent 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 21 

the opposition by China has been responsible for 
its postponement. 

Here we have a triangular dilemma, if it can 
be so called. Japan has been very anxious for an 
extension of the alliance, but has found obstacles 
in its way. Great Britain is not any too enthusiastic 
over the renewal of the alliance, but she is frankly 
unwilling to throw over her Far Eastern ally. And 
China — the one Power most vitally concerned in 
the matter — has protested loudly against the re- 
newal of the alliance, but her words are discounted, 
unheeded, if not unheard. It is evident that each 
of the three Powers has its own preference in the 
matter, but none of them sees its way clear to 
realise it. Is there a solution of the dilemma? 
Or must the Anglo-Japanese alliance be forever 
consigned tO' the anomalous state wherein its 
incompatibility with the League Covenant is 
recognised, but its terms are said to remain in 
force ? 

An unusually happy alternative is found in 
President Harding's proposition for a conference 
on the limitation of armaments and on the Pacific 
and Far Eastern problems, which, though not very 
pleasing to Japan, is heartily welcomed by China 
and Great Britain. On July 10, just at the time 
when the world was in the dark as to what has be- 
come of the Anglo- Japanese alliance, the following 
official statement was issued by the United States, 
giving reasons for the proposition of the confer- 



22 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

ence and expressing hopes for its possible accomH 
plishment : 

"The President, in view of the far-reaching im-' 
portance of the question of hmitation of armament, j 
has approached with informal but definite inquiries the | 
group of powers heretofore known as the principals 
allied and associated powers, that is. Great Britain, \ 
France, Italy and Japan, to ascertain whether it would i 
be agreeable to them to take part in a conference on j 
this subject, to be held in Washington at a time to be ! 
mutually agreed upon. If the proposal is found to be : 
acceptable, formal invitations for such a conference j 
will be issued. ) 

"It is manifest that the question of limitation of i 
armament has a close relation to Pacific and Far '■ 
Eastern problems, and the President has suggested i 
that the powers especially interested in these problems \ 
should undertake in connection with this conference | 
the consideration of all matters bearing upon their solu- i 
tion with a view to reaching a common understanding { 
with respect to principles and policies in the Far East, j 
This has been communicated to the powers concerned, ; 
and China has also been invited to take part in the : 
discussion relating to Far Eastern problems." l 

This proposal for a conference on the limitation j 
of armaments, which is also to discuss Pacific and \ 
Far Eastern problems, came as a timely relief to | 
Great Britain, who has found herself in an embar- \ 
rassing position because of the pressure by Japan . : 
on the one hand for the renewal of the alliance, and j 
of the opposition by Canada and South Africa to | 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 23 

iits continuance on the other. China has welcomed 
the conference, for the fact that she is among the 
Powers invited assures her the opportunity of pre- 
senting her views on the future of the Anglo- 
Japanese alliance, the disposition of which will cer- 
tainly be one of the Pacific and Far Eastern prob- 
lems to be discussed. To Japan, of course, this 
idea of an armament conference is not very pleas- 
ing, but she could ill afford to decline a proposal 
which has already been accep1;pd by all the other 
Powers invited. 

It may not be without interest to add here that, 
while the proposal is a welcomed invitation to 
Great Britain, it is by no means a surprise to her. 
In fact, the idea of a Pacific conference was ger- 
minated by British statesmen themselves, who have 
seen in it the desired opportunity of getting rid 
of the alliance without hurting Japanese suscepti- 
bilities too much. At the Imperial Conference, 
General Smuts expressed the opinion, which was 
warmly endorsed by Premier Massey of New 
Zealand, that the results to be expected from the 
renewal of the alliance could be secured equally 
well from a conference of the Powers interested 
in the Pacific. This idea was later brought out 
again and again in the debates in the Parliament. 
On July 7, in answer to a question as to the prog- 
ress of the negotiation for the renewal of the al- 
liance, Premier Lloyd George said that he was 
waiting to hear from China and the United States, 



24 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

hinting directly at the negotiations then going on 
for the proposal of the Pacific conference. It is 
largely due to the initiative of the United States, 
however, that the proposal for the conference was 
finally formulated, and on July 10, announced.* 
It is also due to the initiative of the United States 
that China, France and Italy have been invited to 
participate in the conference, f 

The question now remains: what action will the 
conference take in regard to the Anglo- Japanese 
alliance ? Will Japan and Great Britain be allowed 
to renew the compact in its present form, or with 
modifications ? Can a general agreement be reached 
by all the Powers interested in the Pacific and the 
Far East so as to take the place of the alliance? 
Italy and France are but slightly interested in the 
question. The future of the alliance depends as 
much upon the wishes of China and the United 
States as upon those of the contracting Powers 
themselves. 

* Prior to the issuance of the proposal, President Harding, 
in a letter to Mr. Mondell, the Repubhcan leader in the 
House, appealed for an expression of opinion favourable to 
the limitation of armaments through international agreement. 
The Borah amendment, which had previously passed the Sen- 
ate, authorising the President to invite Japan and Great 
Britain to a conference for the purpose of reducing their 
naval expenditures for the next five years, was, as a result 
of the appeal, also passed in the House on June 29 by a vote 
of 330 to 4. The passage of the amendment by such a large 
rnajority must have encouraged the President in making 
"informal but definite inquiries" about the conference on the 
limitation of armaments. 

t Belgium, Holland, and Spain have also been invited to 
participate in the discussions on the Pacific and Far Eastern 
questions. 



II 

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE, 1902 

POLITICS makes strange bed-fellows, it has 
been often observed. If this is true with 
individuals, it is equally true with nations. 
Or, how can we account for the conclusion of the 
alliance between Japan and Great Britain in 1902? 

The story of the Anglo-Japanese alliance has all 
the elements of a romance. Born out of a com- 
mon desire of Japan and Great Britain to defend 
their vital interests in the Far East, which were 
being seriously menaced towards the end of the 
nineteenth century by the slow but steady encroach- 
ment by Russia in Manchuria, North China, and 
Korea, it was not^ however, consummated until a 
series of political vicissitudes and diplomatic re- 
verses, which both Powers had suffered, convinced 
them of the community of their interests and the 
advantages of a defensive alliance. 

It is an open secret that, long before ever con- 
sidering Japan as a worthy partner. Great Britain 
had riveted her eyes upon China, whom she had 
regarded as a potential ally, rich, populous, and 
strong enough to cope with the Russian Colossus. 
These two countries, Russia and Great Britain, had 
been traditional enemies. Their interests conflicted 

25 



26 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

in the Far^East, in the Middle East, and in the 
Near East. Russia was in secret alliance with 
France ever since 1891, and with the assistance of 
her ally, she was able to have everything very 
much in her own way, in Europe as well as in the 
East. On the other hand, without a political part- 
ner, Great Britain was forced to play a lone hand 
in all Eastern affairs. It was then, as it is to-day, 
a cardinal point of the British foreign policy to 
defend British interests in India at all cost. The 
Russian menace to the security of India occupied 
the attention of all British diplomats and states- 
men. It is, therefore, easily understandable why 
Great Britain had looked upon China as a possible 
and potential ally. 

In 1894 broke out the Chino-Japanese War in 
'' which China was badly defeated. The Chinese 
giant was shown to be built with feet of clay, 
unable to stand up in the defence of her own in- 
terests, not to say those of Great Britain. There 
was no doubt that Great Britain was disappointed 
in the absolute feebleness of China not suspected 
before, but she found encouragement in the dis- 
covery that, in the Far East, there was at least one 
Power whose growing strength might yet be turned 
to good account. '^ 

y *"The Anglo-Japanese alliance would have been an Anglo- 
Chinese alliance, if China had won the Sino-Japanese War," 
said Mr. Tang Shaoyi, in an interview with a special cor- 
respondent of the New York Tribune, which was published 
in that paper, under a Shanghai date, June 12, 1920. "Great 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 27 

Following the Chino- Japanese War was a pe- 
riod of international scramble in which Russia 
was the most conspicuous figure. With the estab- 
lishment of the Russo-Chinese Bank and the com- 
mencement of the construction of the Chinese East- 
em Railway, Russian influence in Manchuria be- 
gan to assume the most menacing aspect. Her lease 
of Port Arthur and Talienwan only served to 
make her influence more complete, and her po- 
sition in Manchuria more impregnable. Now 
keenly realising that it was to the interest of 
British commerce that Manchuria should not fall 
into the han<is of Russia, Great Britain began to 
place herself in readiness to meet the Muscovite 
challenge. She looked around once again for a 
diplomatic partner, and her choice could not have 
been more unfortunate. Germany was picked as 
her help-mate in the struggle against Russia. On 
October 16, 1900, the Anglo-German agreement, 
commonly called the *' Yangtze Valley agreement" 
in Germany, was concluded and signed by Lord 



Britain made overtures to China shortly before the Sino- 
Japanese War through her minister to Peking, Mr. Mac- 
Donald. He asked China to enter into an understanding with 
Great Britain. China at that time was afraid of Russia, and 
the Peking Government did not wish to make any entangling 
alliances. Then came the Sino-Japanese War, and Great 
Britain watched carefully to see which nutxJn would become 
the better ally. To the victor belonged me alliance, and 
Japan won the war. MacDonald was immediately transferred 
from Peking to the Embassy at Tokio. The result was the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance. That is a point that has not been 
touched upon in tracing the origin of the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance." 



28 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

Salisbury on behalf of Great Britain and Count 
Hatzfeldt, German Ambassador at London, on be- 
half of Germany. From the British point of view, 
the agreement was entered into with implicit under- 
standing of being used as an instrument to check- 
mate Russian advances in Manchuria. The United 
/-States was invited to join, but the invitation was 
declined. Japan saw advantage in the agreement, 
and adhered to it as one of its original signato- 
ries. 

Nothing was further from the intention of Ger- 
many, however, than to use the agreement, as Japan 
and Great Britain both thought it could be used, 
as an instrument to checkmate Russian activities 
in Manchuria. On March 15, 1901, von Bulow, 
then Chancellor of Germany, declared before the 
Reichstag that "the Anglo-German agreement had 
no reference to Manchuria," where Germany had 
no political or economic interest to speak of. Ger- 
many refused, therefore, to apply the agreement to 
Manchuria. 

With this refusal, no doubt, both Japan and 
Great Britain were sadly disappointed. The two 
Powers were thus driven to look for new diplo- 
matic partners. But, in view of the political situa- 
tion existing then, what countries would be willing 
to join their hands? Russia was the very Power 
whose moves on the Manchurian field both Japan 
and Great Britain were more anxious to check. 
Germany, much preferred by Japan as an ally be- 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 29 

cause of her military strength, proved such a disap- 
pointment that, unless she could show a consider- 
able change of heart, it was absolutely futile to ap- 
proach her again. For France there was no consid- 
eration at all as a political partner, for, through 
her alliance with Russia, she was tied hard and 
fast to the wheels of Russian diplomacy in the 
Near East as well as in the Far East. Italy might 
be willing to join hands either with Japan or with 
Great Britain. Owing to the comparatively insig- 
nificant amount of material interest she had in 
China, however, and owing to the relatively small 
diplomatic influence that she could exert in Peking, 
any political combination with Italy would con- 
tribute very little indeed to the ultimate realisation 
of the aims which Japan and Great Britain had in 
view. And the only Power vitally interested in 
the affairs in China and capable of being an ef- 
fective ally of Japan and Great Britain in the Far 
East was the United States. But the United States, 
as everybody knows, had then, as she has to-day, 
a greater respect for the injunctions which Wash- 
ington and Jefferson had handed down of keeping 
away from entangling alliances than for interna- 
tional political combinations, which constituted an 
essential part of the state system of Europe, but 
not of America. Apparently, therefore, there was 
a dearth of suitable partners, who could join the 
hands either of Japan, or of Great Britain, or of 
both, in their endeavour to protect their political 



30 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

and economic interests in China seriously menaced 
by Russian designs. 

In the face of such a situation, two alternatives 
were possible. Both Japan and Great Britain could 
endeavour to effect an understanding with Russia, 
so as to avoid all possible causes of conflict. If 
they should fail in this attempt, or if they should 
deem it impossible and impracticable, they could 
bring about a combination between themselves for 
the purposes which they had in view. 

Now it was an open secret that in Japan there 
were at that time two groups of statesmen, holding 
very different views in regard to her international 
policy. One group, composed of Marquis Ito, 
Count Inouye, Count Katsura, and Marquis. Yama- 
gata, and other influential members of the Genro, 
was strongly in favour of coming to an under- 
standing with Russia herself, respecting their mu- 
tual ambitions and aims in Manchuria and Korea. 
The other group, composed of Count Hayashi, 
Count Komura, Viscount Sone, and other political 
leaders of less prominence, was pro-British in senti- 
ment, and was, therefore, most strenuous in their 
endeavour to effect an Anglo-Japanese understand- 
ing. The first group held the opinion that ques- 
tions concerning Korea and Manchuria could be 
best settled between Japan and Russia alone, and 
that any political arrangement without taking Rus- 
sia into consideration was no settlement at all. 
The Elder statesmen were not, at any rate, prepared 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 31 

to go into an alliance with Great Britain. It was 
their belief that, in view of the traditional policy 
of isolation of Great Britain, it was most unlikely 
that Japan could rely upon her for assistance in 
time of need. On the other hand, the younger 
statesmen of Japan were firm in their belief that 
any satisfactory understanding was impossible with 
Russia, and that the only way to bring her to terms 
was to conclude an alliance with Great Britain 
whose interests in China and Korea were said to 
be identical with those of Japan. 

Rightly or wrongly, they believed that, if Russia 
were faithful in her international obligations, the 
YamagatajLobam^fLHotocol of_M ay 28^8 96, an d - 
the Rosen-Nis si Agreement o f April 13 , 1898, 
which, were, as far as Japan was concerned, still 
satisfactory, should be faithfully observed by both 
Powers. The fact that Russia had been playing 
fast and loose with them indicated how little her 
words could be trusted. 

In England, the opinion was equally divided. On 
the one hand, it was maintained that Great Britain 
should continue her policy of isolation and inde- 
pendence, keeping her hands free, remaining the 
absolute master of her own fate, and trusting to 
her own force for the protection of her political 
and economic interests in China. It was pointed 
out that, if any understanding could be arrived at 
with Russia, it would be well and good, and if it 
were not possible, any arrangement with Japan re- 



32 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

sembling anything like an alliance would be a per- 
petual source of provocation to Russia. Besides, 
the idea of ever entering intO' a diplomatic com- ; 
bination with Japan was said to be most "un- 
English," and no matter whatever its plausible ob- 
jects might be, an Anglo-Japanese alliance would 
be bound to incur the severe condemnation of the 
whole Christendom. On the other hand, the opin- 
ion was equally strong that new factors of inter- 
national politics demanded a re-consideration of 
Great Britain's traditional foreign policy. The fact 
that she was without an ally in any part of the 
world, upon whom she could rely for help and as- 
sistance in the protection of her imperial interests, 
suggested most strongly the advisability of effecting i 
a partnership with the rising Power of the Far I 
East, whose strength could not be questioned. i 
This opinion was held by a large number of j 
British statesmen, and was most eloquently voiced] 
/by Sir Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, in a speech in the | 
House of Commons on the conduct of British for- 1 
eign policy. "It must have occurred to every one," j 
he said on March 1, 1898, "that, during the past ■ 
five years — since 1893 — this country has been j 
steadily pushed down-hill in many parts of Africa, j 
in Asia, and in other quarters of the globe. There \ 
is not a single case that I know of in which this ; 
country has been able to make effective response | 
to foreign encroachment or aggression. I need j 
only mention African-West, Central, East, and j 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 33 

South — Madagascar, Siam, Tunis, the North West- 
ern frontier of India, China, South and North, the 
Ottoman Empire, and the Mediterranean. Every- 
where there has been British retreat and British 
repulse. Why is this ? It is not the result of acci- 
dent. There are two reasons for it. In the first 
place, the deliberate attack, or encroachment, which 
has been made upon British interests by the great 
Russo-French combination which has been and is 
being felt everywhere; and in the second place, the 
injurious and insane, and the most mischievous 
change of policy which took place in 1893, when 
this coimtry began alienating its ancient allies, 
which has left it in a state of practical isolation 
ever since. It is the fact that ever since 1893 we 
have not had a single ally in either Eastern or 
Western Europe, or elsewhere, that is necessary to 
our foreign policy, and, until that great mistake is 
retrieved, until we return to the ancient alliances 
of this country, which are based not on sentimental 
imagination or popular outcry, but upon mutual 
and common interests, there is no hope that this 
country will succeed." 

"We have heard the splendid isolation of Eng- 
land, but England cannot, against an armed Eu- 
rope, stand alone; England, with the richest and 
most coveted possessions in the world, must be a 
prey to the ambitions of other nations." And then 
he went on to point out the impossibility of Great 
Britain facing alone the great combination of Rus- 



V 



34 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES ' 

i 

sia and France, and possibly of Germany, and em- | 
phasising the fact that in Japan, the rising Power ] 
in the Far East, Great Britain could find a political ■■ 
partner, whose interests in Korea and China were | 
more or less like those of her own. "I consider,'* J 
he continued, ''the rise of the Japanese power in ^ 
the East has been very providential for this coun- j 
try. I do not know what our position would have j 
been now if we had to face a combination of Rus- ( 
sia and France, and possibly of Germany as well, | 
in the Far East. There is a very great and strong ' 
power growing up in Japan, and by the help of ; 
Japan alone can we retain our position in the ^ 
Northern Pacific." And Sir Ellis also emphasised i 
the point that by concluding an alliance with Japan, • 
the position of Great Britain in the Far East would j 
become practically invincible. ''By sea, the Eng- j 
lish and Japanese fleets are absolute masters of the I 
position. By land, with the aid of the Japanese j 
army, we are equally masters of the position." It \ 
was with this obvious result in view that Sir Ellis, j 
like so many of his countrymen at that time, urged 1 
the conclusion of an Anglo- Japanese alliance. | 
While both Japan and Great Britain were yet ' 
uncertain as to the wisdom of such a novel com- 1 
bination, balancing in their minds the advantages i 
and disadvantages that were likely to ensue there- ; 
from, the political events in the Far East were i 
moving at such vertiginous speed as to allow but I 
little time for hesitation or deliberation. The lease I 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 35 

by Russia of Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan was 
immediately followed by the lease of Wei-hai-wei 
by Great Britain for as long a period as Russia 
would remain in Port Arthur. The animosity be- 
tween the two Powers was aggravated by their 
struggles for railway and mining concessions in 
China, and it took on the colour of actual hostility 
against each other, when Russia, in consequence 
of the outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion, occupied 
South Manchuria and disregarded the treaty rights 
of British subjects and of the other nationals in 
the region. Japan was also alarmed by Russian 
activities in Korea, where she had claimed para- 
mount interest. The attempt by Russia, though 
futile in its result, to lease a Korean port com- 
manding the Japanese Strait, served to intensify 
the fear which the Japanese Government and peo- 
ple had alike of Muscovite designs. And the re- 
peated failure on the part of Russia to keep her 
promise to wtihdraw her troops from Manchuria, 
and the invidious diplomacy which she had adopted 
in her dealings with the feeble Government at 
Peking^ — ^diplomacy of the kind given expression 
in the Alexieff-Tseng Agreement, the Lamsdorff- 
Yang-yu Agreement, and in M. Lessar's demands 
in August, 1901, exasperated not only China, who 
was weak and had therefore but little to say, but 
also Japan and Great Britain, who were anxious 
to protect their own rights and interests. 

All these events served more and more to 



36 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

estrange Russia from Japan and Great Britain, and 
at the same time, drew the latter Powers closer 
and closer together. The repudiation by Germany 
of the Anglo-German Agreement of October 16, 
1900, by refusing to apply it to Manchuria, drove 
the two Powers into each other's arms. They 
realised that there was a dearth of suitable part- 
ners, and that if any political combination were 
to be eflfected, it could be made only between them- 
selves. They looked each other squarely in the 
face, and decided, owing to a strange community 
of interests in China, to bind each other in a defen- 
sive alliance. The result was the conclusion, after 
numerous exchanges of views between the two 
Governments, of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 
January 30, 1902. 

It is needless to add that the alliance would not 
have been so easily brought about had it not been 
for the new factors coming in for considertaion. 
In the first place, it should be noted that Count 
Tadasu Hayashi, one of the most enthusiastic ex- 
ponents of an Anglo- Japanese understanding, was 
appointed Japanese Minister at the Court of St. 
James. His diplomatic position afforded him the 
necessary opportunity to discuss with Lord Lans- 
downe. Lord Salisbury, and other members of the 
British Government the possibility as well as the 
advisability of coming to a binding understanding 
between the two countries. These discussions were, 
of course, carried on by Count Hayashi on his own 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 37 

intiative, though with the knowledge and approval 
of his home Government. And the second factor 
in the situation, which accelerated the negotiations 
on the Anglo-Japanese alliance, was the mission to 
Europe, headed by no less a personage than Marquis 
Ito, the foremost statesman of Japan at that time. 
It was generally assumed that he had in his pocket 
a proposal for a Russo-Japanese understanding, 
which he was to take up with the Russian Govern- 
ment upon his arrival at St. Petersburg. Officially, 
Marquis Ito took this trip for the purpose of im- 
proving his health; but the fact that he was to go 
to St. Petersburg during the Winter of 1901 — the 
Russian capital which enjoys no particular reputa- 
tion as a health resort^ especially in the Winter 
season, behed his ostensible purpose. Indeed, the 
British Government was frankly fearful that Japan 
might negotiate an alliance with Russia before the 
Anglo-Japanese negotiations could be brought to 
a successful end. 

Sagacious diplomat as he was. Count Hayashi 
was quick to play the trump card that was placed 
in his hands. "I came to the conclusion," he ad- 
mitted in his own Memoirs, ''that the British states- 
men sincerely desired an alliance treaty, but were 
fearful of the conclusion of a convention between 
Japan and Russia. I thought, therefore, that we 
might take advantage of that fear on England's 
part, and by pretending that an agreement would 
be negotiated with Russia hasten on the conclusion 



38 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

of the treaty with Great Britain." * The pretence 
was used with great effect. After a few exchanges 
of views as to the preliminary draft, the treaty was | 
finally concluded on January 30, 1902. In coming i 
to the agreement, the Governments of Japan and ] 
Great Britain were said to be "actuated solely by a | 
desire to maintain the status quo and general peace | 
in the extreme East," "the independence and terri- | 
torial integrity of the Empire of China and the j 
Empire of Korea," and "equal opportunities in 1 
those countries for the commerce and industry | 
of all nations." Among other things, it recognised \ 
the independence of China and Korea; it admitted j 
the rights of Japan and Great Britain to "take such ^ 
measures as may be indispensable" in order to safe- I 
guard their "special interests" in China and Korea; j 
it provided for the neutrality of Great Britain in j 
case Japan was involved in war with one single . 
Power, and for British assistance when more than i 
one Power joined in hostilities against Japan, Lord [ 
Lansdowne was asked to explain "why under this i 
agreement do you undertake to protect Japan in : 
the defence of the interests which are recognised 1 
under the agreement if she be attacked by two | 
Powers, whereas you do not undertake to come to ■-, 
her assistance if she be attacked by only one 1 
Power ?" In reply, he said : "The answer seemed ; 
to me to be an obvious one. We desire to protect i 

*A. M. Pooley, 'The Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu ' 
Hayashi," p. 129. 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 39 

Japan against what we may conceive to be the great- 
est peril which might menace her and that would 
certainly be a coalition of other Powers. Japan 
has a strong Navy and a strong Army, and might 
very fairly expect to hold her own in a single- 
handed encounter with any other Power ; but if she 
were to be threatened with an attack by more than 
one Power she would undoubtedly be in imminent 
peril ; and it is in that imminent peril that we desire 
to come to her succour." 

In this connection, it may be of interest to know 
how the alliance was received in the Parliament 
and how the statesmen responsible for its conclu- 
sion defended it. Lord Lansdowne, in answer to 
a question put to him in the House of Lords on 
February 13, 1902, as to the reasons why Great 
Britain thus abandoned her traditional policy of 
isolation, said: 



"I think it is true that in recent years international 
agreements involving assistance on the part of this 
country to other Powers have been generally regarded 
with considerable suspicion and misgiving; but I say 
frankly we are not going to be deterred by these con- 
siderations, or to admit for a moment that because this 
Agreement does involve a new departure it is there- 
fore open to adverse criticism. 

"I do not think that any one can have watched the 
recent course of events in different parts of the world 
without realising that many of the arguments which 



40 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

a generation ago might have been adduced in support 
of a policy of isolation have ceased to be entitled to 
the sam;e consideration now. What do we see on all 
sides? We observe a tendency on the part of the 
great Powers to form groups. We observe a tendency 
to over-increasing naval and military armaments in- 
volving ever-increasing burdens upon the people for 
the defence of whose countries these armaments are 
accumulated. There is also this — that in these days 
war breaks out with a suddenness which was unknown 
in former days, when nations were not, as they are 
now, armed to the teeth and ready to enter on hos- 
tilities at any moment. When we consider these fea- 
tures of international situation, we must surely feel 
that that country would indeed be endowed with an 
extraordinary amount of what I might call self-suffi- 
ciency which took upon itself to say that it would ac- 
cept, without question, without reservation, the doc- 
trine that all foreign alliances were to be avoided as 
necessarily embarrassing and objectionable. There- 
fore I would entreat your Lordships to look at this 
matter strictly on its merits, and not to allow your 
judgment to be swayed by any musty formulas or old- 
fashioned superstitions as to the desirability of pur- 
suing a policy of isolation for this country. If con- 
sidered on its merits, I venture to suggest that what 
you have to take into account in regard to an alliance 
of this kind is, first, whether the ally is a desirable 
ally, and in the next place whether the objects of the 
alliance are commendable, and last, but not least, 
whether the price you pay for the alliance is greater 
than you ought to pay. If these questions can be satis- 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 41 

factorily answered, then I say the alliance is not a bad 
thing for the country, but, on the contrary, is a good 
thing; for prima facie if there be no countervailing 
objections, the country which has the good fortune to 
possess allies is more to be envied than the country 
which is without them." 

Lord Lansdowne did not take upon himself to 
show that as an ally Japan was desirable, but he 
simply reminded the House that that nation had 
been in the past referred to in the warmest terms. 
He then went on to answer the other two questions 
which he had set before the House : 

"Then as to the object of the alliance. They are 
stated very clearly on the face of the Agreement. They 
are, in the first place, the maintenance of the status quo 
in the Far East; in the second place, they are the 
maintenance of that commercial policy which is for 
convenience usually described as the policy of the 
open door; and I think I may say that the third object 
of the Agreement is the maintenance of that which 
seems to me to be a very valuable interest to us indeed 
— the maintenance of peace of that part of the world 
to which the Agreement applies. These are not objects 
desired by this country alone. I believe I shall be cor- 
rect when I say, speaking in general terms, that the 
whole of the great Powers with whom we have been 
in constant communication in the last few years in 
regard to the affairs of China, that all of these Powers 
have at one time or another given their adhesion to 
the policy of the status quo and the policy of equal 



42 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

commercial opportunities for all countries in the Far 
East. 

"There is, therefore, nothing in this Agreement 
that does violence to the policy which has been ac- 
cepted by other great Powers. Then is it the case 
that we are paying an excessive price for this alliance ? 
I understood the noble Earl (Spencer) to say that he 
well understood our feelings towards Japan, but that 
he was unable to understand why it was necessary to 
resort to an international agreement of this descrip- 
tion in order to give effect to our policy. Well, my 
Lords, I venture to say that if it is indeed our policy 
to support Japan, to protect against the danger of a 
coalition of other Powers, I do not think we can avow 
it too frankly or too distinctly ; and, to my mind, there 
is a much greater danger in leaving important ques- 
tions of international poHcy of this kind to vague and 
hazy understandings than there is in embodying them 
explicitly in an Agreement, the purport of which can- 
not possibly be misunderstood by those concerned." 

In a covering despatch to Sir Claude MacDonald, 
at that time British Minister at Tokio, Lord Lans- 
downe said: "This Agreement may be regarded as 
the outcome of the events which have taken place 
during the past two years in the Far East, and of 
the part taken by Great Britain and Japan in deal- 
ing with them.* This statement was not quite ac- 



* The British Parliamentary Papers, Treaty Series, No. 3, 
1902 : Agreement between the United Kingdom and Japan 
relative to China and Korea, signed at London, January 30, 
1902. Vide also Appendix B. 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 43 

curate. Whatever might have been the immediate 
cause of the conclusion of the Anglo- Japanese al- 
liance — of which there v^ere many, as we have 
shown above, it was admitted on all hands that the 
genesis of the alliance went further back than two 
years. As a matter of fact, the Anglo-Japanese 
flirtations had been going on in no uncertain fash- 
ion even before the conclusion of the Chino-Japa- 
nese War, when Great Britain made up her mind 
that China was not strong enough tO' be trusted 
as an ally against the Muscovites. At that time, 
international philandering ,was of the most Platonic 
sort, and no concrete result was expected there- 
from. In 1895, Great Britain refused to take part 
in the three-Powers intervention to keep Japan out 
of Liaotung peninsula. A year before. Great 
Britain consented to a revision of her treaties with 
Japan, and to the abolition of the extra-territorial 
jurisdiction, thus according her a cordial and full 
recognition of her place among the family of na- 
tions. In return for these favours, Japan was will- 
ing to withdraw her troops from Wei-hai-wei so 
as to make it possible for British occupation. In 
1899, Japan exerted her influence to arrange for a 
British concession in Newchwang. And in 1900, 
upon the outbreak of the Boxer Insurrection, the 
two Powers conducted themselves in perfect har- 
mony, both during the campaign and throughout 
the negotiations for peace. In the year following, 
negotiation for the conclusion of the alliance was 



44 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES \ 

taken up by Count Hayashi and Lord Lansdowne, i 
with the result already known. ] 

The Anglo-Japanese alliance treaty was said to j 
be a remarkable document, "the like of which is j 
seldom seen in history, especially when it is con- 
sidered that it united reciprocally two nations \ 
widely apart in race, religion, and history, one of ^ 
which had rarely in time of peace entered into a ; 
regular alliance with a European Power." * It was \ 
truly said that for the first time in her history that 
Great Britain had concluded a defensive alliance : 
of this sort with a foreign Power, and indeed it j 
was the first time in modern history of the world ] 
that a European Power had concluded an alliance, \ 
not with an Occidental, but with an Oriental i 
Power. \ 

But what effect or effects did the alhance have ; 
upon the general course of events in the Far East? ] 
How were the Contracting Powers benefited by it? ! 
What bearing did it have upon the future of China? \ 
And how much did it contribute to the maintenance 
of the Open Door policy? All international agree- \ 
ments, this and the others to come, in order to I 
ascertain their true purport, must be analysed to ' 
answer these questions. 

Speaking of the effects of the alliance as far as ! 
Japan was concerned, we cannot do any better than ] 
quoting a Japanese writer. Dr. T. lyenaga, who ; 
has been for years a semi-official spokesman for the '• 

* K. Asakawa, "The Russo-Japanese Conflict," p. 202. 



AND THE ANGLO- JAPANESE ALLIANCE 45 

Japanese Government in the United States, and 
the Director of the East and West News Bureau 
in New York City. "Leaving the treatment of the 
effects of the treaty on England to English writers, 
from a Japanese standpoint it seems that the agree- 
ment safeguards Japan's position in Korea, it 
greatly relieves her from working under the night- 
mare of a European coalition against her, it en- 
hances her advice (sic) with that of England at 
the Court of Peking, and it adds to the weight of 
whatever Japan may undertake to do in foreign 
relations." * Indeed, it would come as a natural 
consequence of the consummation of the alliance 
that Japan, having thus allied herself with a world 
Power, or with "the strongest naval Power" in the 
world then, would take her full part in the game 
of world politics. 

On the other hand, the advantages which Great 
Britain hoped for from the alliance were not so 
definable. Generally speaking, it helped to improve 
her diplomatic prestige abroad, and placed her in 
a well fortified position where she could direct her 
offensive and defensive operations. It has been 
generally held, but very erroneously, that from the 
British point of view, the object of the alliance was y^ 
to provide against a Russian invasion in India. 
This waS'the avowed object of the second and the 
third alliances, with which we shall deal in later 
chapters, but certainly not that of the first alliance 
* The American Review of Reviews, April, 1902, p. 461. 



46 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES | 

I 
treaty (the text may be found in the appendix), ^ 

in which not a word was said about India at all. \ 

In fact, according to Count Hayashi's memoirs, \ 

India was purposely excluded from the sphere of ; 

operation of the alliance on the ground that, inas- ; 

much as Japan had no material interests there, to 

include the British Indian Empire in the scope of i 

the alliance would mean too much responsibility \ 

for her. The alliance, it is true, was directed I 

against Russia; but the published version of the t 

treaty gives no ground for thinking or believing ] 

that it provided against Russian menace to India. ; 

On the very contrary, it was distinctly stated in the 

treaty that the "special interests" of Great Britain ■ 

related "principally to China.'' An English writer, j 

whose competency to speak on such a subject has 1 

been well recognised, observed that from the British I 

point of view, the making of the Anglo- Japanese ; 

alliance in 1902 "was a wise and necessary meas- ] 

ure, intended to check the encroachments of Russia . 

upon Northern China and to safeguard our com- ; 

mercial interests in that region." * 

But the question remains: HJow was Great ; 

Britain benefited by the alliance? Did the combi- | 

nation with the Island Empire of the East really | 

improve the prestige of the Island Empire of the ; 

West? "In general," it was shrewdly observed, ; 

"an alliance does not add to a nation's prestige; t 

j 

*J. O. p. Bland, "Recent Events and Present Policies in ; 
China," p. 291. . i 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 47 

it is a confession of weakness rather than an evi- 
dence of strength." * The alliance was attracted 
by the rising power in Japan, and, as Sir Ellis 
Ashmead-Bartlett had observed, by the prospect 
that, through a naval and military combination, 
both Powers would be placed in an invincible po- 
sition. 

That the alliance was directed against Russia and 
against her sinister activities in Northern China and 
Korea was well realised by herself and by her ally. 
This was evidenced by the sardonic declaration by 
the Governments of Russia and France, which the 
conclusion of the alliance elicited. The two Gov- 
ernments, after due consultation on the subject, 
made this declaration on March 17, 1902 : 

"The allied Governments of Russia and France 
have received a copy of the Anglo- Japanese Agree- 
ment of the 30th January, 1902, concluded with 
the object of maintaining the status quo and the 
general peace in the Far East, and preserving the 
independence of China and Korea, which are to 
remain open to the commerce and industry of all 
nations, and have been fully satisfied to find therein 
affirmed the fundamental principles which they 
have themselves, on several occasions, declared to 
form the basis of their policy, and still remain so. 

"The two Governments consider that the ob- 
servance of these principles is at the same time a 
guarantee of their special interests in the Far East. 
* Prof. Edwin Maxey, "The Arena," May, 1902, p. 453. 



^ 



48 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

Nevertheless, being obliged themselves also to take 
into consideration the case in which either the ag- 
gressive action of third Powers, or the recurrence 
of disturbances in China jeopardising the integrity 
and free development of that Power, might become 
a menace to their own interests, the two allied Gov- 
ernments reserve to themselves the right to con- 
sult in that contingency as to the means to be 
adopted for securing those interests.'' 

The St. Petersburg Messager OMciel published 
three days later (March 20, 1901) the Franco- 
Russian Declaration, together with an official state- 
ment that the Government of Russia, in spite of 
the comments in diplomatic circles and in some of 
the continental newspapers to the contrary, had, 
received the announcement of the Anglo-Japanese: 
alliance "with the most perfect calm" and had ac- 
corded it the most cordial reception inasmuch as the 
object of the alliance was the very one which Rus- 
sia had always insisted upon, namely, the preserva- 
tion of the independence and integrity of China: 
and Korea. "Russia desires the preservation of \ 
the status quo" the statement continued to say, j 
"and general peace in the Far East, by the con- ; 
struction of the great Siberian Railroad, together ; 
with its branch line through Manchuria, toward a \ 
port always ice-free. Russia aids in the extension 
in these regions of the commerce and industry of 
the whole world. Would it be to her interest to 
put forward obstacles at the present time? The 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 49 

intention expressed by Great Britain and Japan to 
attain those same objects, which have invariably 
been pursued by the Russian Government, can 
meet with nothing but sympathy in Russia, in spite 
of the comments in certain poHtical spheres and in 
some of the foreign newspapers, which endeavoured 
to present in quite a different light the impassive 
attitude of the Imperial Government toward a dip- 
lomatic act which, in its eyes, does not change in 
any way the general situation of the political 
horizon." 

This Russian statement was significant for it ex- 
plained what Russia had conceived to be the status 
quo in the extreme East, that the Contracting 
Parties of the alliance expressed it to be their de- 
sire to maintain. "We have each of us desired," 
said Lord Lansdowne in his covering letter to^ Sir 
MacDonald, "that the integrity and independence 
of the Chinese Empire should be preserved, that 
there should be no disturbance of the territorial 
status quo either in China or in the adjoining re- 
gions, that all nations should, within those regions, 
as well as 'within the limits of the Chinese Empire, 
be afforded equal opportunities for the development 
of their commerce and industry, and that peace 
should not only be restored, but should, for the 
future, be maintained." In other words, what 
Great Britain had meant by status quo was the 
maintenance of the territorial and commercial con- 
ditions existing in China, and in the adjoining 



50 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

regions. What Russia had understood by status 

quo was the preservation of the special rights and 1 

privileges which she had in Manchuria and North- , 

ern China. It was curious that the Russian Gov- j 

ernment did not interpret the status quo as to mean ] 

continuous occupation by Russian forces of Man- i 

churia. At the time when the Anglo-Japanese Treaty ; 

was concluded, January 30, 1902, the Russian troops ! 

were still in occupation of Manchuria. In the j 

absence of a clear definition of the status quo, Rus- j 

sia would have more than legitimate ground if she j 

should decide to continue her occupation of Man- : 

churia in order to be in conformity with the \ 

avowed object of the alliance! i 

The most striking, as well as the most important j 

for our purpose, of the provisions of the alliance j 

treaty and of its objects, was the ostensible attempt > 

by the Contracting Parties to preserve the inde- ' 

pendence and integrity of China and to maintain | 

equal opportunities "for the commerce and industry | 

of all nations." How far they were successful in \ 

this attempt is a question, which cannot be an- ^ 

swered at this stage of our narrative without an- ; 

ticipating the long train of events. For our pur- > 

pose, it is sufficient to say here, that the Anglo- > 

Japanese alliance, whatever might be said for or : 

against it, and whatever might be its hidden or ' 

yopen motives, was to us nothing less than an asser- | 

y Aion of Japanese and British spheres^ of interest in ; 

/ China, an open challenge to Russia, and a distinct ; 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 51 

violation of the spirit of the Open Door policy. It 
was true, indeed, that the High Contracting Parties 
"recognised the independence of China and Korea" 
and declared themselves "to be entirely uninflu- 
enced by any aggressive tendencies in either coun- 
try." But did they not also declare that, in view 
of their special interests in China and Korea, "the 
High Contracting Parties recognise that it will be 
admissible for either of them to take such measures 
as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those 
interests if threatened either by the aggressive ac- 
tion of any other Power or hy disturbances aris- 
ing in China or Korea?" Such a provision might 
be in the interest of the Contracting Parties, but it 
was highly dangerous to the sovereign rights of 
China and Korea. When carried to its logical con- 
clusion, the provision was nothing less than a 
mutual recognition that both Contracting Parties 
would have a free hand in taking whatever meas- ^ 
ures necessary to protect their special interests, in 
disregard of the independence and the sovereignty 
of China and Korea. If a revolution should break 
out in China, which injured the allied interests in 
the country, Japan and Great Britain, according 
to the alliance, would consider it "admissible" for 
either of them, or both, "to take such measures as 
may be indispensable in order to safeguard those 
interests." In other words, they would consider 
it "admissible" to intervene in any domestic dis- 
turbance in China ! And if Russia should continue 



52 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

her occupation of Newchwang permanently, Japan 
and Great Britain would, according to this under- 
standing, also seize other ports of China to balance 
the power and to protect their special interests! 
Could such a spirit be reconciled with the avowed 
object of the alliance, which seeks to maintain the 
administrative independence and territorial integ- 
rity of China so as to provide equal opportunities 
for commerce and industry for all nations in the 
world? Both Japan and Great Britain unctuously 
declared that they were "specially interested in 
maintaining the independence and territorial integ- 
rity of the Empire oi China" and "in securing 
equal opportunities" for all nations. And these 
very same Powers pledged each other a free hand 
to do whatever each saw fit in case of foreign 
aggression or internal disturbance in China. A 
free hand could only mean intervention, and inter- 
vention in the domestic affairs of China would 
nullify the very independence, and in many cases, 
impair the very integrity, the maintenance of which 
they professed to be "specially interested" in! 



Ill 

THE SECOND ANGLO-JAPANESE 
ALLIANCE 

THE alliance of 1902 would have lasted with- 
out renewal till the beginning of 1907, and 
could not have been terminated by either 
party without twelve months' notice to the other. 
The Japanese Government, seeing that the war with 
Russia was drawing to an end, thought it wise to 
take time by the forelock and have it renewed im- 
mediately. 

The Anglo- Japanese alliance of 1905 bore little 
or no resemblance to that of three years ago. It 
was virtually a new instrument altogether. De- 
signed for an entirely different set of purposes and 
objects, and intended to meet diplomatic contin- 
gencies not provided for in the original document, 
the second alliance could hardly be said to be a 
renewal of the old. 

The alliance was negotiated at London between 
Lord Lansdowne and Count Hayashi prior to the 
meeting of the Peace Conference at Portsmouth 
between Japan and Russia. When President Roose- 
velt offered the good offices of the United States, 
and when the belligerent Powers agreed to treat 

53 



54 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

for peace, the statesmen at Tokio were quick to see 
the advantages of a new and strengthened alliance 
with Great Britain, which would not only fortify 
her position at the forthcoming peace conference, 
but also insure her against the revival of any com- 
bination of European Powers such as that which 
she was confronted with at the conclusion of the 
Chino-Japanese War. Count Hayashi, under in- 
structions from the Government at Tokio, immedi- 
ately began negotiations with the British Foreign 
Minister, the result of which was the signature of 
the second Anglo- Japanese alliance on the 12th of 
August, 1905, exactly three days after the peace 
negotiations at Portsmouth were commenced. Al- 
though the text of the agreement was not published 
at the time, it was no secret with the Russian dele- 
gates at the Peace Conference that a new alliance 
had been entered into between Japan and Great 
Britain. What influence it had upon the conduct 
of the peace negotiations was not definitely known, 
however. 

The new alliance was designed to replace the 
agreement concluded between Japan and Great 
Britain on the 30th of January, 1902. It had as 
its objects (1) the consolidation and maintenance 
of peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of 
India, (2) the preservation of the common inter- 
ests of all Powers in China by insuring her inde- 
pendence and integrity and the maintenance of the 
Open Door policy, and (3) the maintenance of the 



AND THE ANGLO- JAPANESE ALLIANCE 55 

territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties 
in the Far East and India, and the defence of their 
special interests in the said regions. It was agreed 
that, if these interests and rights were menaced, 
the Contracting Parties would communicate with 
each other fully and frankly and would take com- 
mon measures to safeguard them; and that, if 
either Contracting Party should be involved in war 
in defence of these rights and interests, the other 
would come at once to the assistance of her ally 
and conduct the war in common. As Japan pos- 
sessed paramount political, military, and economic 
interests in Korea, Great Britain recognised her 
right to take such measures of guidance, control, 
and protection in Korea as she deemed proper and 
necessary to safeguard and to advance those inter- 
ests, provided always such measures were not con- 
trary to the principle of equal opportunities for the 
commerce and industry of all nations. On the other 
hand, as Great Britain had a special interest in the 
security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognised 
her right to take such measures as she found neces- 
sary for safeguarding her Indian possessions. The 
alliance was to remain in force for ten years after 
the date of its signature. 

That the terms of the new treaty were entirely 
different from those of the old was apparent. It 
is not quite accurate, therefore, to speak of the new 
alliance as a renewal of the old. To call it a revi- 
sion, it is nearer to the truth. To emphasise the 



56 CHINA, THE UNITEiD STATES 

difference between the two, we need only contrast 
the terms of the two agreements. 

In the first place, the Anglo- Japanese alliance 
treaty of 1902 was to run for five years, and there- 
after until one year after either Contracting Power 
should have denounced it. *'But if, when the date 
fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is ac- 
tually engaged in war, the alliance ipso facto shall 
continue until peace shall have been concluded." 
But the new treaty was to run for ten years, al- 
though with the same provisions for its termina- 
tion. The first alliance was strictly defensive, in- 
asmuch as it provided that, in case either of the 
Contracting Parties should become involved in war, 
the other would maintain "a strict neutrality" and 
would use her best efforts to prevent other Powers 
from joining in hostilities against her ally, and 
that she would go to the assistance of her ally only 
when the ally was attacked by more than one 
Power. The new alliance was much broader in 
scope, as it provided that war with one Power 
should be sufficient cause for common action. It 
was of course understood that such a war must not 
be aggressively provoked by either of the Contract- 
ing Parties, and must be a war in defence of their 
territorial rights and special interests in China, 
India, and Korea. In the first agreement, India 
was purposely left out upon the demand of the 
Japanese Government; but the scope of the new 
treaty extended to India as well as to "Eastern 



AND THE ANGLO- JAPANESE ALLIANCE 57 

Asia." In concluding the alliance of 1902, the 
Governments of Japan and Great Britain, it was 
pointed out, were "actuated solely by a desire to 
maintain the status quo and general peace in the 
extreme East." Although the maintenance of gen- 
eral peace was still included among the purposes of 
the revised treaty, it was not known that the Con- 
tracting Parties were still actuated by the desire 
to maintain the status quo in the Far East. This 
change of heart was perhaps due to the fact that 
Japan had won the war against Russia. To con- 
tinue to respect the status quo as provided for in 
the first alliance agreement would be to permit 
Russia to remain in Port Arthur and Talienwan, 
and to deny Japan herself the right to take over 
the southern portion of the Island of Sakhalin and 
to succeed to the Russian economic concessions in 
South Manchuria. And, lastly, it may also be ob- 
served, that, in 1902, Great Britain and Japan were 
"specially interested in maintaining the independ- 
ence and the territorial integrity of the Empire of 
China and the Empire of Korea, and in securing 
equal opportunities in those countries for the com- 
merce and industry of all nations.'* The second 
alliance, however, referred only to the independ- 
ence and integrity of China and the maintenance 
of the Open Door policy in that country. The in- 
dependence and the integrity of Korea were en- 
tirely overlooked. 

In addition to these differences which are dis- 



58 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

cernible from the published terms of both treaties, i 
we may also note, in passing, a few less conspicu- j 
ous but none the less important elements that dis- j 
tinguish the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1905 from i 
that of 1902. It was an open secret that, while j 
the old agreement was directed against Russia and ; 
against her only, the revised treaty was meant not : 
only for Russia who was still a menace to the se-i 
curity of the British India, but also for Germany, ; 
who, because of the rapid increase and expansion j 
of her military and naval forces, threatened the! 
balance of power in Europe. In fact, the second] 
alliance marked the beginning of the series of 
international agreements,"^ which were designed, ; 
nominally for the purpose of maintaining the Openi 
Door policy in China and her territorial integrity, \ 
but really for the purpose of "encircling" Germany i 
in the diplomatic world. And then it may also be I 
observed that the old alliance was more favourable ; 
to Japan than to Great Britain, as it prevented i 
France from joining in the hostilities against her. i 
To Great Britain, the new alliance, covering not] 
only a common sphere of interest in the Far East, i 
but also India, was at least in this one respect more j 
favourable than the old. It freed her from con- I 
stant anxiety concerning the future of her greatest | 
dependency, and ''allies her more intimately with I 



* The Franco- Japanese Agreement, 1907 ; the Russo-Jap- 
anese Agreement, 1907; the Anglo-Russian Agreement, 1907, 
etc. 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 59 

a nation which has shown itself to be a military 
and naval Power of the first rank." 

As has been noticed, the objects of the alliance 
were to preserve peace in the regions of Eastern 
Asia and India, to maintain the Open Door policy 
"by insuring the independence and integrity of the 
Chinese Empire and the principle of equal oppor- 
tunity for the commerce and industry of all na- 
tions in China," and to safeguard the ''territorial 
rights" and ''special interests" of the High Con- 
tracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and 
India. With the first object we have nothing to 
quarrel. It may be noted, however, that the al- 
liance of 1902 had a similar declaration. The fact 
that it had failed absolutely to maintain peace in 
the Far East showed most clearly the real worth 
of such a declaration. The second object was 
plausible, for it was ostensibly a reiteration of their 
desire for the maintenance of the Open Door policy 
in China. "But its meaning would have been 
clearer had the characteristic bit of diplomatic hum- 
bug been omitted. Instead of its object being 'the 
preservation of the common interests of all the 
Powers in China,' it is, of course, the preservation 
in China and the far and Middle East of the in- 
terests of Great Britain and Japan. The phrasing 
almost amounts to an impertinence, since none of 
the other Powers have asked England and Japan 
to take care of their interests in that part of the 
world, and none of them would be at all disposed 



60 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES ] 

to admit greater competence on the part of these I 
two Powers to look after other national interests | 
than is possessed by the other nation themselves." \ 
At any rate, the profession for the Open Door by j 
the Contracting Parties was stultified by their ; 
avowed purpose of maintaining and defending their | 
"territorial rights" and ''special interests" in India ] 
and in the Far East. What were these "territorial I 
rights" and "special interests?" Who were to de- : 
fine them? Special interests are incompatible with i 
the principle of the Open Door. To insist on the i 
one is to nullify the other. It is easy to understand ; 
that the "territorial rights" of Great Britain in the | 
regions of Eastern Asia and India referred to her ! 
possessions of India, of Burma, and of Hongkong, ; 
and possibly to her lease of Wei-hai-wei. But what 
were the "territorial rights" of Japan in the said i 
regions ? In India, she had none ; in Eastern Asia, \ 
she had not yet acquired any at the time of the \ 
conclusion of the second alliance. It is true that ■ 
Port Arthur and the Kwangtung peninsula were ] 
occupied by the Japanese forces at the time; it is j 
also true that Japan had also occupied the Sakhalin ■ \ 
Island. In these regions, however, Japan could i 
have no other territorial rights than those involved I 
in military occupation. The Russo-Japanese War : 
was not yet brought to the end when, on August ! 
12, 1905, the new alliance treaty was signed at ; 
London. The peace conference at Portsmouth had , 
commenced but for three days, and it was not \ 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 61 

known what form the peace treaty would take. 
Even the international law principle of uti possi- 
detis — the principle which legalises the state of 
territorial possession at the moment of the conclu- 
sion of peace, unless stipulations to the contrary 
are contained in the treaty — could not, therefore, 
be held to be operative. . In Korea, Japan had not 
yet acquired any territorial rights. In spite of the 
fact that the country was overrun by Japanese 
forces and placed under Japanese military occu- 
pation, Korea was still an independent nation. At 
the time of the conclusion of the second Anglo- 
Japanese alliance, therefore, Japan did not possess 
a foot of territory, either by acquisition, by lease, 
or by conquest, on the continent of Asia. It is 
difficult to see why Great Britain should go out of 
her way to undertake the maintenance for her ally 
of the "territorial rights" of which Japan had none, 
and was not likely to have any if Russia should 
have stood firm and if China should have refused 
to consent to the transfer of the territorial leases 
in Manchuria from one belligerent Power to 
another. 

The real importance of the second Anglo- Japa- 
nese alliance was, at any rate, not to be found in 
the meaningless provision for the maintenance of 
the Open Door policy. Although many have been 
led to believe that the Open Door was the funda- 
mental principle, upon which the foundation of 
the alliance rested, the truth was that the inclusion 



62 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES i 

of the principle was designed to deprive the al- j 

liance of its sting, and to win for it the applause j 

of the world. It was a gratuitous declaration, de- | 

void of sincerity of purpose of ever carrying it out. j 

In the light of the events that took place in China j 

in general, and in Manchuria in particular, im- j 

mediately after the conclusion of the Russo-Japa- \ 

nese conflict, and in view of the repeated violations \ 

by Japan of the principle of equal opportunity, \ 

which became a source of constant irritation and \ 

complaint by the Western Powers, it is within the i 

bounds of truth to say that the declaration for the I 

Open Door in the Anglo- Japanese alliance of 1905 i 

looked as if it were made to violate, and not to ; 

observe. With the numerous infractions of the \ 

principle by Japan in Manchuria, we shall deal in i 

extenso in a later chapter. It is sufficient to say i 

here that, as far as it concerned the maintenance \ 

of the Open Door policy in China, the second j 

Anglo- Japanese alliance did nothing more than lip- ' 

service to the policy. Like all the sanctimonious < 

agreements that Japan has entered into since 1902, j 

it proved to be absolutely useless and worthless for ' 

the maintenance of the Open Door policy. Its ' 

efficacy was tested in the five years following the I 

conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, but it was i 

found wanting. i 

The hollowness of the profession for the Open • 

Door in China and for her independence and in- i 

tegrity became all the more glaring with the con- j 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 63 

elusion of secret agreements between Japan and 
Russia, first in 1907, and again in 1910. The se- 
cret agreement of 1907 was entered into at the 
same time as the pubHc agreement of that year. 
Its principal object was to delimit the respective 
spheres of interest or influence of Japan and Russia 
in Manchuria. The secret agreement of 1910 sup- 
plemented the public agreement of the same year, 
which was entered into by Japan and Russia as a 
direct answer to the challenge which the American 
Secretary offered in the form of a proposal for 
the neutralisation of railways in Manchuria. Be- 
sides reaffirming their respective spheres in Man- 
churia, the secret agreement provided for the 
maintenance of their acquired interests even at the 
risk of resorting to force. 



IV i 

THE THIRD ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE \ 

WHILE busily engaged in the gigantic task I 
of empire-building in Korea, and thor- j 
oughly occupied in her process of peace- 1 
ful penetration in Manchuria, Japan was not j 
unmindful of the fact that her alliance with Great ^ 
Britain, concluded on August 12, 1905, required a j 
careful revision in order to meet the important po- 1 
litical changes that had taken place in the Far East ^ 
in the five or six years following the conclusion of ; 
the Russo-Japanese conflict. I 

It should be recalled, in the first place, that the { 
second aUiance was signed before Japan and Russia | 
agreed upon the terms of peace as finally embodied ' 
in the Portsmouth Treaty. Between the two Pbw- ] 
ers, technically speaking, the war was still going ] 
on, and peace had not yet been concluded. The 1 
Anglo- Japanese alliance of 1905 was entered into | 
flagrante hello. This fact accounted for the pres- j 
ence of the sixth article in the alliance treaty, which i 
provided for the continuous maintenance of neu- ' 
trality by Great Britain if no other Power should 
join in hostilities against Japan. With the conclu- 
sion of peace at Portsmouth, this provision became 
no longer useful as it was no longer applicable. 

64 



THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 65 

And it must be noted that the defeat of Russia 
was in itself an important change in the diplomatic 
situation in the Far East. Instead of being a 
menace to the British interests in Northern China, 
in India, and in the Middle East, Russia, through 
her readiness to forget the past and willingness to 
reconcile with former foes, — ^became a fast friend, 
not only of Japan, but also of Great Britain. The 
Russo-Japanese agreements of 1907 and 1910 and 
the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 show more 
than anything else the radical change of heart and 
policy on the part of Russia. The conclusion in 
1907 of the Anglo-Russian agreement settled once 
forever the outstanding disputes regarding their 
mutual interests in the Near East and Middle East 
and removed the traditional Russian menace to 
India. The second alliance was partly directed 
against Russia, and the provision for "the security 
of the Indian frontier" had apparently the Russian 
menace in view. It is hardly necessary to point out 
that such a provision, with a friendly Russia in the 
North, would be meaningless. 

But the most radical change in the political situa- 
tion in the Far East was the annexation of Korea 
by Japan in 1910, which, according to the contem- 
porary interpretations given by the press in the 
Orient, was the direct result of the Russo-Japanese 
agreement of that year. It should be recalled that 
in the second alliance treaty, Japan was recognised 
to have possessed "paramount political, military, 



66 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES \ 

and economic interests in Korea," and the right to I 
take such measures for the guidance, control, and ] 
protection of the kingdom. And the measure which ,; 
Japan deemed proper and necessary for the purpose | 
was annexation. With the Hermit Kingdom be- ,; 
coming an integral part of the Japanese Empire, 
such a recognition by Great Britain as found in j 
the alliance agreement would be not only unneces- ] 
sary, but entirely superfluous. It was highly de- | 
sirable that all these provisions should be elimi- \ 
nated from the agreement, as they were no longer 
applicable or useful. Thus, on July 13, 1911, a new ; 
alliance was concluded at London, the object of i 
which was, like that of the second alliance, to main- j 
tain the general peace in Eastern Asia and India, i 
to insure the independence and integrity of China : 
and the Open Door policy, and to preserve the ter- \ 
ritorial rights of the Contracting Parties in the re- j 
gions of Eastern Asia and India and their special ^ 
interests in those regions. ] 

In view, however, of the readiness on the part \ 
of Great Britain to accept without protest the secret | 
agreements which Japan, her ally, had entered into ! 
with Russia in 1907 and in 1910 and which, as we ; 
have pointed out in the previous chapter, were | 
hardly in accord with the Open Door principle but I 
clearly in violation of the integrity of China, it was j 
difficult to understand how these two Powers could ' 
thus brazenly pronounce to the world that the main- 
tenance of the principle of equal opportunity in i 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 67 

China and of her integrity was included among the 
objects of the alliance. Did not the Contracting 
Parties rely for their bold but meaningless asser- 
tion upon the assurance that the Russo-Japanese 
secret agreement of 1907 and of 1910 would remain 
forever a secret? Or were they quite aware that 
the profession for the integrity of China and the 
Open Door policy was but a meaningless reitera- 
tion which was in conflict with their secret engage- 
ments and understandings? They were either pre- 
suming too much upon the general ignorance of 
the world or dishonest to themselves. In one case 
they deliberately entered into an engagement which 
they knew was impossible of fulfilment, and in the 
other they undertook to do something for China and 
for the rest of the world which they never had any 
honest intention of doing. The alliance might serve 
to consolidate the general peace in the region of 
Asia and India and to maintain the territorial rights 
and special interests of the High Contracting 
Parties in those regions. To say that it would 
also serve to preserve *'the common interests of 
all the Powers in China" by insuring her inde- 
pendence and integrity and the principle of equal 
opportunities is to attribute to the alliance a 
virtue not intended even by its Contracting Pow- 
ers. 

The real object of the third Anglo-Japanese 
alliance was, however, to be found in the desire of 
the British Government to make it clear that the 



68 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

alliance, if it was to be continued, should not and 
could not be held to apply in case of an armed con- 
flict between Japan on the one side and the United 
States on the other. This exception was deemed 
necessary by the British Government for reasons 
of State, and the necessity became all the more ap- 
parent to the British Government when it found 
that the relations between Japan and the United 
States were none too cordial and that Japan, as an 
answer to the American proposal for the neutrali- 
sation of the Manchurian railways, did not hesitate 
in 1910 to conclude a secret agreement amounting 
to a defensive alliance with Russia, which had un- 
deniably the United States in view. The British 
Government had, for this reason, considered a re- 
vision of the alliance so as to make it inapplicable 
in case of difficulties between Japan and the United 
States. The opportunity did not present itself until 
at the end of 1910 or at the beginning of 1911, 
when President Taft urged the conclusion of gen- 
eral Arbitration Treaties with all the Powers oi 
the world. An Arbitration Treaty was being nego- 
tiated between Great Britain and the United States, 
and another one between the United States and 
Japan. It is needless to say that such general ar- 
bitration arrangements would conflict with the obli- 
gations of the Anglo- Japanese alliance. "Our sub- 
sisting alliance with Japan," observed the London 
Times editorially, July 10, 1911, "binds us to come 
to her assistance in the cases defined, and it remains 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 69 

in force until 1915. Any such alliance manifestly 
conflicts with any general arbitration treaty with 
a third Power. The difficulty would never be likely 
to arise in practice, for, in spite of the occasional 
wild talk of Chauvinists, responsible statesmen on 
both sides of the Pacific are unanimous in regard- 
ing as inconceivable any development in which our 
obligations under the alliance would conflict with 
those under the proposed Arbitration Treaty. We 
all know that our Japanese allies are as anxious 
as we are to live on friendly terms with the United 
States and to see us on friendly terms with them; 
and we have no doubt that the successful conclu- 
sion of the present negotiations will be sincerely 
welcomed in Japan. Nevertheless, the formal con- 
tradiction between the two treaties is not to be gain- 
said. Happily our relations with Japan are such 
that should it be thought desirable, there would be 
no difficulty in agreeing upon some modification in 
the wording of the Treaty of alliance that would 
do away with the incongruity." And it may be 
added that the conclusion of a general Arbitra- 
tion Treaty between the United States and Great 
Britain, or between the United States and Japan, 
was something more than mere incongruity. Bound 
as they were by the alliance subsisting between 
them, Japan and Great Britain would, naturally and 
very logically, be confronted with conflicting obli- 
gations which they could not fulfil at one and the 
same time. It was not only desirable, but highly 



70 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

necessary, therefore, that this possibility of con- 
flicting obligations should be eliminated. 

It was with the removal of this embarrassment 
in view that the Governments of Japan and Great 
Britain began negotiations for the revision of the 
alliance. The discussion of the revision could not, 
of course, be confined to the mere phraseology of 
the alliance. It was sure to raise the infinitely more 
important question of its prolongation. At that 
time, it should be recalled that the Prime Ministers 
of the self-governing Dominions were assembled 
in London for Imperial Conference. The British 
Government seized this precious opportunity to dis- 
cuss with them the general principles of British 
foreign policy and to secure from them the unani- 
mous approval of the revision and renewal of the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance. "The Government laid 
the general principles of our foreign policy fully 
and plainly before their colleagues from oversea in 
the confidential sittings with the Defence Commit- 
tee," the London Times commented in an editorial, 
July 13, 1911. "There was a free interchange of 
views upon these high matters, amongst which the 
Japanese alliance stands prominent, at these sit- 
tings ; and it is clear that, when the Dominion Min- 
isters had heard the statements and the explana- 
tions made to them, they were satisfied that this 
policy is the best that could be devised in the last- 
ing interests of the Empire as a whole and of each 
of its constituent units. Any new arrangement 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 71 

now made with Japan, or any modification of our 
present arrangement with her, will be made with 
the new authority and the new moral force given 
to it by the previous assent of all the self-govern- 
ing Dominions." And it was with this assent that 
Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, and Baron T. Kato, Japanese Am- 
bassador at London, signed on July 13, 1911, the 
third Anglo-Japanese alliance, of which the fourth 
Article was easily the most important. It provided 
that should either of the High Contracting Parties 
conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third 
Power, the said party would not be obliged to go 
to war with the Power with whom such an arbi- 
tration treaty was in force. 

It has generally been assumed that Great Britain 
first proposed this revision. The truth is other- 
wise, however. Viscount Ishii, who came to the 
United States at the head of a Special Mission in 
1917 and who took part in the revision of the al- 
liance in 1911, was responsible for the statement 
that Japan had taken the initiative in the matter. 
In a speech before the National Press Club at 
Washington, September 21, 1917, Viscount Ishii 
said: "Let me tell you a little piece of secret his- 
tory. When it became known to us that the Ameri- 
can and British Governments were alike desirous 
of entering into a general treaty of arbitration, but 
that they found the making of such a treaty was 
precluded by the terms of the British alliance with 



y 



72 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

Japan as they then stood, it was not with the con- 
sent of Japan, but it was because of Japan's spon- 
taneous offer that the stipulations of the aUiance 
were revised so that no obstacle might be put in 
the way of the proposed treaty. As you know, 
Article IV of the new Anglo-Japanese Treaty now 
in effect excludes the United States from its opera- 
tion. This is a true account of the genesis of that 
clause. ... It was my good fortune to be in the 
Foreign Office at Tokio at the time of the revision 
of the Treaty of alliance with Great Britain, and, 
modest as was the part I took therein, I can give 
you the personal and emphatic assurance that there 
was at that time no one in the Government or 
among the public of Japan opposed to the terms 
of that revision." 

Was it really true that "at that time no one in 
the Government or among the public of Japan op- 
posed to the terms of that revision?" Of course, 
officials of the Japanese Government would have 
very little to say; at least, not publicly. But the 
Japanese press, muzzled thoug^h it was, then as it 
is now, could not be kept permanently silent. We 
have here at least one editorial comment on the 
subject by a Japanese paper, which is interesting, 
not only for the views it expressed, but also for the 
fairly accurate prediction which it ventured. The 
YorodBii regarded the renewed and revised pact as 
a "diplomatic blunder" of the Japanese Government 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 7Z 

(of the Katsura Cabinet) and commented on it in 
the following language: 

"The revised treaty of alliance makes Japan a ludi- 
crous figure. She is required to stand guard to India 
and British interests in China without receiving any 
return from England. There is no doubt that the re- 
newal and the revision of the alliance was made at 
the initiative of Downing Street. Our diplomats have 
the peculiar virtue of being passive and of following 
the lead of other nations endowed with greater diplo- 
matic finesse. Th alHance is to remain binding for 
ten years from now. Just wait ten years. Before 
that period expires, England will have found or created 
a chance to clasp hands with Germany, while her col- 
onies bordering the Pacific will have augmented their 
armaments to such an extent that they will no longer 
be haunted by the spectre of a Japanese invasion. Until 
such a stage is reached, Great Britain needs Japanese 
co-operation. But when once that stage is reached, 
British interests in China will no longer be threatened 
by Germany, while the British fleet, freed of anxiety 
over the activities of the Kaiser's navy, will be able to 
leave home waters and protect the colonies. Then it 
is time that John Bull would throw the alliance over- 
board." 

This prophecy was made ten years ago, when the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance was revised and renewed 
for the second time. In the light of the events that 
have taken place since then, it is easy to appreciate 
how near the prophecy has come to be true. Be- 



74 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

fore the alliance has expired, Great Britain, instead 
of finding or creating "a chance to clasp hands with 
Germany," has, together with the allied Powers, 
defeated Germany in such a way that she cannot 
prove to be a menace again. German interests in 
the Orient have been practically wiped out, and the 
German fleet has been reduced to a negligible quan- 
tity. Thus, within the life term of the alliance, 
Great Britain has reached the stage when or where 
she ceases to be haunted by a spectre of a Japanese 
or German invasion. British interests in the Far 
East are no longer threatened by Germany, and 
her colonies in the Pacific, which have always 
dreaded of a Japanese invasion, have found them- 
selves now greatly relieved, not only by the increase 
of their own armaments, but also by the fact that 
the British fleet, freed of the duty to counter the 
German menace in the North Sea, is able to leave 
home waters for the protection of the colonies. 
With this vital change of circumstances, all the 
reasons which had possibly prompted Great Britain 
to revise and to renew the alliance in 1911 have 
disappeared, and it remains to be seen whether or 
not "John Bull would throw the alliance over- 
board." 

The misgivings which Japanese newspapers had 
entertained in 1911 about the revised compact, were, 
however, a little premature. It was then suspected 
that, as far as the United States was concerned, 
the alliance was emasculated by the insertion of 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 75 

Article IV, exempting either contracting party to 
go to war with a Power with whom there was in 
existence a treaty of general arbitration. On the 
contrary, the alliance was not deprived of its ef- 
ficacy. The treaty of general arbitration between 
Great Britain and the United States, in anticipa- 
'tion of the conclusion of which the alliance was 
revised, was not ratified by the Senate. The result 
is that, since 1911, there has been no agreement or 
convention in existence between the two countries 
that can be regarded as within the definition of a 
treaty of general arbitration. The obligation of 
Great Britain to come to Japan's assistance has 
never been affected. 

The Anglo-Japanese alliance has now already 
reached its stipulated term of ten years, and it 
would have lapsed had it not been for the self- 
extending clause in the treaty. In the Summer of 
1920, the renewal of the alliance was considered 
by the Governments of Japan and Great Britain. 
Owing to the desire on the part of the British Gov- 
ernment to consult the opinions of the Dominions 
about the continuation of the alliance, no definite 
decision was reached. It was officially announced, 
however, that the alliance was found to be incon- 
sistent with the League of Nations, in letter, if not 
in spirit. "The Governments of Great Britain and 
Japan," reads the official communication to the 
Secretary of the League, which was signed by Lord 
Curzon and Viscount Chinda, and dated July 8, 



76 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

1920, "have come to the conclusion that the Anglo- 
Japanese agreement of July 13, 1911, now existing 
between the two countries, though in harmony with 
the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Na- 
tions, is not entirely consistent with the letter of 
that Covenant, which both Governments desire 
earnestly to respect. They accordingly have the 
honour jointly to inform the League that they rec- 
ognise the principle that if the said agreement be 
continued after July, 1921, it must be in a form 
which is not inconsistent with that Covenant." In 
other words, the alliance was by mutual agreement 
between the Japanese and British Governments per- 
mitted to run for another year, and if it were con- 
tinued after July, 1921, they would so revise its 
terms as to be consistent with the Covenant of the 
League of Nations in letter as well as in spirit. 

This joint communication to the Secretary of the 
League was held by the law officers of the Crown, 
Sir Gordon Hewart and Sir Ernest Pollock, as con- 
stituting a denunciation of the alliance; and accord- 
ingly, if this view had prevailed, the alliance would 
have ceased to exist, by July 8, 1921 — "one year 
from the day on which either of the High Con- 
tracting Parties shall have denounced it." But 
Lord Birkenhead took a different position. On 
July 3, 1921, when the Dominion Premiers delib- 
erating on the alliance were unable to reach a de- 
cision as to its renewal or non-renewal, and when 
Premier Lloyd George was about to propose that 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 71 

the operation of the alliance should be extended for 
a period of three months for the purpose of allow- 
ing a full discussion on its disposal, the Lord High 
Chancellor made the eleventh-hour ruling (though 
it might seem very timely to some British states- 
men) that the joint note sent to the Secretary of 
the League of Nations, July 8, 1920, did not con- 
stitute a "denunciation" and that the alliance would, 
therefore, automatically remain in force. 

In this ruling, both the Governments of Japan 
and Great Britain acquiesced. Accordingly, on July 
7, 1921, another joint communication was des- 
patched to the Secretary of the League of Nations, 
announcing that the contracting parties of the al- 
liance had agreed that, in case of inconsistency, the 
procedure prescribed by the League would take the 
place of the procedure prescribed by the alliance. 
The communication reads: 

*' Whereas the Government of Great Britain and 
Japan informed the League of Nations in their joint 
notification of 8th July, 1920, that they recognised the 
principle that if the Anglo- Japanese alliance agree- 
ment of 13th July, 1911, is continued after July, 1921, 
it must be in a form which is not inconsistent with 
the Covenant of the League, they hereby notify the 
League, pending further action, that they are agreed 
that if any situation arises whilst the agreement re- 
mains in force in which the procedure prescribed by 
the terms of the agreement is inconsistent with the 
procedure prescribed by the Covenant of the League 



78 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

of Nations, then the procedure prescribed by the said 
Covenant shall be adopted and shall prevail over that 
prescribed by the agreement." 

Until it is denounced by both or either of its 
contracting parties, the Anglo-Japanese alliance, as 
it stands to-day, will remain in force indefinitely. 



V 

THE UNITED STATES AND THE ANGLO- 
JAPANESE ALLIANCE 

A CLOSE study of the history of the develop- 
ment of the Anglo- Japanese alliance, such as 
presented in the preceding chapters, must lead 
inevitably to the conclusion that the interests of 
the United States are intimately involved. The 
very fact that Japan and Great Britain saw fit to 
attempt to exempt the United States from the op- 
eration of the alliance when they were engaged in 
revising and renewing it in 1911 is an unmistakable 
recognition by the Contracting Powers of the in- 
terests which the United States has had in the al- 
liance. The most cordial sentiments which the 
Dominion statesmen have publicly expressed for 
America and their insistence upon American co- 
operation in settling the Pacific and Far Eastern 
problems are additional proofs of the fact that, of 
the disposition of the Anglo- Japanese alliance, to 
renew or not to renew, the United States is by no 
means an indifferent spectator. Officially, not a 
word has been said or heard that would indicate 
that the United States is opposed to the continua- 
tion of the alliance. Much of the opposition has 
found expression in the American newspapers only. 

79 



80 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

There can be no doubt, however, as to where the 
Government of the United States stands on the 
question. If its views have not been expressed 
before, it is because they will be expressed at a con- 
venient opportunity when they can count most. 

The interests of the United States in the future 
of the alliance grow out of the possibilities of dan- 
ger which its renewal will naturally imply, and of 
the important and vital bearing which it will surely 
have upon the American-British relations in the 
future, upon the question of limitation of arma- 
ment, and upon the American policy in the Pacific 
and the Far East. For almost twenty years, the 
alliance has existed; but it was not until after the 
conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, when Japan 
began to follow the very same aggressive designs 
upon Manchuria and Korea for which she had 
fought Russia, that the people in the United States 
commenced to ask whether the alliance was not 
being used for purposes diametrically opposed to 
those mentioned in its preamble. In 1902, when 
the alliance was entered into for the first time, the 
United States welcomed it as a potential force in 
adjusting the political balance of the Far East. 
When the alliance was revised and renewed in 
1905, the attitude of the American people was cold, 
but not hostile. A few years later, when Japan, 
intoxicated by her victorious struggle against Rus- 
sia, attempted to close the "open door" in Man- 
churia, the United States began to suspect the use- 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 81 

fulness of the alliance. This suspicion assumed the 
form of apprehension in 1907-8, when the Ameri- 
can-Japanese relations became greatly strained ow- 
ing to the San Francisco school children question 
— so much so that President Roosevelt sent the 
American battle fleet to the Far East, ostensibly 
on a practising cruise. Hurriedly, the alliance was 
revised again in 1911, and according to Viscount 
Ishii whom we have quoted before, this was done 
in order to exempt the United States from the 
operation of the alliance. Now the instrument has 
reached its stipulated term of ten years; it is due 
for renewal or denunciation. What Japan has done 
under the cloak of the alliance within the last ten 
years is a long story which it is not necessary to 
go into here. It may be said, however, that with 
the United States, the alliance has grown less and 
less in favour, not only because Japan has failed 
to accomplish what has been expected of her, but 
also because she has done what is contrary to the 
professed objects of the alliance. 

While the official attitude of the United States 
has never yet been made known, it is no secret that 
the sentiment of the American people is uniformly 
against the continuation of the alliance. Japanese 
publicists have professed inabiHty to see why the 
American people should oppose the renewal of the 
alliance which deos not directly concern them, and 
of which they are not a contracting party. When 
the situation is carefully surveyed and analysed, 



y 



82 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

however, it is not so difficult as the Japanese writers 
have thought to understand why the American 
people, taken as a whole, overwhelmingly oppose 
the extension of the alliance, either in its present 
form or with suitable modifications. Their an- 
tagonism rests upon a number of reasons, the most 
important of which are: (1) the belief that the 
alliance has served its original purpose and is no 
longer in harmony with the new international order 
of affairs; (2) the suspicion which they have to- 
wards Japan as a nation; (3) the fear of future 
difficulties between Japan and the United States 
over the immigration question; (4) the possibiHty 
of using the alliance as it has been used in the past 
as a shield behind which to hide designs upon China 
contrary to the Open Door principle; (5) the fear 
that a renewal of the alliance will result in com- 
petition in armament between the United States 
on the one hand, and Japan and Great Britain on 
the other, and thus menace the British- American 
relationship, and (6) finally, the belief, amounting 
almost to conviction, that the alliance will be di- 
rected against the United States, protestations by 
statesmen of Japan and Great Britain to the con- 
trary notwithstanding. 

It is admitted on all hands that the alliance has 
outlived its usefulness, and that with the present 
day world conditions brought about as a result of 
the European War, it is no longer in harmony. 
Russia, who was the objective of the first two al- 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 83 

liances, has been paralysed by her internal disturb- 
ances, and yet for another score of years she is not 
likely to resume her old vigour and to take a com- 
manding place in the council of nations. In fact, 
because of the understandings reached between Rus- 
sia on the one side and Japan and Great Britain on 
the other, the so-called Russian menace has since 
1907 ceased to be the raison d'etre of the alliance. 
When it was revised and extended in 1911, it had 
Germany, instead of Russia, as its potential enemy. 
The withdrawal of the British squadron from the 
Far Eastern waters, made necessary by the concen- 
tration of British naval forces in the North Sea, 
is an indication at once of the limited use which 
Great Britain had made of the alliance, and of the 
potential enemy against whom it was supposed to 
operate. Japan's participation in the European 
War in 1914 to fulfil her obligations to Great 
Britain as an ally is another proof of the fact that 
the alliance was directed against Germany. The 
result of the European conflict is such that to-day 
Germany has ceased to be a factor of international 
politics in the Far East. Her erstwhile strong 
navy has been destroyed; her colonial possessions 
have been all taken away from her; in short, Ger- 
many to-day is bereft of all the possibilities to be- 
come a danger either to Great Britain in Europe 
or to Japan in the Far East. Where is, therefore, 
the raison d'etre of the alliance to-day? Obviously, 
the instrument has served its purpose, and in the 



84 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES | 

present day international situation its continuance | 

is no longer necessary. j 

Ever since 1905 when she won the victorious j 

war against Russia, Japan has been suspected by ; 

the American people, as by the rest of the wodd, '\ 

of harbouring imperialistic ambitions and sinister : 
designs in the Far East and in the Pacific. This 

suspicion has been greatly strengthened, first by her ; 

annexation of Korea; then by her repeated at- j 

tempts to close the Open Door in Manchuria, by ] 

her forcible occupation of Chinese territory and ! 

seizure of German possessions in the Pacific, then \ 

by her excessive demands upon China, and finally | 

by her forcible appropriation of the northern half i 

of Saghalien and the eastern coast of Siberia. The \ 

Yap dispute between Japan and the United States j 

has further contributed to the feeling of distrust '[ 

which the American people have always had to- ; 

wards the Japanese as a nation. It has been gen- \ 

erally believed here in the United States that the ^ 

alliance has been employed by Japan for the pur- ; 

pose of territorial aggrandisement, and that if it ' 

were renewed, it would merely add momentum to ; 

her expansion movement which requires immediate : 

checking as it is. | 

And then it must not be forgotten that, between j 

Japan and the United States, there is always this | 

question of immigration which has not yet been 1 

settled and which is not likely to be settled yet for \ 

a long time. The United States will continue to \ 

i 



AND THE ANGLO- JAPANESE ALLIANCE 85 

prohibit Japanese immigration, the Western States 
will continue to legislate against the Japanese al- 
ready in this country, and Japan will continue to 
harp on the theme of "race equality." Serious dif- 
ficulties may easily arise over this question between 
Japan and United States. With the Anglo-Japa- 
nese alliance renewed, it is easy to see the possi- 
bility of its being made use of in such difficulties. 
Even Premier Hughes of Australia, who advo- 
cates the extension of the alliance in a modified 
form, sees the possibility of the Commonwealth 
being overrun by the Japanese under the aegis of 
the alliance, and therefore insists upon the policy 
of "white Australia" as a necessary condition for 
the continuation of the alliance. Premier Massey 
of New Zealand, who supports Premier Hughes in 
his advocacy for the renewal of the alliance, sup- 
ports him also for the exclusion of the Japanese. 
Is it any wonder that, while the Dominion states- 
men who are in favour of the alliance see trouble 
ahead, the American people who are opposed to it 
should also take into serious consideration possible 
difficulties between Japan and United States over 
the immigration question ? * 

* A writer in Current History, August, 1921, on the Menace 
of the Anglo- Japanese alliance, makes the point that Japan's 
policy in regard to the so-called "California issue" is a mere 
cloak to cover her ambitious designs in the Far East. "This 
issue, Hke that of race equality in general, is being used by 
Japan merely as a smoke screen to hide her actions in the 
Far East, and to imbue the populace of Japan with a strong 
hatred of America as a popular pretext for war. Her loud 
protestations about the California issue are answered by 



S6 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

There is another angle from which the question 
of the renewal or non-renewal of the Anglo- Japa- 
nese alliance has been viewed in the United States. 
It has been held that within the last ten or more 
years Japan has used the alliance as a cloak to cover 
her sinister designs in China, which are contrary 
to the Open Door policy and to the principle of 
equal opportunity for industrial and economic un- 
dertakings for all nations in the world. Instances 
are not wanting to show that the alliance, in spite 
of its avowed object of preserving "the common 
interests of all the Powers/' has been relied upon 
to extend or to protect exclusive Japanese interests 
in China. We need only refer to two well-known 
cases in which American interests were involved. 
The first is the so-called Chinchow-Aigun Railway 
dispute. On October 2, 1909, a preliminary con- 
tract was entered into by the Viceroy of Manchuria 
and the Governor of Fengtien on the one side, and 
the American Banking Group "^ and Pauling & 
Company (British) on the other, for the financing, 
construction, and operation of a railway from Chin- 



merely pointing to the fact that Japan herself does not allow 
foreigners to become citizens or hold land, does not allow 
them even to become labourers or engage in any business. 
Many Americans now realise that Japan is harping on the 
California issue to keep America's attention from the Far 
East, just as she harped on the issue of race equality at the 
Peace Conference to keep the world's attention from the issue 
of Shantung." 

*J. P. Morgan & Company, Kuhn, Loeb & Company, the 
First National Bank, and the National City Bank of New 
York, constituted the American Group. 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 87 

chow to Aigun. Secretary Knox, in a memorandum 
to the British Government, said : "The Government 
of the United States is prepared cordially to co- 
operate with His Britannic Majesty's Government 
in diplomatically supporting and facilitating this 
enterprise, so important alike to the progress and 
to the commercial development of China." This 
enthusiastic overture by the American Secretary of 
State elicited but a qualified acquiescence in the 
scheme from the British Government. In the mean- 
time, Japan objected to the construction of the line. 
Russia, who was always hand in glove with her 
former enemy, also protested to the Chinese Gov- 
ernment against the scheme. "British poHcy at this 
juncture," said an English writer on Far Eastern 
questions, "might have served the purposes of the 
*open door' and international morality; but Down- 
ing Street's loyalty to the Anglo-Japanese alliance, 
wherein lay clearly the line of least resistance, took 
the form of a general acquiescence in Japan's pro- 
ceedings, even though these were obviously detri- 
mental to the fundamental objects for which the 
alliance was made." As a result, the scheme of 
financing and constructing the Chinchow-Aigun 
Railway collapsed like a bubble. 

Closely connected with this affair was the well- 
known proposal by Secretary Knox for the com- 
mercial neutralisation of Manchurian railways — a 
proposal which was cordially welcomed by China 
as a means of putting an end to the economic in- 



y 



88 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

roads in Manchuria, was accepted in principle by 
France and Great Britain, but was flatly rejected by 
Japan and Russia. Two suggestions were made by 
the United States, either of which, if carried out, 
would have safeguarded China's sovereignty over 
Manchuria and maintained the Open Door therein. 
"The most effective way to preserve the undis- 
turbed enjoyment by China of all political rights 
in Manchuria and to promote the development of 
those provinces under a practical application of the 
policy of the Open Door and equal commercial op- 
portunity would be to bring the Manchurian high- 
ways, the railroads, under an economic, scientific, 
and impartial administration by some plan vesting 
in China the ownership of the railroads through 
funds furnished for that purpose by the interested 
Powers willing to participate." "Should this sug- 
gestion not be found feasible in its entirety, then 
the desired end would be approximated, if not at- 
tained, by Great Britain and the United States dip- 
lomatically supporting the Chinchow-Aigun ar- 
rangement and inviting the interested Powers 
friendly to complete commercial neutralisation of 
Manchuria to participate in the financing and con- 
struction of that line and of such additional lines 
as future commercial development may demand, 
and at the same time to supply funds for the pur- 
chase by China of such of the existing lines as 
might be offered for inclusion in this system." The 
Chinchow-Aigun project, as we have shown, did 
not materialise owing to objections from Japan and 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 89 

Russia, in which Great Britain, because of her allied 
relationship with Japan, acquiesced. The proposal 
for neutralisation, however, met with no better 
fate. Japan and Russia joined hands once again, 
and objected to the proposal on the ground that if 
it were carried out it would alter the stattis quo in 
Manchuria. Like the Chinchow-Aigun project, 
therefore, the neutralisation proposal vanished into 
thin air. This failure, it is true, could not be at- 
tributed directly to the existence of the Anglo- 
Japanese alliance. On the other hand, it is equally 
true that, had it not been for the alliance. Great 
Britain would have been free to take a stand against 
the Russo-Japanese combination. In other words, 
because of her political partnership with the Island 
Empire of the Far East, Great Britain was tied 
hard and fast to the wheels of Japanese diplomacy 
in China. The alliance, with the ostensible object 
of preserving common interests of all nations in 
China, was, at least in these two instances, nothing 
short of an unsurpassable barrier to the enjoyment 
by the United States and other Powers of equal 
opportunity in Manchuria. 

Now, it cannot be too strongly emphasised that 
the United States will not yield an inch in her in- 
sistence upon the Open Door policy, and will not 
barter away her rights to equal opportunity in China 
(Manchuria included) for any political combina- 
tion which the other Powers may enter into in the 
furtherance of their own interests to the exclusion 
of those of the rest of the world. It has been 



90 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

proved beyond doubt that the alliance between 
Japan and Great Britain has been employed as an 
instrument in furthering Japanese imperialistic de- 
signs in China. To renew it now will be tanta- 
mount to sanctioning the sinister way in which it 
has been made use of. 

But the more important reason for objecting to 
the continuance of the alliance even in a modified 
form is to be found in the general apprehension 
that a renewal of the alliance, no matter whatever 
form it may take and whatever terms it may con- 
tain, will eventually result in competition in arma- 
ment between the United States on the one hand 
and Japan and Great Britain on the other. This 
competition, as surely as the sun rises in the East, 
will give birth to serious misunderstandings, which 
may result in hostilities, not only between Japan 
and the United States, but also between the United 
States and England and her Dominions. One of 
the arguments that the Prime Minister of Canada 
has used against the renewal of the alliance is that 
it would impede the possibilities of an international 
agreement for the limitation of armaments. And 
it may be added here, any agreement for limitation 
of armament must depend largely upon the readi- 
ness of the United States. The United States will 
not be ready to limit her armament, until or unless 
she can reach a comprehensive understanding with 
England, with her Dominions. Is it at all likely 
that such an understanding can be arrived at while 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 91 

Great Britain is in alliance with Japan who is in- 
sisting upon the completion of her eight-eight pro- 
gramme * and rapidly building up her armament to 
equal that of the United States? It should always 
be borne in mind that the question of the renewal 

* Under the title "Japan's Amazing Naval Programme," 
the New York Journal of Commerce made a remarkable 
analysis of Japan's naval preparations after the conclusion 
of the European war, by comparing Japan's navy of to-day 
to that of Germany before the war. It may be pointed out 
here that Japanese navy personnel is now 76,000 men, exceed- 
ing the total of German navy in 1915. The article in question 
reads : 

"The position of the Japanese Government in regard to 
disarmament is somewhat equivocal. But there is nothing 
equivocal about the apparent desire of Japan to possess the 
strongest navy in the world. The policy prompted by such a 
desire seem.s to external observation to be as ruinous as it is 
uncalled for, and one of the good results of such a confer- 
ence as that for which Senator Borah's resolution provides 
would be to elicit an intelligible explanation from Japan as 
to the purpose of the tremendous naval programme to which 
she stands committed. 

"Taking into account the national resources of Japan, the 
so-called eight-eight naval expansion scheme is the most am- 
bitious ever undertaken in time of peace by any modern na- 
tion. It imposes on the Japanese people an effort greater than 
that of Germany in 1914 when her war preparations reached 
their maximum. In fighting pov/er it aims at placing Japan 
nearer the United States than Germany was to England in 
1914. It proposes to make Japan the equal if not the superior 
of America in naval power and will relegate the British navy 
as it stands to-day definitely to the third place. 

"The eight-eight programme provides that Japan must have 
eight superdreadnoughts and eight battle-cruisers, all less than 
eight years old. It was at first assumed that this programme 
included at least four of the superdreadnoughts in the present 
Japanese navy and four of the present battle-cruiser fleet. 
But, as a matter of fact, these ships are relegated to the 
second line, although to-day there are no finer fighting ships 
afloat. 

"The four superdreadnoughts shortly to receive a subordi- 
nate rating are larger than any in the British navy, the four 
battle-cruisers are the equal of the British Tiger and larger 
than the Repulse and Renown. The first two of the eight 



92 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

of the alliance is closely and intimately connected 
with the question of the limitation of armament. 
After all, the alliance is a military instrument, de- 
signed for military purpose. Its continuance, in 
whatever form it may take, will necessarily mean 
the continuous military and naval co-operation be- 
tween Japan and Great Britain. The United States 
is not building her navy to out-rank that of Great 
Britain; she is not building her fleet to double that 
of Japan; the motive that underlies her naval pro^ 
gramme can be easily understood: that so long as 

new battle-cruisers have just been started, their keels having 
been laid in December, They are designed to be the equal 
of the British Hood and the American battle-cruisers of the 
Lexingto7i class, 43,000 to 45,000 tons in displacement, carry- 
ing 16-inch and possibly 18-inch guns and having a speed of 
^3y2 knots. 

"The world is asked to believe by the Japanese Premier 
and the Japanese Ambassador in London that all this pro- 
digious naval preparation is to defend the coast and the com- 
merce of Japan, and nothing more. But there ought to be 
some correspondence between the volume of a nation's ocean- 
borne commerce or the tonnage of the ships that carry it 
and the relative strength of her fighting fleet. 

"Now Japan's merchant marine is approximately only one- 
fifth that of the United Kingdom and one-fourth that of 
the United States. Further, Japan's foreign trade is to that of 
the United Kingdom as 1 to 3^ and to that of the United 
States as 1 to 6i^. Yet Japan is planning to build a navy 
equal to that of the United States to protect one-four as 
much merchant shipping and less than one-sixth as much 
foreign commerce, and proposes greatly to surpass the British 
navy to protect one-sixth as much merchant shipping and a 
little over one-fourth as much foreign trade. 

"Perhaps the most amazing feature of it all is the docility 
with which the Japanese taxpayer submits to the crushing bur- 
den that is being laid upon him. The naval programme of 
Japan proposes to use 33.3 per cent, of her entire national 
revenue for the navy; it claims five times as large a share of 
her imperial revenues as did the German fleet from the Ger- 
man Imperial Treasury in the last year of peace." 



AND THE ANGLQ-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 93 

Japan and Great Britain are in alliance, so long 
will the United States need a navy capable of pro- 
tecting her own interests in the Atlantic as well as 
in the Pacific. Japan is, as has been shown, stick- 
ing to her eight-eight programme. Against whom, 
the Americans will ask, is she building? Japanese 
statesmen and diplomats have urged the renewal of 
the alliance. Why is it necessary to renew the al- 
liance ? again the Americans will ask. And against 
whom is it to be aimed? Whatever may be said 
jabout the absolute necessity of carrying out Japan's 
eight-eight programme for her national defence, and 
v/hatever adva,ntages may be pointed out about the 
renewal of the Anglo-Japanese compact, the truth 
is that, when renewed, and even revised, the al- 
liance will be a serious obstacle to cordial co-opera- 
tion and good relationship between Great Britain 
and the United States. This is because the alliance 
is, in the first place, a military instrument, and as 
such it is conducive to bringing about armed con- 
flict between Japan and the United States; and sec- 
ondly, because of this possibility, both countries 
will be engaged in increasing their armaments; and 
thirdly, because in case of the outbreak of hostili- 
ties, England, if not Great Britain, including 
Canada, Australia, and other Dominions, would be 
bound by the alliance to come to the aid of Japan 
against the United States. Any trifling difiiculty, 
any misunderstanding about Japanese immigration 
in California or about American interests in China, 



94 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

will create a casus belli more reasonable and per- 
haps more convincing for resorting to force than 
the violation by Germany of Belgian neutrality. 
The outbreak of the European War in August, 
1914, saw the United States almost as unprepared 
to face the situation as was China, and for almost 
two years after the war was raging in Europe, the 
United States, when called upon to participate in 
the conflict, was still ill prepared to meet the con- 
sequences. She is not to be caught napping again, 
however. The lesson once learned is not likely to 
be forgotten again. 

Its enthusiastic advocates will point out, then, 
that the alliance is not, and has never been, directed 
against the United States. Its renewal will not, 
therefore, adversely affect the future British- 
American relations. On the contrary, the United 
States is intentionally exempted from the operation 
of the alliance, they will say, pointing to the fourth 
article of the 1911 agreement as their proof, which 
reads : "Should either High Contracting Party con- 
clude a treaty of general arbitration with a third 
power, it is agreed that nothing in this alliance shall 
entail upon such contracting party the obligation 
to go to war with the Power with whom such a 
treaty of arbitration is in force." The United 
States, they say, had concluded in 1911 a treaty of 
general arbitration w4th Great Britain, and for that : 
reason. Great Britain will not come to the aid of 
Japan against the United States in case of war. In 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 95 

support of this argument, Japanese statesmen at 
home and diplomats abroad freely gave out state- 
ments, purporting to show that Japan and Great 
Britain, in concluding the alliance, had never had 
the United States in mind, and that the article 
quoted above specifically exempted the United 
States from the operation of the alliance. Thus, 
Viscount Hayashi, Japanese Ambassador at Lon- 
don, commenting on Lord Northcliffe's assertion 
that by the terms of the Anglo-Japanese compact 
Great Britain was not under any obligation to join 
her ally if war should unfortunately break out be- 
tween Japan and the United States, issued the fol- 
lowing statement to the London Times, January 
3, 1921: 

"I welcome the statement as a timely and wise warn- 
ing to both Japan and the United States. The basic 
idea of the alliance is to protect by common action 
the territorial rights and special interests of both Japan 
and Great Britain in Eastern Asia and India. 

"The United States has never been thought of by 
the contracting parties as a country which would 
ever take or contemplate taking any action likely to 
threaten their territorial rights or special interests in 
the Far East, and there was, therefore, never in the 
mind of the Japanese Government any idea to fight 
the United States at all. 

"Moreover, in the most improbable of eventualities, 
such as a war, I prefer merely for the sake of argu- 
ment, Japan would not expect England to come to her 
help since the Japanese and British Governments 



96 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

agreed to insert in the alliance treaty Article 4, which 
would absolve Great Britain from any obligation to 
join Japan against America. Only general phraseology 
was selected in the alliance agreement for reasons of 
diplomatic nicety, but what the negotiators of the agree- 
ment had in mind is obvious. 

"I must, further, state, in refutation of irresponsible 
an sensational utterances in the American press and 
elsewhere, that there exists no secret agreement be- 
tween the Japanese and British Empires. I am sin- 
cerely sorry that thre are such mischief-makers whose 
efforts are not only injurious to Japan and England 
alone but to the United States itself in these circum- 
stances. 

"I can assure you with all the emphasis at my com- 
mand that an alliance will never stand in the way of 
good understanding and friendly relations between 
Great Britain and the United States, nor is it in the 
least the intention of Japan to use the alliance as a 
means to direct pressure in any degree upon her old 
friend, the United States." 

Leaving its accuracy to be commented on a little 
later, we may at once notice that the statement 
undertook to "refute" "irresponsible and sensa- 
tional utterances in the American press and else- 
where," and denied the existence of secret agree- 
ment between Japan and Great Britain. This is ! 
interesting for the reason that the statement issued 
on July 4, 1921, by Baron Shidehara, Japanese 
Ambassador at Washington, was also in the nature 
of a "refutation" of irresponsible utterances against ; 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 97 

the alliance. Of the two, the statement by Baron 
Shidehara is more interesting and more important, 
as it had apparently been submitted to the Japanese 
Foreign Office at Tokio before it was given to the 
press in Washington. It reads : 

"Negotiations looking to the renewal of the Anglo- 
Japanese alliance have not yet begun. In the mean- 
time, a campaign seems to be actively at work misrep- 
resenting the possible effect of the alliance upon the 
United States. By no stretch of the imagination can 
it be honestly stated that the alliance was ever designed 
or remotely intended as an instrument of hostility or 
even defense against the United States.* 

"The Anglo-Japanese alliance, in its history for 
nearly twenty years, has twice been renewed. In each 
case the fundamental policy underlying it has remained 
unchanged. It aims permanently to preserve and to 
consolidate the general peace of the Far East. The 
original agreement of 1902, in line with that policy, was 
calculated to localize any war which might be forced 
upon either contracting party in defense of its defined 
interests or vital security. It was made when China 
was under the menace of foreign aggression, and the 
United States, showing the utmost friendliness toward 
both parties to the alliance, viewed the compact with 
sympathy and approval. 

*The version given out by the Foreign Office at Tokio is 
somewhat different in wording. The first paragraph reads : 
*'A commencement has not yet been made with negotiations 
in respect of the continuation of the alliance between Great 
Britain and Japan. Yet the work of propaganda appears 
already to have been set on foot with the object of mis- 
representing the effect which the alliance is likely to produce 
upon the United States," etc. 



98 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

"In 1905, when the alHance was renewed and re- 
vised to meet the changed conditions that followed the 
Russo-Japanese War, no thought occurred to the states- 
men of either country that the United States might 
possibly become a potential enemy of either, and for 
that reason, and that alone, no provision was inserted 
taking so remote a contingency into consideration. 

"The alliance was again revised in 1911, and Article 
IV of that agreement contains the following provision : 
Should either high contracting party conclude 
a treaty of general arbitration with a third power, 
it is agreed that nothing in this agreement shall 
entail upon such contracting party an obligation to 
go to war with the power with whom such treaty 
of arbitration is in force. 

"This provision, in its relation to the United States, 
has often been made the subject of conflicting inter- 
pretations. To a practical mind, however, the circum- 
stances which led up to its inclusion should at once 
serve to remove all doubt regarding its significance. 
The idea of revising the alliance in 1911 was conceived 
primarily with the object of facilitating the negotia- 
tions which were known to be then in progress between 
London and Washington for the conclusion of a gen- 
eral arbitration treaty. 

"Neither Japan nor Great Britain has ever contem- 
plated, under the alliance, any casus foederis preju- 
dicial or inimical to the interest of the United States; 
and any plan designed to remove the possibiHty of an 
armed conflict between the United States and Great 
Britain was of course agreeable to Japan. It was in 
pursuance of this policy that the quoted provision of 
Article IV was adopted. 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 99 

"The same policy inspires Japan as strongly to-day 
as ever before. It has not, in any degree, been affected 
by the fact that the Anglo-American general arbitra- 
tion treaty failed to secure the approval of the United 
States Senate. Nor is it practically necessary to carry 
on the legal analysis of the question as to whether the 
Peace Commission .treaty, signed and ratified by the 
United States and Great Britain in 1914, should be con- 
strued as a general arbitration treaty within the mean- 
ing of Article IV of the Anglo- Japanese agreement. 
For, apart from that question, it was already well 
understood at the time of negotiating the existing 
agreement that the alliance should in no case be di- 
rected against the United States. 

"In explanation of Japan's attitude, Count Uchida, 
the Japanese Foreign Minister, made the following 
statement to the Budget Committee of the Japanese 
House of Representatives on February 4, 1921 : 

As far as I understand, when Article IV of the 
treaty (Anglo-Japanese alliance) was inserted, 
the United States was specifically in mind, and 
therefore, as a practical matter, the question 
whether the general arbitration treaty mentioned in 
Article IV has been ratified by the United States 
Senate or not makes no particular difference. In 
other words, looking at the matter from a broad 
point of view, we can safely say that already at 
the time of the conclusion of the treaty (Anglo- 
Japanese alliance) it was understood that there 
should be no application of this treaty to the 
United States. 
"Japan is naturally anxious to strengthen the ties 



100 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

of friendship and loyal co-operation between herself 
and the British Empire, which she regards as of the 
utnxost importance to the stability of the Far East. 
At the same time, it is the firm and fixed determina- 
tion of Japan to permit nothing to hamper her tra- 
ditional relations of good will and good understanding 
with the United States. She is satisfied that these two 
affiliations are in no way incompatible, but, on the con- 
trary, complementary and even essential to each other. 
"Charges have sometimes been made that the alli- 
ance tends to encourage aggressive designs on the part 
of Japan in China. If this were the case it would 
be contrary to the preamble of the agreement, which 
provides for 

the preservation of the common interests of all 
powers in China by insuring the independence and 
integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle 
of equal opportunities for the commerce and in- 
dustry of all nations in China. 

"Japan fully realizes that any such venture of ag- 
gression would be not only hopeless of attainment, but 
destructive of her own security and welfare. She sin- 
cerely wishes for China an early achievement of peace, 
unity and stable government. She desires to cultivate 
her relations with that country along the path of mu- 
tual respect and helpfulness. Her vast commercial 
interests alone, if for no other consideration, point 
unmistakably to the wisdom of such a policy. 

"This is a basic principle of the Anglo-Japanese alli- 
ance. In no adverse direction has the alliance ever 
exerted its influence." 

An ambassadorial statement such as this, given 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 101 

out for publication presumably with the authority 
of or under instructions from the Tokio Govern- 
ment, is imusual, if not unprecedented. In spite of 
its tone of marked friendliness for the United 
States, and in spite of its obvious intention of as- 
suring the United States that the proposed renewal 
of the Anglo- Japanese alliance, then under consid- 
eration in London, was in no way hostile to this 
country, the statement had nevertheless the effect 
quite different from that which was looked for. 
The first general impression that one gets from a 
perusal of the statement is that Japan is eager for 
the renewal of the alliance and is determined to do 
everything in her power to remove, or to counter- 
act, all antagonistic influences in the United States 
which might have an effect upon the minds of 
British statesmen. The intimation that propa- 
gandists were at work in the United States, mis- 
representing the possible effect of the renewal of 
the alliance, raises the question whether the ambas- 
sadorial statement, designed as it was as an ex- 
planation or as an answer to the "campaign" of 
misrepresentation, was itself in the nature of propa- 
ganda. It is an admitted fact that about the re- 
newal of the Anglo- Japanese alliance very little has 
been said or written in the United States — much 
less than either in Japan or Great Britain. To re- 
gard as a "campaign" "misrepresenting the possible 
effect of the alliance upon the United States," or to 
regard as "a work of propaganda," as the Tokio 



102 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

version has it, a few occasional and scattered com- 
ments in the American newspapers more or less un- 
favourable to the continuance of the Anglo-Japa- 
nese alliance, is certainly inaccurate, if it is not in 
itself a case of "misrepresentation." And finally, 
the question persists in the mind of the readers: 
why should the Anglo-Japanese alliance be renewed 
at all? Or, as an offensive and defensive instru- 
ment, where is the necessity for renewing it? In 
a two-column editorial, under the caption "A Use- 
less Alliance," the New York Times, July 5, 1921, 
made the most pertinent remark apropos of the 
statement made by the Japanese Embassy and of 
the future of the Anglo- Japanese alliance. It de- 
serves to be quoted in full : 

"Remarkable in every way is the statement about 
the Anglo-Japanese alliance given out for publication 
yesterday by the Japanese Ambassador at Washing- 
ton. Baron Shidehara must, of course, have been 
speaking with the authority of his own Government, 
and if he followed diplomatic precedent must have 
ascertained that his public declaration would not be 
displeasing to our State Department. In its tone of 
marked friendliness for the United States it could be 
displeasing to no American. It is gratifying to have 
this official assertion of the 'firm and fixed determina- 
tion of Japan' to allow nothing to impair a good under- 
standing with this country; and the Ambassador's as- 
sertion that by no stretch of the imagination could the 
renewal of the Anglo-Japanese treaty be interpreted as 
having an intent in any way hostile to the United 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 103 

States is entirely in line with the positive statements 
which the British Government has more than once 
recently made. 

''Making full acknowledgment of these protestations 
of friendship, Americans must still ask for sound 
reason why the alliance between Japan and Great 
Britain should be continued, even in modified form. 
Both parties to it affirm that it has no possible bearing 
on their relations with the United States. Yet it is 
evident that they cannot talk about it at all without 
bringing in the United States. This is just as true of 
British Ministers as it is of the Japanese Government. 
The very first question which the Premiers of the 
Dominions raised when they got to London — in fact, 
even before they got there — was why any step should 
be taken that might even seem to involve embarrass- 
ment for America. The curious result is that in all 
the public utterances, whether of British or Japanese 
officials, a note almost of apology is apparent. It is 
not absent from the explanations given by Baron 
Shidehara. Indeed, his amiable and considerate words 
seem as if intended to lead up to the conclusion that 
the Anglo- Japanese alliance is no longer needed. If 
in truth it is not aimed at the United States or any 
other great Power, why renew it at all? 

"This query is plainly one which is troubling Eng- 
land. A surprising amount of English sentiment is 
manifesting itself against the extension of the alliance. 
This has been taken note of by the spokesmen for the 
Government. Both Mr. Austen Chamberlain and Mr. 
Lloyd George have been as explicit as possible in de- 
claring that it is 'a cardinal feature of British policy' 



104 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

to cultivate the best relations with the United States. 
Mr. Chamberlain, in the House of Commons, stated 
flatly that 'we should be no party to any alliance di- 
rected against America or in which we could be called 
upon to act against America.' This is welcome, but 
still leaves us in the dark concerning the motives for 
the renewed alHance between Great Britain and Japan. 
"On this subject Mr. Chamberlain was particularly 
obscure. He virtually admitted that the conditions 
which had given rise originally to the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance had 'passed away/ But, he continued, 'what 
about the conditions of to-morrow ?' The British Gov- 
ernment had to look forward 'into the possible combi- 
nations of the future/ All this, it is clear, leaves us 
just where we were. And when Mr. Lloyd George, in 
his speech to the Premiers, undertook to show why the 
Japanese alliance should be renewed, he did not emerge 
from an unsatisfactory and even mysterious vague- 
ness. He spoke of England's gratitude to Japan for 
help given in the war. It was a 'well-tried friendship,' 
which it was hoped would be preserved. Very good, 
but with what special object? Something is said about 
the solution of all problems in the Far East. But no 
one can talk of them without at once acknowledging 
that the interest of the United States in them is as 
important as that of any other country. In fact, both 
Lloyd George and Mr. Chamberlain, as well as Baron 
Shidehara, conceded that such is the case. So con- 
vinced of this is General Smuts that he has proposed 
a special conference of the Pacific Powers to deal with 
the whole problem of the Orient before the Anglo- 
Japanese alliance is extended. Yet if such a confer- 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 105 

ence were to succeed, even measurably, it would cause 
the Anglo-Japanese treaty to appear more than ever 
useless. 

"The whole matter is evidently one giving no small 
concern to the British Government. It is not content 
with the offhand opinion of the Lord Chancellor that 
the failure to denounce the treaty with Japan would 
have the effect automatically of continuing it for at 
least one or two years. The dispatches state that Mr. 
Lloyd George intends to go behind Lord Birkenhead 
\ and consult the law officers of the Crown. He evi- 
dently, is aware of the uneasiness of the Dominion 
Premiers and also of the drift of English public opin- 
ion adverse to the treaty, at least in its present form. 
"While the United States stands apart at present 
from the negotiation, our interest in it is obvious. We 
cannot fail to be concerned at the possibilities involved 
in the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Stronger guarantees 
than now exist that it could never be used against this 
country are certainly desirable, if it is to be kept in 
force. All that we have to depend upon now is the 
rather roundabout and inconclusive legal argument 
based upon Article IV of the treaty as it was revised 
in 1911. Something more definite and binding should 
be written into it if it is to be renewed. This the 
British Dominions would desire as strongly as the 
United States. 

"Even so, the question would recur why there should 
any longer be such an alliance at all. If it was at first 
designed as a safeguard against German ambitions in 
the Far East, any danger from that source is to-day 
chimerical. The possibilities of Russian aggression in 



106 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

the Orient are no longer what they were conceived to 
be in 1905. The occasion of the treaty has passed, and 
with it the treaty itself ought to pass. All its professed 
objects, so far as they are legitimate, can better be 
secured by a more comprehensive agreement. The 
Anglo-Japanese alliance is on its face exclusive. What 
the civilized nations desire is an understanding that is 
universal. The original alliance, even if changed in 
detail, would be continually open to suspicion. Why 
not drop it in order to give place to an all-embracing 
agreement into which every nation that desired could 
enter with good-will and entire confidence?" 

Now it remains but to add that it is inaccurate 
and highly misleading to say that, by virtue of the 
provision on general arbitration found in Article 
IV of the 1911 agreement, the United States is 
exempted from the operation of the alliance. At 
the time of the revision of the alliance, there was 
under negotiation between Great Britain and the 
United States a treaty of general arbitration. In 
fact, according to Viscount Ishii whom we have 
quoted in a previous chapter, and Baron Shidehara, 
whose statement we have reproduced in the above, 
the alliance was revised in 1911 with the object 
of facilitating the negotiations between London and 
Washington for the conclusion of a general arbi- 
tration treaty. Article IV was, therefore, inserted 
in the alliance in anticipation of successful conclu- 
sion of such a treaty between Great Britain and 
United States. Unfortunately, the Senate refused 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 107 

to ratify the treaty when concluded, on the ground 
that it impinged on the sovereignty of the United 
States. The resuh is that no "treaty of general 
arbitration" exists to-day between the two coun- 
tries. The only treaty now in existence that ap- 
proximates the nature of a general arbitration 
treaty, is the Peace Commission Treaty, signed on 
September 15, 1914. It provides for the investiga- 
tion of all disputes before resorting to war by a 
commission which will be given one year in which 
to report. It provides for delay, but not for arbi- 
tration. It contains no stipulation that would pre- 
vent resorting to war, after an investigation has 
been made. Strictly speaking, it is not a "treaty 
of general arbitration," and can never be consid- 
ered as such. Baron Shidehara, while admitting in 
his statement the fact that the Anglo-American 
treaty of general arbitration failed to secure the 
approval of the Senate, refused to say that the 
Peace Commission treaty "should be construed as 
a general arbitration treaty within the meaning of 
Article IV of the Anglo-Japanese agreement." It 
is evident, therefore, that Article IV of the Anglo- 
Japanese alliance is inoperative, so long as the speci- 
fied kind of treaty does not exist: The United 
States is not exempted from the operation of the 
alliance, and Great Britain is morally and legally 
bound to come to Japan's aid in case of war against 
the United States. It is no wonder that, among 
the American people, the belief is very strong, 



108 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

amounting almost to conviction, that the alliance, 
if renewed, will be directed against the United 
States, protestations by statesmen and diplomats of 
Japan to the contrary notwithstanding. Both Rus- 
sia and Germany, against whom the alliance was 
originally directed, have disappeared as world 
Powers, and for years to come they will remain 
impotent. Against whom will the alliance be di- 
rected then, if not against the United States? 

Very recently, it has transpired that, as soon as 
the Peace Commission Treaty was concluded and 
ratified by Great Britain and the United States in 
1914, the British Government notified the Gov- 
ernment at Tokio that the said treaty was to be 
considered as a ''treaty of general arbitration" 
within the meaning of Article IV of the Anglo- 
Japanese alliance. This report finds circulation only 
in newspapers. There is no official or "authorita- 
tive" statement either denying or affirming it. It 
is not known that the United States has been in- 
formed that the Peace Commission Treaty with 
Great Britain has been considered as an arbitration 
treaty within the meaning of Article IV of the 
alliance.''' 

The Washington correspondent of the London 

* It is held in some quarters that the Root-Bryce arbitration 
treaty of 1908 is within the meaning of the stipulation of the 
alliance. Those who have held this view have apparently 
overlooked the last article of the said treaty, which provides : 
"The present Convention is concluded for a period of five 
years, dating from the day of the exchange of ratifications." 
The ratifications were exchanged at Washington, June 4, 1908. 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 109 

Times stated the situation quite accurately when he 
said that the continuance of Great Britain's and 
Japan's association in aUiance was an insuperable 
obstacle to Britain and America being in accord. 
"I am able to say with absolute certainty," he said, 
"that all efforts have been unavailing to get inserted 
into the new treaty of alliance a clause exempting 
the United States from the implications of the 
treaty. To conceal this fact will serve no good 
purpose, because the continuance of Britain's and 
Japan's association in alliance, however it may be 
modified, is an insuperable obstacle to Britain and 
America being in accord. America's policy of close 
and friendly co-operation presupposes that Britain 
will be free from such commitments as the Anglo- 
Japanese alliance. The alliance will prevent any 
agreement regarding the limitations of armaments, 
and will complicate — ^perhaps rendering impossible 
— the solution of the Pacific problem. America 
realises that Japan wants renewal and that Britain 
is reluctant to refuse a loyal ally's desire, and that 
she does not wish to adopt a policy taking race into 
account if a road can be found out of it." The 
road is found in the Conference on the limitation 
of armaments and on the Pacific problems, which, 
if successful, will surely bring about a solution of 
the involved problems of armament and the Far 
East on a plane above that of engagements like 
the Anglo-Japanese alliance. 



VI 

CHINA AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE 
ALLIANCE 

4 SIDE from Japan and Great Britain, its con- 
r\ tracting parties, there is no country whose 
interests and rights are so directly and so 
intimately affected by the alliance as those of China. 
Ever since 1902 when the alliance was entered into 
for the first time, China has been made its virtual 
victim in more sense than one. Her interests have 
been adversely affected; her sovereign rights have 
been frequently encroached upon; her territory has 
been twice made the theatre of war; her economic 
development has been seriously impeded; her po- 
litical growth has been unnecessarily retarded; her 
territory has been disposed of by the very Powers 
who have professed to maintain her integrity; her 
internal peace has been repeatedly disturbed, though 
somewhat indirectly, by her neighbour who under- 
takes to preserve peace in the Far East; and her 
Open Door policy has been reduced to a mere fic- 
tion by the very Power who seeks to preserve "the 
common interests of all the Powers in China." In 
short, within the last score of years, the lifetime of 
the Anglo-Japanese alliance, China has been its un- 
willing victim. She has been the loser, not the 

110 



THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 111 

gainer. Is it any wonder that she now strongly 
objects to its renewal? If there is one country 
which has every reason to object to the continuation 
of the alliance, it is China. 

That the interests of China are intimately in- 
volved in the disposition of the alliance, as much as 
are those of its contracting parties, is apparent to 
any one who has watched the evolution of the com- 
bination from its very beginning. In 1902, when 
the alliance was concluded for the first time, the 
territory in which it was supposed to operate was 
practically limited to China and Korea. For the 
second alliance, concluded in 1905, the sphere of 
operation was extended to India. In 1910 Korea 
was made an integral part of the Japanese Empire. 
The scope of the third alliance was, therefore, again 
limited to China and India. The exact language 
used in the alliance describing the regions in which 
it was supposed to operate is "the regions of East- 
ern Asia and India." But what is India but a 
colonial possession of Great Britain? What is 
Eastern Asia but another geographical expression 
for China? If Great Britain desires to have her 
imperial interests and territorial rights in India 
safeguarded, it is well and good, and there shall be 
no one to question her right in doing so, except, 
perhaps, the Indian people who may have a better 
opinion of themselves and who may not be able to 
see the necessity of calling upon Japan to defend 
them. And if Japan desires to have her imperial 



112 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

interests and territorial rights in Korea defended, 
it is within her right to do so, and no one will ques- 
tion it except the Koreans who naturally consider 
the Japanese as interlopers in their country. Both 
Japan and Great Britain, however, begin to en- 
croach upon the rights of China as an independent 
and sovereign nation, when they arrogate to them- 
selves the well-intentioned but none the less un- 
necessary task of maintaining and consolidating 
the general peace in ''Eastern Asia" which is, when 
Korea and India are counted out, to all intents and 
purposes, but another geographical expression for 
China. 

That the alliance as it stands to-(iay has its main 
interests in China is shown by the language used 
in its preamble. One of its avowed objects is said 
to be "the preservation of the common interests 
of all the Powers in China by insuring the inde- 
pendence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and 
the principle of equal opportunities for the com- 
merce and industry of all nations." Why the two 
Contracting Powers alone have undertaken the task 
which, in its very nature, ought to fall upon the 
shoulders of all the Powers interested in equal op- 
portunities in China and in her territorial integrity, 
is a question to which there has been yet no answer. 
The same question may be asked about "the con- 
solidation and maintenance of the general peace 
in the regions of Eastern Asia and India" which is 
Cbviously a task for all, and not for individual, 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 113 

nations interested in these regions. "The preser- 
vation of peace in the Far East," His Excellency 
Sao-ke Alfred Sze, Chinese Minister to the United 
States, pointed out at the banquet of the New York 
State Bankers' Association, Atlantic City, June 24, 
1921, "is a matter of such supreme moment that 
it concerns not only England and Japan, but other 
countries as well. China and the United States 
ought to have something to say in the matter." But 
has the alliance ever succeeded in maintaining peace 
in the regions of Eastern Asia and India? Has it 
ever carried out its professed object of preserving 
"the common interests of all the Powers in China ?" 
Has it approached anywhere near its avowed pur- 
pose of "insuring the independence and integrity" 
of China? And finally how far has it been suc- 
cessful, or has it been successful at all, in maintain- 
ing "the principle of equal opportunities for the 
commerce and industry of all nations in China"? 
Minister Sze, in his address referred to above, de- 
fined the Anglo-Japanese alliance as "a warlike 
measure designed by England and Japan to protect 
their interests in the Far East." As a measure for 
war, it cannot succeed in maintaining peace; and 
as an instrument designed to protect special inter- 
ests of particular Powers, it can never succeed in 
preserving the common interests of all nations. 
The alliance may have been useful in the defence 
and maintenance of the special interests and terri- 
torial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the 



114 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

regions of Eastern Asia and India, but it has proved 
worse than useless as far as its other avowed ob- 
jects are concerned. It is worse than useless, for 
it not only has failed to accomplish those objects, 
but also has violated the fundamental principles in 
which the alliance is said to have been conceived. 

Without generalising too much, let us come to 
the specific reasons why the Anglo- Japanese al- 
liance, its high-sounding and lofty pronouncements 
to the contrary notwithstanding, has proved to be 
a compact damaging to China and her sovereign 
interests. It is well-known that China strongly ob- 
jects to the renewal of the alliance. The reasons 
for her objection are many, of which the more 
significant ones are (1) the mention of China in 
the agreement without her knowledge or assent; 
(2) the violation of her territorial integrity under 
the aegis of the alliance; (3) the incompatibility 
of the alliance with the League of Nations, of 
which China, and Japan and Great Britain as well 
are members; (4) the impediment which the al- 
liance places in the economic development of 
China; (5) the fear that its continuance would 
mean the continuance of Japan's dominance and 
domination in China; and (6) finally the failure to 
maintain peace in the Far East owing to the exist- 
ence of the alliance. 

It is needless to say that the failure of Japan and 
Great Britain to consult China in the negotiation 
of the alliance is a just cause of complaint, espe- 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 115 

daily when her vital interests are involved in it. 
"You observe that this alliance has a great deal to 
do with China," said the Chinese Minister at Wash- 
ington in a speech we have already referred to in 
the above, ''but China has nothing to do with it. 
Here is an agreement vitally affecting China, but 
China has not even been consulted in its making. 
You will agree with me that any nation would re- 
sent such treatment." As early as March, 1920, 
when the subject of the renewal or termination of 
the alliance began to occupy the press in the Far 
East, China made representations to the British 
Government, pointing out that, while the conclu- 
sion of the alliance was primarily a matter between 
its Contracting Parties, the mention of China in 
the agreement justified her demand to be consulted. 
In other words, uninformed and unconsulted in its 
making, China has been made a subject of inter- 
national agreement by Japan and Great Britain, not 
once, but again and again. She has been treated 
merely "as a territorial entity." Matters affecting 
her international standing and international rela- 
tions have been disposed of behind her back and 
without her assent. This treatment is not only 
humiliating to China, but also unbecoming to the 
Contracting Powers themselves. It is, therefore, 
quite proper for China to demand that either she 
should be consulted in the renewal of the alliance 
or no mention of her should be made in agreement. 
To this representation, the British Government 



116 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

merely replied that ''the question of the renewal or 
the termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance had 
not yet come up for consideration," and that "in- 
asmuch as the successive agreements had been 
couched in the same language, it would naturally 
follow that if the alliance were renewed it must 
follow the same lines." * In other words, the 
British Government insisted on mentioning China 
in the agreement, without consulting her in its ne- 
gotiation. As a result, an official memorandum was 
sent to the British Government, protesting in ad- 
vance against reference to China in the alliance 
agreement without her actual participation in the 
conclusion of the treaty. The following is a trans- 
lation of the Aide-Memoir e, handed to the British 
Minister at Peking by the Chinese Foreign Office 
in May, 1920, relating to the renewal of the Anglo- 
Japanese alliance: 

"We are repeatedly informed that reports have 
been in circulation regarding the proposed renewal of 
the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which will expire in July 
next year (1921). These reports aver that in view 
of a stipulation in the treaty, which obligates the 
Contracting Parties to confer together one year be- 
fore its expiration, in case its renewal is desired, the 
British and Japanese Governments have already be- 
gun informally to exchange views on the subject, and 
that the alliance, if renewed, would have to be re- 
vised. 

* Vide Appendix H. 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 117 

"The whole question of the Anglo- Japanese alliance 
affects the destiny of the Far East in general and of 
China in particular. The Chinese people view the 
proposed renewal of the alliance with deep concern 
and strong misgivings. Fortunately it has been an 
established international usage that when two friendly 
nations conclude a treaty, it can cover only those 
rights and interests which legitimately belong to the 
nations who are parties to the agreement. 

"This usage has acquired fresh strength as a re- 
sult of the European War, out of which has been 
developed the doctrine of equality of nations. The 
treaty of alliance in question contains reference to 
China and her integrity. Such reference, without 
China's actual participation in the conclusion of the 
treaty, will seriously impair the dignity and good 
name of her people as an independent nation. The 
Government and the people of China, therefore, can- 
not allow the matter to pass without expressing their 
emphatic protest. 

"Your Excellency is therefore earnestly requested 
to convey the above statement confidentially to your 
Government for due consideration when the terms of 
the alliance are to be renewed." 

To this protest, it is not known that the British 
Government has ever replied. China has had no 
assurance that her views will be heard and her 
wishes will be respected in the renewal of the al- 
liance. She has, therefore, an unusually strong 
reason for opposing the continuation of the alliance. 
Any reference to her in the agreement, without her 



118 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

knowledge or assent, or without her participation 
in the condusion of the alHance, will, indeed, seri- 
ously impair "the dignity and good name of her 
people as an independent nation." 

The case becomes all the more exasperating, 
when Japan and Great Britain, aside from men- 
tioning China in the agreement without her assent, 
continue to undertake the maintenance of her in- 
dependence and integrity. China does not and has 
never asked any Power to maintain her independ- 
ence and integrity. For Japan and Great Britain 
to assume this role without reference to her wishes 
is a gratuitous insult, of which there should never 
be another repetition. Within the span of twenty 
years of the alliance's life, China's integrity has 
been violated, and her independence has been in- 
fringed upon, repeatedly. Japan has attempted a 
number of times to establish her police system in 
Manchuria, in Eastern Mongolia, and then in 
Fukien province; she has erected wireless stations 
at Hankow and Tsinan without the permission of 
the Chinese Government ; she has extended her civil 
administration practically over the entire province 
of Shantung against the vigorous protest by the 
Chinese Government. Are these not sufficient evi- 
dence of infringements upon China's independ- 
ence? On the other hand. Great Britain was, at 
least in one instance, guilty of violating China's 
territorial integrity. We refer to the secret agree- 
ment which she entered into with Japan, in Septem- 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 119 

ber, 1917, whereby Shantung was handed over to 
her ally. With these instances in view, it would be 
nothing short of mockery to say that the alliance 
aims at insuring the independence and territorial 
integrity of China. 

China's objection to this gratuitous undertaking 
by Japan and Great Britain is greatly strengthened 
by the fact that they are all members of the League ^' 
of Nations. Article X of the Covenant of the 
League provides : "The members of the League 
undertake to respect and preserve as against ex- 
ternal aggression the territorial integrity and 
existing political independence of all members of 
the League. In case of any such aggression or in 
case of any threat or danger of such aggression, 
the Council shall advise upon the means by which 
this obligation shall be fulfilled." This article, at 
the last meeting at Geneva of the Assembly of the 
League, has been recommended for retention by the 
Amendments Committee. It is plainly unnecessary, 
therefore, for Japan and Great Britain to renew 
their undertaking, which is meaningless as it is 
never meant to be carried out. 

As a member of the League of Nations, China 
has another reason against the renewal of the al- 
liance. Obviously, the League and the alliance are 
incompatible with each other — a fact which is ad- 
mitted by Japan and Great Britain themselves in • 
their promise to revise the treaty, so as to make it 
accord with the spirit and the letter of the Cove- 



120 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

nant. Article XX of the Covenant says: "The 
members of the League severally agree that this 
Covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations 
or understandings inter se which are inconsistent 
with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that 
they will not hereafter enter into any engagements 
inconsistent with the terms thereof." Japan and 
Great Britain have officially admitted that the al- 
liance is inconsistent with the League Covenant. 
Being such, it should be abrogated altogether. To 
retain it, even after due revision, would be not only 
contrary to the specific engagement provided for 
in Article XX, but also violating the very spirit of 
the League. "Since all members are on an equality 
and are allied for common purposes," observed the 
New York Tribune, "any special compact between 
two for mutual defence of their rights and inter- 
ests against a third member is theoretically out- 
lawed. Great Britain is bound to side against 
Japan, and Japan against Britain, in any case of 
disputes in which one or the other is found to be 
in the wrong by the League Council or Assembly. 
The dual community of interest is thus broken. 
There can be no casus foederis against another 
league member as to which either signator may 
exercise its independent judgment. Since, also, 
the Covenant provides for treating as a member 
any non-member involved in a dispute with a mem- 
ber, a pledge in advance by two Powers to assist 
each other is a violation of the whole spirit of the 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 121 

peace enforcement sections of the League code." 
In other words, it ought to be plain to Japan and 
Great Britain that their obHgations to each other 
as allies should be superseded by their obligations 
as members of the League. 

A still more serious objection may be raised by 
China against the renewal of the alliance, and it is 
that the instrument has been an impediment to her 
economic development for the last twenty years. 
Instances are not lacking to show that Great 
Britain, being tied to her political partner in the Far 
East, has nolens volens sided with Japan on many 
occasions, in spite of the obvious fact that her own 
interests, her profession for the Open Door in 
China, and her undertakings in the alliance de- 
manded that she should act against her ally. 

One typical instance in which the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance actually obstructed China's economic de- 
velopment was furnished in the bickering between 
China and Japan in regard to the construction of 
a Manchurian railway in 1909. In November of 
the said year, the Viceroy of Manchuria entered 
into a contract with a British firm to build an ex- 
tension of the North China Railway from Hsin- 
mintun, about forty miles west of Mukden, to 
Fakumen. The Japanese Government objected to 
the construction of the line on the ground that it 
was in the neighbourhood of and parallel to the 
South Manchurian Railway which was transferred 
to the Japanese hands by the Portsmouth Treaty 



122 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

of Peace between Japan and Russia. As a matter 
of fact, the nearest point on the proposed line is 
more than thirty-five miles distant from the South 
Manchurian Railway and separated from it by the 
Liao River. Furthermore, it is a very well-known 
fact that very little, if any, of the trade of this 
fertile and thickly populated district has found its 
way to the South Manchurian Railway; not even 
to-day. That the Japanese contention could not 
be supported was apparent; but the British Gov- 
ernment supported the Japanese position, and the 
entire scheme fell through. Now, it may be said with 
truth that the failure to construct the line in question 
has been proved to be a very serious impediment 
to the economic development of Manchuria. At 
any rate, no one would believe that the position 
such as Japan had taken in this dispute was in the 
nature of preserving ''the common interests of all 
nations in China" by insuring her independence and 
integrity and the principle of equal opportunities. 
It was a denial of ''equal opportunity"; it was a 
direct attack upon China's independence and in- 
tegrity by blocking her right of way. If the Con- 
tracting Parties of the alliance meant one thing and 
did another, they were not faithful to their own 
words. They were either deceiving themselves, 
which was improbable, or they were deceiving the 
world. If they did what they never meant to do, 
they had, at least, in that instance, violated the 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 123 

principle of the Open Door and thus impeded the 
economic development for Manchuria. 

But this was not all. As soon as the Hsinmintun- 
Fakumen scheme fell through, another line was pro- 
posed — one which we have already referred to in 
the previous chapter, the Chinchow-Aigun Railway. 
This line was to run from Chinchow, on the Gulf 
of Pechili, via Taonanfu, to Tsitsihar, on the 
Trans-Siberian Railway, and thence north to Aigun, 
on the Amur River, covering a distance of about 
800 miles. It would run entirely through Mon- 
golia, with the exception of a few miles at both 
ends. A glance at the geography of Manchuria 
and Mongolia would show that whole line would 
at no place come within a distance of less than 
fifty miles from the South Manchurian Railway, 
the traffic of which would not at all be affected. 
But Japan, not particularly anxious to see Man- 
churia and Mongolia developed as they should be, 
raised the same objection that the line under con- 
sideration would injuriously affect the traffic of the 
South Manchurian Railway, and therefore blocked 
the project altogether. This action, curiously 
enough, was again supported by the British Gov- 
ernment. Unofficial explanations were offered that, 
being tied hard and fast by her alliance with Japan, 
Great Britain could have no other choice but to say 
ditto. If this were the real cause for the British 
support, as we have every reason to believe it was, 



124 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

the alliance could not be anything else but a serious 
impediment to China's economic development, and 
ought to have been "denounced" and abrogated as 
soon as possible. The alliance of 1905, as that of 
1911, had as its object the maintenance of the com- 
mon interests of all nations. What the allies had 
done in this case was diametrically opposed to their 
professed object. The alliance undertook, as it was 
defined in the preamble, to maintain the principle 
of "equal opportunity." What they did was a de- 
nial of equal opportunity, not to the other Powers 
only, but to China as well. It was contrary to the 
letter and spirit of the Anglo-Japanese alliance that 
these two Powers had blocked the Manchurian 
Railway development; it was in violation of the 
Open Door principle to which they had been 
pledged; and it was a denial to China to exercise 
her sovereign rights in her own territory. 

It is, of course, always difficult to say just exactly 
how much Great Britain was behind her ally in these 
two instances, or in other similar cases. It is easy 
to understand, however, that being in alliance with 
Japan, Great Britain did not enjoy freedom of 
action. She could ill afford to say "no" to her ally 
even in cases when she knew to be acting contrary 
to the avowed purposes of the alliance, or against 
her own interests. We can readily see that Great 
Britain did not need to endorse everything that 
Japan might do in China. Her complaisant atti- 
tude towards Japanese policy in China, however, 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 125 

made it hard to say whether or not Great Britain 
was in complete accord with her ally. 

This policy of complaisance, which the alliance 
has apparently induced Great Britain to adopt re- 
garding Japanese activities in the Far East in gen- 
eral and in China in particular, is the ground for 
the belief, generally held among the Chinese, that 
the renewal of the alliance is tantamount to a pub- 
lic endorsement by Great Britain of Japanese policy 
in China and a "recognition of the status quo." 

Since 1911 when the alliance was revised and 
extended, a good deal of water has flowed under 
the political bridge of the Far East. In those years 
immediately following the outbreak of the war in 
Europe and before the conclusion of peace, Japan 
has entrenched herself so firmly that her present 
position and influence in China is not only domi- 
nating, but domineering. She went into Manchuria 
in 1905 after the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese 
War, and she has remained there ever since. 
Through her control over the means of communi- 
cation, over the Manchurian currency (largely by 
the Bank of Chosen), and over the postal and 
telegraphic systems, Manchuria is to-day virtually a 
Japanese economic reserve. She went into Shan- 
tung in November, 1914, and in spite of her re- 
peated promise to China and to the world at large 
to get out, she has remained there. By her sys- 
tematic appropriation of the valuable properties in 
Kiaochow and Tsingtao left over by the Germans, 



126 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

by her extensive investment in land, and by her 
control over the railways, Shantung is to-day 
another Manchuria to her. In 1915, she presented 
the "twenty-one demands" * on China, and by 
threat of war, she forced the unwilling Govern- 
ment at Peking to accept. In a recent statement by 
a Japanese Government official, it is said that Japan 
would absolutely refuse "scrapping the twenty- 
one demands." In 1918, a clash occurred between 
Japanese soldiers and Chinese police at Cheng- 
chiatun, Manchuria. Under the pretext of main- 
taining peace in the district, Japan established her 
police system there, which has remained ever since. 
The same was attempted at A'moy but last year. 
And then it must not be forgotten that, during the 
last four or five years, Japan has loaned to Chinese 
officials in the North as well as in the South for the 
purpose of carrying on the civil war, to an amount 
approximating Yen 350,000,000, Because of this 
huge sum which Japan has loaned to China, she is 
now in a dominating position in regard to Chinese 
/ finance. In short, Japan's policy in China for the 

* The Twenty-one Demands were presented to China in 
five Groups. The first group consists of those which assure 
Japan of her succession to the German rights in Shantung; 
the second, of those which extend Japan's lease of Port 
Arthur and Talienwan, the South Manchurian Railway and 
the Autung-Mukden Railway, and assure her economic (and 
political) rights in Eastern Mongolia; the third relating to 
the taking over of the Hanyehping Ironworks by a Chino- 
Japanese company; the fourth relating to the non-alienation 
of Chinese territory ; and the fifth relating to the employ- 
ment of Japanese advisers, Japanese "missionary" propa- 
ganda, control of China's munitions of war, etc., etc. 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 127 

last ten years at least is one of economic penetra- 
tion and political aggression. She has discarded 
every argument of prudence, and every considera- 
tion of restraint. She reckons on the continuous 
and almost almost unquestioned support from 
Great Britain, who, as we have said before, is, be- 
cause of the existence of the alliance, deprived of 
her freedom of action, if not her independent judg- 
ment, and is consequently incapable of following 
any other course than of supporting or at least 
acquiescing in her ally's policy in China. When 
she was pressing the Twenty-one Demands on 
China, the United States filed a protest with both 
the Chinese and Japanese Governments. But Great 
Britain, her hands being tied by the alliance, had 
not a word to say. And what more convincing 
proof does the world need to show that Great 
Britain has always been on Japan's side than the 
secret agreement which she entered into in 1917, 
giving Shantung to her ally? Judged by her con- 
duct in the Far East for the last few years, Japan 
cares little or nothing about the bitter resentments 
which she has provoked in China and the unfavour- 
able public opinion which she has created in the 
Western world. So long as the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance remains, so long will Great Britain be on 
her side, in a diplomatic sense at least; and so long 
as Great Britain takes the side of her ally and acts 
as her second in all Far Eastern affairs, so long 
will Japan follow her policy of economic penetra- 



128 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES ; 

tion and political aggression in China. There is, 
therefore, more than legitimate ground to suppose i 
that the continuance of the Anglo- Japanese alliance, \ 
even in a modified form, will mean the continuance i 
of Japan's domination in China. \ 

A word may be said about the assertion that the \ 
Anglo-Japanese alliance seeks to maintain peace in \ 
the Far East — an assertion which has been repeated \ 
ad nauseam. Now, has the alliance really main- i 
tained peace in the Far East? The answer is not j 
far to seek. It may be said that, while it is well I 
borne out by the language of the alliance, the as- | 
sertion is not substantiated by the fact. In con- | 
eluding the agreement in 1902, the Governments i 
of Japan and Great Britain were said to be "actu- j 
ated solely by a desire to maintain the status quo '. 
and general peace in the extreme East." When re- 
vised and renewed in 1905, the alliance had as one 3 
of its objects : "The consolidation and maintenance j 
of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia ' 
and of India." The same wish was expressed in ; 
the third agreement, in exactly the same language. 
These stipulations, however, are nothing more than ; 
the pious wishes of the Contracting Powers and ■ 
are never meant to be realised. Or else, the out- \ 
break of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 and the \ 
Anglo-Japanese joint attack upon the German \ 
leased territory in China in 1914 would not be very i 
happy examples of the preservation of peace in the ! 
Far East. And unless one speaks with tongue in 1 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 129 

the cheek, it is hardly accurate to say that the mo- 
bilisation by Japan of her military and naval forces 
to compel China to accept the "Twenty-one De- 
mands," and the military expedition to Siberia 
which has resulted in the occupation by Japan of 
Vladivostock, of Niklolaievsk, of the northern half 
of Saghalien, and of Eastern Siberia, are exactly 
in the nature of preserving peace in Eastern Asia 
as provided for in the terms of the alliance. 

On the contrary, the alliance, instead of being an 
instrument of peace, has proved to be an instru- 
ment of war. At least for two armed conflicts in 
the Far East, the alliance can be said to be directly 
responsible. If one thing is more certain than 
another, it is that the Russo-Japanese War was the 
direct and almost immediate outcome of the al- 
liance.* In the first place, the agreement was 

* Speaking in the House of Commons, February 13, 1902, 
defending the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, Mr. 
Arthur J. Balfour said that the alliance would make "strongly 
for peace." "In these days," he continued, "while a war be- 
tween two Powers is sufficiently formidable, a war in which 
a large number of Powers is involved is practically so great 
an undertaking that even the most adventurous statesmanship / 
would shrink from it. If it were possible for two first-class ^ 
Powers to coalesce to fight against Japan, the result would be 
either that Japan would be crushed, would suffer very serious 
losses, and be practically crippled, or that before that event 
took place she would modify her policy to suit the demands 
of her two antagonists (the two antagonists Mr. Balfour had 
then in mind were Russia and France). It is neither good 
for us that Japan should be crushed, nor that through a 
coalition of two Powers she should be obliged to mould her 
policy in a direction antagonistic to our interests. Now that 
this Treaty has been carried out, it is quite evident that that 
contingency can not take place. There never can be two 
Powers ranged against Japan alone, any more than there can 



130 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

entered into in anticipation of an armed struggle 
between Japan and Russia. And secondly, the 
undertaking by Great Britain to remain neutral 
when Japan was involved in war with one Power 
only, and to come to Japan's assistance when she 
was attacked by more than one Power, had the 
effect of not only keeping the field clear for Japa- 
nese action, when actual hostilities were com- 
menced, but also encouraging Japan to go on the 
war-path, when she could yet be dissuaded from 
resorting to force. In 1914, upon the outbreak of 
the war in Europe, Sir Conyngham Greene, then 
British Ambassador at Tokio, made a formal re- 
quest on behalf of his Government for Japanese 
assistance under the terms of the alliance. On 
August 4, Baron Kato, then Japanese Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, replied that Japan would be ready 
to meet the responsibilities which she had assumed 
according to the terms of the alliance. Thus, on 
August 14, Japan sent an ultimatum to the Ger- 
man Government, demanding Germany to withdraw 
from the Far East entirely. Upon Germany's fail- 



be two Powers ranged against us alone in the Far East. That 
fact clearly and evidently makes for what is the greatest 
interest of the civiHsed world — the interest of peace." Appar- 
ently, Mr. Balfour did not think that a war between Japan 
and Russia alone would disturb the peace of the world. 
Lord Lansdowne, who concluded the alliance, was more prac- 
tical. Speaking in the House of Lords on the same day, he 
said : "It is an agreement which will make for the main- 
tenance of the peace of the world, and should that peace 
unfortunately be broken, its effect will be to restrict the area 
within which hostilities are likely to take place." 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 131 

ure to accept, Japan issued, on August 23, the dec- 
laration of war, in which she referred to the obli- 
gation she incurred under the alliance as the ground 
for her action. 

In view of these facts, it will be presuming too 
much upon the intelligence of the world to say that 
the alliance has succeeded in preserving the peace 
in the Far East. China has very strong reasons 
for complaining against the failure of the Contract- 
ing Powers to carry out the fundamental object, 
as it has been so called, of the alliance. Of course, 
whether the alliance has or has not succeeded in 
maintaining peace in the Far East is a question that 
does not directly concern China. But the fact that, 
because of its failure to maintain peace, wars were 
fought right on the Chinese territory, is a serious 
question which China cannot overlook. The Russo^ 
Japanese War was fought in Manchuria, and the 
Anglo- Japanese attack upon the German fortress at 
Tsingtao was carried on in the Province of Shan- 
tung. China's neutrality was violated; her sov- 
ereignty was infringed upon; and her territorial 
rights were totally disregarded. And what is worse 
is that, after each conflict, the victorious party re- 
mains on the Chinese territory! Japan would not 
'have closed the Open Door in Manchuria had she 
not secured for herself as a result of the Russo- 
Japanese War such a stronghold therein as to 
enable her to do whatever she might please; and 
she would not have been in Shantung to-day if she 



132 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

had not been requested under the terms of the al- 
liance to dispossess the Germans from their leased 
territory in China, so as to maintain peace in the 
Far East. These violations of China's neutrality, 
encroachments upon her sovereign rights, and at- 
tacks upon her territorial integrity — are they not, 
one and all, the direct blessings of the Anglo- Japa- 
nese alliance? For these blessings, China should 
be thankful to none but Japan and Great Britain, 
who contracted the alliance to maintain peace only 
to have war. 



VII 
CONCLUSION 

WHAT action is to be taken on the Anglo- 
Japanese alliance? Will the Washington 
conference permit it to be renewed, re- 
vised, and extended? Or, can a general under- 
standing be reached at the conference to take the 
place of the alliance? 

Strictly speaking, the alliance is an affair exclu- 
sively between Japan and Great Britain. These two 
Powers are, therefore, disposed, at least technically, 
to take the view that the question of the renewal 
or non-renewal of the alliance is separate from the 
discussions of the armament conference. On the 
other hand, the fact is well recognised that these 
two questions are interdependent, and that neither 
Japan, nor Great Britain, nor the United States can 
proceed far with either question without the other. 
It is not at all unlikely, particularly in view of the 
fact that the armament conference is also to discuss 
the Pacific and Far Eastern problems, that some 
general understanding on broad principles will be 
reached among the Powers interested in the Pacific 
and the Far East so as to make the renewal of the 
alliance entirely unnecessary. 

There is a general belief that the Washington 
133 



134 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

conference on limitation of armaments furnishes 
the opportunity of developing the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance into an agreement among all the Powers 
interested in the Eastern hemisphere. The New 
York Evening Post points out that, "if we only 
will, we can seize upon this question of the Anglo- 
Japanese alliance and expand it into a grand assize 
of the Pacific." Viscount Kato of Japan said that 
the prime motive of the Washington conference 
lay in the common desire of Great Britain and the 
United States to seek some agreement between 
themselves, and between them and Japan, in the 
hope of replacing the Anglo-Japanese alliance. 

The hope that a Pacific understanding of some 
kind would result from the Washington confer- 
ence so as to take the place of the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance is shared by many responsible statesmen 
of British Dominions and frankly avowed by the 
British Prime Minister. In his speech to the House 
of Commons on August 18, 1921, while saying 
ditto to the American Secretary of State in regard 
to the programme of the Washington conference 
and praising the loyalty of the Japanese to the treaty 
of alliance, the British Prime Minister made it quite 
plain that England would be at once pleased and 
relieved if the outcome of the deliberations at 
Washington could put aside the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance and substitute for it a Pacific Ocean under- 
standing in which all the Powers, including China, 
especially interested in the great problems of the 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 135 

Pacific and of the Far East are ready to join. In 
other words, the British Premier, like many of his 
fellow countrymen, has seen in the Washington 
conference an opportunity of evolving some dip- 
lomatic formula which can take the place of the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance. "In the part of his speech 
in the Commons which dealt with the Japanese al- 
liance," the New York Times remarked, ''Mr. 
Lloyd George had the air of a man rubbing his 
hands over happily getting rid of a troublesome 
question." But the ''troublesome question" has not 
yet been gotten rid of. The question is one yet to 
be solved. There had been some doubt at first 
whether the joint communication to the League of 
Nations about the treaty of the alliance had not 
had the legal effect of "denouncing" it. But the 
Lord High Chancellor has since definitely decided 
that it had not — a view shared by the Japanese 
Government itself. The treaty of alliance is, there- 
fore, by its own terms, in force for one more year, 
and will continue to be in force indefinitely until 
one year after its denunciation. And in the second 
place, there is no assurance that any hard and fast 
understanding such as the British or the Japanese 
diplomats might expect will emerge from the Wash- 
ington conference with the United States and China 
as its contracting parties. China has learned to 
cherish great suspicions against the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance or any similar international agreement. As 
the Chinese Minister at Washington has pointed 



136 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

out, the Anglo-Japanese alliance "is a warlike 
measure designed by England and Japan to protect 
their interests in the Far East." It can be taken 
for granted that China will not bind herself to any 
"warlike measure" which seeks to further Anglo- 
Japanese interests in the Far East. In the past, the 
alliance has been nothing but a diplomatic instru- 
ment which safeguards and improves the interests 
of Japan and Great Britain in the Far East largely 
at the expense of China. Is it likely, or is it think- 
able, that China will lend her hand in the making 
of the rope which is designed for her own strangu- 
lation ? 

On the other hand, the attitude of the United 
States towards entangling alliances is too well- 
known to be pointed out here. The United States 
will not enter into any agreement partaking the 
nature of an alliance, nor will she become a party 
to any understanding which binds her to a certain 
course of action in the Pacific and in the Far East 
other than that of maintaining peace on the basis 
of the Open Door and equality of opportunity. 
This is not in the nature of a political prediction. 
The policy of the United States towards entangling 
engagements is well known, and no one need be a 
political prophet in order to be able to foretell what 
she might or might not do in regard to proposals 
of an Anglo-American-Chinese-Japanese alliance. 
Thus, when Premier Lloyd George expressed the 
hope in the House of Commons that Great Britain's 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 137 

alliance with Japan may yet emerge into a greater 
understanding between Great Britain, Japan, the 
United States and China on all problems of the Pa- 
cific to serve as a guarantee of peace in that region, 
the administration at Washington was ominously 
silent, and no indication has been forthcoming that 
the hope so generally cherished by the statesmen 
of Great Britain will be realised as a result of the 
Washington conference. *'But a common under- 
standing between the Powers interested in the Far 
East, with a view to maintaining peace on the basis 
of the Open Door and equality of opportunity, 
would be welcome to the Administration," said the 
Washington correspondent of the New York Times 
in a special despatch to that paper, August 19, 
1921. "Officials are inclined to make sharp distinc- 
tions between the kind of agreements that might 
be entered into," he continued. "In the usually 
accepted sense, an alliance is an agreement entered 
into by two or more Powers to protect particular 
interests. In the modern acceptance of an agree- 
ment, the Contracting Parties reach an accord upon 
common principles which are to actuate them in 
their dealings with the other parties. It is this kind 
of understanding that the Harding Administration 
would be likely to take an interest in. Whether the 
United States would be willing to enter a tripartite 
understanding to the extent of agreeing to a cer- 
tain course of action is doubtful." In other words, 
what the United States would like to arrange is an 



138 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

agreement among all the Powers interested in the 
Pacific upon the principles that shall govern them 
in dealing with the questions that may arise in the 
Eastern Hemisphere. It will be an agreement to 
which China can become a willing and consenting 
party. The British statesmen and diplomatists may 
send out all their trial balloons to test the public 
sentiment in the United States. They are, one and 
all, destined to collapse, if their goal is a hard and 
fast agreement to take the place of the Anglo- Japa- 
nese alliance, the renewal of which Japanese states- 
men have endeavoured to bring about, but British 
statesmen have apparently decided to avoid. The 
United States cannot be expected to allow herself to 
be tied to the wheels of the chariot of Anglo-Japa- 
nese diplomacy, and it would be foolish to suppose 
that the nation which has declined even to become a 
member of the League of Nations could ever be 
persuaded to form a hide-bound partnership with 
Japan and Great Britain. While it is not impos- 
sible, in fact, it is to be hoped for, that as a result 
of the Washington conference a general under- 
standing will be reached in regard to the problems 
in the Pacific and the Far East, it is entirely out 
of question that either China or the United States 
will enter into any agreement that has as its ob- 
ject the protection of special interests of particular 
Powers in the Far East, as it is the case with the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance. 

The question will naturally arise: To what kind 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 139 

of agreement will China become a consenting and 
willing party? Of course, China's position vis-a- 
vis the Anglo-Japanese alliance is well known and 
requires no further elucidation. It is to be ex- 
pected that she will vigorously oppose any attempt 
to bring about an international agreement that is 
similar to the Anglo- Japanese alliance in object and 
in practice. She will perhaps be ready to consent 
to an agreement in which the Powers, instead of 
undertaking, as it has been their favourite pastime 
in the past, to guarantee her independence and in- 
tegrity, pledge themselves not to encroach upon 
China and to redeem their existing relations which 
seriously affect her independence and integrity. In 
other words, China will welcome a negative under- 
taking, instead of a positive guarantee. At present, 
there are in existence more than ten treaties and 
agreements in which China's integrity and inde- 
pendence are guaranteed, but none of which have 
been of any effect. China has never asked any 
Power to guarantee her independence and integrity; 
what she wants is that the Powers do not violate 
them. To assimie the role of a guarantor without 
reference to her wishes is a humiliating insult, 
which can be easily appreciated by the Powers them- 
selves. And then China will perhaps also be ready 
to consent to an agreement in which the Powers, 
instead of proclaiming once again the Open Door 
policy and the principle of equal opportunities for 
all nations, merely undertake not to do anything to 



140 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 

obstruct China's economic development. In other 
words, China welcomes an engagement by the Pow- 
ers not to obstruct her economic freedom, instead 
of an undertaking by them for the maintenance of 
the Open Door policy. Of course, it is needless 
to add that any agreement that tends to preserve 
peace in the Far East and in the world is welcome 
to China. 

But the last Power to be heard from is Japan, 
who can really help make the Washington confer- 
ence a success or a failure. It is a well-known 
fact that Japan is very anxious to continue the al- 
liance, and through her opposition or approval, an 
international agreement along the lines such as sug- 
gested above may become a possibility or merely a 
day dream. 

It is interesting to examine the reasons given for 
the renewal of the alliance. From the Japanese 
point of view, it is urged that the friendly relations 
between Japan and Great Britain require the con- 
tinuance of the alliance; that unless it is renewed, 
Japan will be diplomatically isolated; and that it 
is still needed in view of the Bolshevik menace 
from Russia. On the other hand. Great Britain 
is lukewarm in her interest in the continuance of 
the alliance, as can be seen from the public utter- 
ances of her leading statesmen. Whatever argu- 
ments there are in favour of the alliance, they are 
offered by Premier Hughes of Australia, who, nev- 
ertheless, like all his colleagues, thinks of the al- 



AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 141 

liance predominantly in terms of the United States. 
He favours the renewal of the alliance on the 
ground that it affords the cheapest means of pro- 
tection for Australia,* that Great Britain would be 
in a better position to exercise her influence upon 
Japan's policy as an ally rather than as a potential 
enemy. Besides these two reasons, there seems to 
be in England a general feehng that, for a country 



* In this connection, it is highly interesting to remember 
the argument which Premier Hughes of Australia has ad- 
vanced in urging the renewal of the alliance, and to compare 
it with the statement which he had made in 1911, when the 
alliance was under revision. In 1911, Premier Hughes, among 
the supporters of the alliance, said that he welcomed it as 
giving Australia ten more years to strengthen her defence. 
His present argument is that the safety of Australia demands 
the continuance of the alliance which is regarded as the 
cheapest means of protection. This amounts to saying: "Aus- 
tralia is afraid of Japan, and it is therefore necessary to bind 
her in an alliance to diminish her danger and to save the cost 
of a huge navy." This point of view is very easy for the 
Japanese to understand. Under the caption "Alliance and 
Navy," the Jiji, a well-known Japanese daily, remarks sar- 
castically: "Mr. Hughes's attitude toward the alliance was 
cool in the spring of last year (1920) when Australia was 
determined to build a 'self -guaranteeing navy,' with Japan for 
their hypothetical enemy. But now (June, 1921) both the 
Premier (Mr, Hughes) and the Secretary of Finance (Sir 
Joseph Cook), who was formerly Secretary of Navy, extol 
the service of the Japanese Navy in the past and express 
themselves desirous of the maintenance of the same relations 
in future. Seeing that a battleship will cost Yen 80,000,000 
in the near future, and that it is no easy matter to build a 
really strategically efficient navy, it is quite reasonable for the 
Australian Government to try and economise naval expendi- 
ture by means of every diplomatic means. As it is almost 
unimaginable that so long as the Anglo-Japanese alliance 
remains in force Australia should be attacked by a third 
Power, _ why should they not ensure their national defence 
economically by making use of the alliance?" It is open to 
question, however, whether Premier Hughes's attitude repre- 
sents the real sentiment of the Australian people. 



142 CHINA, THE UNITED STATES 1 

which has been in continuous alliance with Por- | 
tugal since the twelfth century, it does not look i 
well to throw Japan over "after nearly twenty ] 
years of amicable intimacy." 

We need not go into the merits of the arguments, i 
Whether or not they can be considered as valid | 
reasons for urging the renewal of the alliance ought j 
to be very clear to those who have watched the 1 
international situation of to-day. There can be | 
no denying that Japan, for reasons apparently | 
other than those given above, is very anxious to : 
have the alliance renewed and extended, and she : 
will leave no stone unturned to achieve her ambi- j 
tion. Great Britain is, however, lukewarm in her i 
interest in the alliance, and owing to the objections | 
from the Dominions and China and America, she | 
is more than ready to drop it altogether. If the : 
alliance is to be dropped, she is, of course desirous > 
of avoiding "humiliating Japan and perhaps arous- ; 
ing within her a spirit which might react unfor- > 
tunately upon the situation in the Pacific." So, in j 
the last analysis, Japan is the one and only one ; 
Power who can help or kill the chance of sue- ; 
cessful arrival at a general understanding in place \ 
of the alliance. There can be no hope for such a ■ 
general understanding, if Japan has in view some- ; 
thing quite apart from the avowed objects of the i 
alliance. I 



APPENDIX A 

AGREEMENT BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND JAPAN, 

RELATIVE TO CHINA AND COREA (ALLIANCE, ETC.). 

SIGNED AT LONDON, JANUARY 30, 1902 

The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, actu- 
ated solely by a desire to maintain the status quo and 
general peace in the extreme East, being moreover 
specially interested in maintaining the independence 
and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and 
the Empire of Corea, and in securing equal oppor- 
tunities in those countries for the commerce and in- 
dustry of all nations, hereby agree as follows : — 

ARTICLE I 

The High Contracting Parties, having mutually rec- 
ognised the independence of China and Corea, de- 
clare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by any 
aggressive tendencies in either country. Having in 
view, however, their special interests of which those 
of Great Britain relate principally to China, while 
Japan, in addition to the interests which she pos- 
sesses in China, is interested in a peculiar degree politi- 
cally as well as commercially and industrially in Corea, 
the High Contracting Parties recognise that it will be 
admissible for either of them to take such measures 
as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those 
interests if threatened either by the aggressive action 

143 



144 APPENDICES 

of any other Power, or by disturbances arising in 
China or Corea, and necessitating the intervention of 
either of the High Contracting Parties for the pro- 
tection of the Hves and property of its subjects. 

ARTICLE II 

If either Great Britain or Japan, in the defence of 
their respective interests as above described, should 
become involved in war with another Power, the other 
High Contracting Party will maintain a strict neu- 
trality, and use its efforts to prevent other Powers 
from joining in hostilities against its ally. 

ARTICLE III 

If, in the above event, any other Power or Powers 
should join in hostilities against that ally, the other 
High Contracting Party will come to its assistance, 
and will conduct the war in common, and make peace 
in mutual agreement with it. 

ARTICLE IV 

The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of 
them will, without consulting the other, enter into 
separate arrangements with another Power to the 
prejudice of the interests above described. 

ARTICLE V 

Whenever, in opinion of either Great Britain or 
Japan, the above-mentioned interests are in jeopardy, 
the two Governments will communicate with one an- 
other fully and frankly. 



APPENDICES 145 

ARTICLE VI 

The present Agreement shall come into effect imme- 
diately after the date of its signature, and remain in 
force for five years from that date. 

In case neither of the High Contracting Parties 
should have notified twelve months before the expira- 
tion of the said five years the intention of terminating 
it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one 
year from the day on which either of the High Con- 
tracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when 
the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is 
actually engaged in war, the alliance, shall, ipso facto, 
continue until peace is concluded. 

In faith whereof the Undersigned, duly authorised 
by their respective Governments, have signed this 
Agreement, and have affixed thereto their seals. 

Done in duplicate at London, the 30th day of Janu- 
ary, 1902. 

(L.S.) Lansdowne, His Britannic Majesty's 
Principal Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs. 
(L.S.) Hayashi, Envoy Extraordinary and 
Minister Plenipotentiary of His 
Majesty the Emperor of Japan at 
the Court of St. James. 



APPENDIX B 

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. MacDonald 

Foreign Office, January 30, 1902. 
Sir: 

I have signed to-day, with the Japanese Minister, 
an Agreement between Great Britain and Japan, of 
which a copy is enclosed in this despatch. 

This Agreement may be regarded as the outcome 
of the events which have taken place during the last 
two years in the Far East, and of the part taken by 
Great Britain and Japan in dealing with them. 

Throughout the troubles and complications which 
arose in China consequent upon the Boxer outbreak 
and the attack upon the Peking Legations, the two 
Powers have been in close and uninterrupted commu- 
nication, and have been actuated by similar views. 

We have each of us desired that the integrity and 
independence of the Chinese Empire should be pre- 
served, that there should be no disturbance of the ter- 
ritorial status quo either in China or in the adjoining 
regions, that all nations should, within those regions, 
as well as within the limits of the Chinese Empire, 
be afforded equal opportunities for the development 
of their commerce and industry, and that peace should 
not only be restored, but should, for the future, be 
maintained. 

From the frequent exchanges of views which have 
taken place between the two Governments, and from 

146 



APPENDICES 147 

the discovery that their Far Eastern policy was iden- 
tical, it has resulted that each side has expressed the 
desire that their common policy should find expression 
in an international contract of binding validity. 

We have thought it desirable to record it in the 
Preamble of that instrument the main objects of our 
common policy in the Far East to which I have al- 
ready referred, and in the first Article we join in 
entirely disclaiming any aggressive tendencies either 
in China or Corea. We have, however, thought it 
necessary also to place on record the view entertained 
by both the High Contracting Parties, that, should their 
interests as above described be endangered, it will be 
admissible for either of them to take such measures 
as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those 
interests ; and words have been added which will ren- 
der it clear that such precautionary measures might 
become necessary and might be legitimately taken, 
not only in the case of aggressive action or of an 
actual attack by some other Power, but in the event 
of disturbances arising of a character to necessitate 
the intervention of either of the High Contracting 
Parties for the protection of the lives and property 
of its subjects. 

The principal obligations undertaken mutually by 
the High Contracting Parties are those of maintain- 
ing a strict neutrality in the event of either of them 
becoming involved in war, and of coming to one an- 
other's assistance in the event of either of them being 
confronted by the opposition of more than one hostile 
Power. Under the remaining provisions of the Agree- 
ment, the High Contracting Parties undertake that 



148 APPENDICES 

neither of them will, without consultation with the 
other, enter into separate arrangements with another 
Power to the prejudice of the interests described in 
the Agreement, and that whenever those interests are 
in jeopardy they will communicate with one another 
fully and frankly. 

The concluding Article has reference to the dura- 
tion of the Agreement which, after five years, is 
terminable by either of the High Contracting Parties 
at one year's notice. 

His Majesty's Government have been largely influ- 
enced in their decision to enter into this important 
contract by the conviction that it contains no provisions 
which can be regarded as an indication of aggressive 
or self-seeking tendencies in the regions to which it 
applies. It has been concluded purely as a measure of 
precaution, to be invoked, should occasion arise, in the 
defence of important British interests. It in no way 
threatens the present position or the legitimate inter- 
ests of other Powers. On the contrary, that part of 
it which renders either of the High Contracting Parties 
liable to be called upon by the other for assistance 
can operate only when one of the allies has found 
himself obliged to go to war in defence of interests 
which are common to both, when the circumstances 
in which he has taken this step are such as to estab- 
lish that the quarrel has not been of his own seeking, 
and when, being engaged in his own defence, he finds 
himself threatened, not by a single Power, but by a 
hostile coalition. 

His Majesty's Government trust that the Agree- 
ment may be found of mutual advantage to the two 



APPENDICES 149 

countries, that it will make for the preservation of 
peace, and that, should peace unfortunately be broken, 
it will have the effect of restricting the area of hos- 
tilities. 

I am, etc., 

Lansdowne. 



APPENDIX C 

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND \ 

JAPAN, SIGNED AT LONDON, 12tH AUGUST, 1905 j 

PREAMBLE 

The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, be- i 

ing desirous of replacing the Agreement concluded be- ; 

tween them on the 30th January, 1902, by fresh stipu- i 
lations, have agreed upon the f oUovi^ing Articles, which 
have for their object: 

(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the gen- j 
eral peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, i 

(b) The preservation of the common interests of ; 
all Powers in China by insuring the independence and ; 
integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of 
equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of | 
all nations in China. 

(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the | 
high contracting parties in the regions of Eastern Asia i 
and of India, and the defence of their special interests 1 
in the said regions. 

ARTICLE I I 

It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either \ 

Great Britain or Japan, any of the rights and inter- i 

ests referred to in the preamble of this Agreement j 

are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communi- | 
cate with one another fully and frankly, and will con- 

150 \ 



APPENDICES 151 

sider in common the measures which should be taken 
to safeguard those menaced rights or interests. 

ARTICLE II 

If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive 
action, whenever arising, on the part of any other 
Power or Powers, either contracting party should be 
involved in war in defence of its territorial rights 
or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this 
Agreement, the other contracting party will at once 
come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the 
war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement 
with it. 

ARTICLE III 

Japan possessing paramount political, military, and 
economic interests in Korea, Great Britain recognises 
the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, 
control, and protection in Korea as she may deem 
proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those 
interests, provided always such measures are not con- 
trary to the principle of equal opportunities for the 
commerce and industry of all nations. 

ARTICLE IV 

Great Britain having a special interest in all that 
concerns the security of the Indian frontier, Japan 
recognises her right to take such measures in the 
proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary 
for safeguarding her Indian possessions. 

ARTICLE V 

The high contracting parties agree that neither of 
them will, without consulting the other, enter into 



152 APPENDICES 

separate arrangements with another Power to the 
prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of 
this Agreement. 

ARTICLE VI 

As regards the present war between Japan and 
Russia, Great Britain will continue to maintain strict 
neutrality unless some other Power or Powers should 
join in hostilities against Japan, in which case Great 
Britain will come to the assistance of Japan, and will 
conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual 
agreement with Japan. 

ARTICLE VII 

The conditions under which armed assistance shall 
be afforded by either Power to the other in the cir- 
cumstances mentioned in the present Agreement, and 
the means by which such assistance is to be made 
available, will be arranged by naval and military au- 
thorities of the contracting parties, who will from 
time to time consult one another fully and freely 
upon all questions of mutual interest. 

ARTICLE VIII 

The present Agreement shall, subject to the pro- 
visions of Article VI, come into effect immediately 
after the date of its signature, and remain in force 
for ten years from that date. 

In case neither of the high contracting parties 
should have notified twelve months before the expira- 
tion of the said ten years the intention of terminating 
it, shall remain binding until the expiration of one 



APPENDICES 153 

year from the day on which either of the high con- 
tracting parties shall have denounced it. But if, when 
the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally 
is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, ipso facto, 
continue until peace is concluded. 

In faith whereof, the undersigned, duly authorised 
by their respective Governments, have signed this 
Agreement, and have affixed thereto their seals. 

Done in duplicate at London, the 12th day of Au- 
gust, 1905. 

Lansdowne, His Britannic Majesty's 
Principal Secretary of State for For- 
eign Affadrs. 
Tadasu Hayashi, Envoy Extraordinary 
and Minister Plenipotentiary of His 
Majesty the Emperor of Japan at the 
Court of St. James. 



/^APPENDIX D 

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. Hardinge 

Foreign Office, September 6, 1905. 
Sir: 

I enclose, for your Excellency's information, a copy 
of a new Agreement concluded between His Majesty's 
Government and that of Japan in substitution for that 
of the 30th of January, 1902. You will take an early 
opportunity of communicating the new Agreement to 
the Russian Government. 

It was signed on the 12th of August, and you will 
explain that it would have been immediately made 
public but for the fact that negotiations had at that 
time already commenced between Russia and Japan, 
and that the publication of such a document whilst 
those negotiations were still in progress would obvi- 
ously have been improper and inopportune. 

The Russian Government will, I trust, recognise that 
the new Agreement is an international instrument, to 
which no exception can be taken by any of the Pow- 
ers interested in the affairs of the Far East. You 
should call special attention to the objects mentioned 
in the preamble as those by which the policy of the 
contracting parties is inspired. His Majesty's Gov- 
ernment believes that they may count upon the good- 
will and support of all the Powers in endeavouring to 
maintain peace in Eastern Asia, and in seeking to 
uphold the integrity and independence of the Chinese 

154 



APPENDICES 155 

Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for 
the commerce and industry of all nations in that 
country. 

On the other hand, the special interests of the con- 
tracting parties are of a kind upon which they are 
full entitled to insist, and the announcement that those 
interests must be safeguarded is one which can create 
no surprise, and need give rise to no misgivings. 

I call your special attention to the wording of Arti- 
cle II, which lays down distinctly that it is only in 
the case of an unprovoked attack made on one of the 
contracting parties by another Power or Powers, and 
when that party is defending its territorial rights and 
special interests from aggressive action, that the other 
party is bound to come to its assistance. 

Article III, dealing with the question of Korea, is 
deserving of special attention. It recognises in the 
clearest terms the paramount position which Japan 
at this moment occupies, and must henceforth occupy 
in Korea, and her right to take any measures which 
she may find necessary for the protection of her po- 
litical, military, and economic interests in that coun- 
try. It is, however, expressly provided that such 
measures must not be contrary to the principle of 
equal opportunities for the commerce and industry 
of other nations. The new Treaty no doubt differs 
at this point conspicuously from that of 1902. It has, 
however, become evident that Korea, owing to its 
close proximity of the Japanese Empire, and its ina- 
bility to stand alone, must fall under the control and 
tutelage of Japan. 

His Majesty's Government observe with satisfac- 



156 APPENDICES 

tion that this point was readily conceded by Russia 
in the Treaty of Peace recently concluded with Japan, 
and they have every reason to believe that similar 
views are held by other Powers with regard to the 
relations which should subsist between Japan and 
Korea. 

His Majesty^s Government venture to anticipate 
that the alliance thus concluded, designed as it is 
with objects which are purely peaceful, and for the 
protection of rights and interests, the validity of which 
cannot be contested, will be regarded with approval 
by the Government to which you are accredited. They 
are justified in believing that its conclusion may not 
have been without effect in facilitating the settlement 
by which the war has been so happily brought to an 
end, and they earnestly trust that it may, for many 
years to come, be instrumental in securing the peace 
of the world in those regions which come within its 
scope. 

I am, etc., 

(Signed) Lansdowne. 



APPENDIX E 

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND 
JAPAN, SIGNED AT LONDON, JULY 13, 1911 

PREAMBLE 

The Government of Japan and the Government of 
Great Britain having in view the important changes 
which have taken place in the situation since the con- 
clusion of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of August 
12, 1905, and believing that the revision of that Agree- 
ment responding to such changes would contribute to 
general stability and repose, have agreed upon the 
following stipulations to replace the Agreement above 
mentioned, such stipulations having the same object 
as the said Agreement, namely: 

A. — The consolidation and maintenance of the gen- 
eral peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and India. 

B. — The preservation of the common interests of 
all the Powers in China by insuring the independence 
and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the princi- 
ple of equal opportunities for the commerce and indus- 
try of all nations in China. 

C. — The maintenance of the territorial rights of 
the High Contracting Parties in the regions of East- 
ern Asia and of India and the defence of their special 
interests in those regions: — 

ARTICLE I 

It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either 
Japan or Great Britain, any of the rights and interests 

157 



158 APPENDICES 

referred to in the preamble of this Agreement are in 
jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with 
one another fully and frankly, and will consider in 
common the measures which should be taken to safe- 
guard those menaced rights and interests. 

ARTICLE II 

If by reason of an unprovoked attack or aggressive 
action, wherever arising, on the part of any other 
Power or Powers, either of the High Contracting 
Parties should be involved in war in defence of its 
territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the 
preamble of this Agreement, the other High Con- 
tracting Party will at once come to the assistance of 
its Ally and will conduct the war in common and 
make peace in mutual agreement with it. 

ARTICLE III 

The High Contracting Parties agree that neither 
of them will, without consulting the other, enter into 
a separate agreement with another Power to the preju- 
dice of the objects described in the preamble of this 
Agreement. 

ARTICLE IV 

Should either of the High Contracting Parties con- 
clude a treaty of general arbitration with a third 
Power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement 
shall impose on such contracting party an obligation to 
go to war with the Power with whom such an arbitra- 
tion treaty is in force. 



APPENDICES 159 

ARTICLE V 

The conditions under which armed assistance shall 
be afforded by either Power to the other in circum- 
stances entered into the present Agreement, and the 
means by which such assistance is to be made avail- 
able, will be arranged by the military and naval au- 
thorities of the High Contracting Parties, who will 
from time to time consult one another fully and 
frankly upon all questions of mutual interests. 

ARTICLE VI 

The present Agreement shall come into effect imme- 
diately after the date of its signature, and remain in 
force for ten years from that date. In case neither 
of the High Contracting Parties should have notified 
twelve months before the expiration the intention of 
terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expi- 
ration of one year from the day on which either of 
the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced 
it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration ar- 
rives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the Alli- 
ance shall, ipso facto, continue until peace is con- 
cluded. 

In faith whereof the undersigned, duly authorised by 
their respective Governments, have signed this Agree- 
ment and have affixed their seals thereto. Done at 
London July 13, 1911. 

T. Kato, the Ambassador of His Maj- 
esty the Emperor of Japan at the 
Court of St. James. 
Edward Grey, H.B.Mfs Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs. 



APPENDIX F 

The views and opinions of the Chinese people on 
the subject of the Anglo- Japanese alliance and its re- 
newal are well known. They are, however, best em- 
bodied in the memorandum which ten important 
Chinese organisations in Shanghai had presented to 
Sir Beilby Alston, British Minister to Peking, who 
was on his way to London on furlough, July, 1920. 
The document, setting forth the reasons for which 
the Chinese people have objected to the continuance of 
the alliance, was signed by The Educational Associa- 
tion of Kiangsu Province; The Shanghai City Cham- 
ber of Commerce ; The Chinese Bankers' Association ; 
The Chinese Cotton Mill Owners' Association; The 
Shanghai Educational Association; The Western Re- 
turned Students' Union; The World's Chinese Stu- 
dents' Federation; The Overseas Federation; The 
Chinese Christian Union; and The National Associa- 
tion of Vocational Education of China. It reads: 

"This memorandum is drawn up in order to call 
the attention of the British Government to the rapidly 
growing public sentiment in China against the renewal 
of the Anglo- Japanese alliance, at least in its present 
form. 

"It is to be conceded at the outset that it is not 
an appropriate act for a third party to interfere when 
two governments desire to enter into an alliance or to 
renew an existing one; but it will be the duty of the 
third party to register its objection if the alliance 

160 



APPENDICES ;i61 

so contracted directly concerns the welfare of the third 
party. 

"The Anglo- Japanese alliance does concern the wel- 
fare of China; for, in section B of the preamble of 
the alliance, in the text of both the 1905 and 1911 
agreements, matters affecting China's international 
standing and relations were specially treated. 

"The Chinese people will look to their Government 
to take diplomatic steps to register China's objections 
to its renewal without consulting China. 

"The present memorandum merely sets forth the 
views of the Chinese people, as reflected through the 
various organisations in whose name this statement is 
made. 

"The question is dealt with here only in these aspects 
which touch upon the interests of China. 

"In forming an alliance, there are, at least, two mo- 
tives to be accounted for: 

"First, what are the objects to be attained? 

"And, secondly, what are the antagonisms to be 
offset? 

"The objects of the Anglo- Japanese alliance, pre- 
sumably, were to protect the interests of Great Britain 
and Japan in the Far East, and the antagonisms were 
at first the power and policy of Russia and later 
those of Germany. 

"The two motives are, in the last analysis, really 
only one— to combine the strength and resources of 
Great Britain and of Japan in order to protect their 
interests in the Far East, which were considered to 
be identical, from a common enemy, at first Russia 
and later Germany. 



162 APPENDICES 

"These motives do not exist now. Russia fought 
on the side of the AlHes for over three years and, in 
spite of the Revolution, which crippled her as a fight- 
ing unit for the Allies, its menace to East Asia as an 
aggressive power no longer exists. She is in no posi- 
tion to endanger the interests of Great Britain or 
Japan. ? Ij 

"The power of Germany before the Great War was 
indeed most threatening. Her navy was rapidly de- 
veloped, so as to challenge the British supremacy. 
Realising her growing strength she did not even take 
the trouble to conceal her policy of the conquest of 
the world. 

"What the Great War has done to Germany needs 
no comment. It may be said without any fear of con- 
tradiction that Germany is no more a menace to the 
interests of Great Britain and Japan in East Asia. 

"With the elimination of these Powers antagonistic 
to the contracting parties, the motives calling forth 
the alliance are also removed. 

"We therefore maintain that there is no necessity 
to renew the alliance unless there should arise a new 
enemy. So far as we are aware, no such enemy exists. 

"The United States of America is the only Power 
that has the strength to be a menace to the Anglo- 
Japanese interests in the East ; but history has demon- 
strated America's disinterestedness in China. 

"She is not likely to change overnight her tradi- 
tional policy of friendship for China, her Hay doc- 
trine of the 'open door' and equal opportunities, to an 
aggressive attitude. 

"The objects of the Anglo- Japanese alliance, as 



APPENDICES 163 

far as China is concerned, are specific and unequivocal, 

"Section B of the preamble says: The preserva- 
tion of the common interests of the Powers in China 
by insuring the independence and integrity of the 
Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportuni- 
ties for the commerce and industry of all nations in 
China/ 

"Japan's actions, however, are at variance with her 
professions. When Europe was desperately engaged 
in a lif e-and-death struggle for liberty, Japan presented 
to China, January 18, 1915, the well-known Twenty- 
one Demands/ 

"These demands could only be matched in spirit 
and purpose with the demands Austria made upon 
Servia which led to the World War. 

"The dark designs of the demands were greatly 
heightened by Japan's unusual actions. Instead of pre- 
senting these demands through the regular diplomatic 
channel of the Chinese Government, its Foreign Office, 
the Japanese Minister handed the same to President 
Yuan Shih-k'ai directly, who was required to main- 
tain utter secrecy and to take speedy action. 

"When secrecy could no longer be maintained, Japan 
at first made official denial of the existence of any of 
the demands, then the existence of some of them, and 
finally had to confess to the existence of all of them. 

"The demands cannot stand any scrutiny without 
arousing indignation, even among impartial observers 
of Far Eastern affairs. 

"We will quote the words of a well-known British 
pubHcist whose analysis of the demands will go to 
show such indignation. 



164 APPENDICES 

"In the first group of these articles China concedes 
in advance any arrangements that Japan might in 
the future make with Germany regarding the posses- 
sion of Kiao-chow and other rights in the province 
of Shantung. The way was thus paved for Japan's 
later victory at the Peace Conference. 

"In the second group of articles Japan demands that 
China recognise Japan's special privileges in Man- 
churia, privileges accorded to no other nation. P'or 
example, Article 3 reads : 

" 'Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel 
in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia and 
engage in business and manufacture of any kind what- 
soever. 

" Article 4 — The Chinese Government agrees to 
grant to Japanese subjects the right of opening the 
mines in South Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia. 

" Article 6 — If the Chinese Government employs po- 
litical, financial, or military advisers or instructors in 
South Manchuria or Eastern Mongolia, the Japanese 
Government shall first be consulted.' 

"That is how Japan kept her promise to maintain 
the 'open door' and the independence of China in 
Manchuria. In Group IV, furthermore: 

" 'The Chinese Government engages not to cede or 
lease to any third power any harbour or bay or island 
along the coast of China.' 

"Even this group, however, did not offer the worst 
instance of special privilege or infringement of 
China's sovereignty. The articles of Group V go 
further : 

" The Chinese Government shall employ influential 



APPENDICES 165 

Japanese advisers in political, financial and military 
affairs. 

" The police departments of important places (in 
China) shall be jointly administered by Japanese and 
Chinese or the police departments of these places 
shall employ numerous Japanese, so that they may 
at the same time help to plan for the improvement 
of the Chinese Police Service. 

" 'China shall purchase from Japan a fixed amount 
of munitions of war (say fifty per cent, or more) of 
what is needed by the Chinese Government or there 
shall be established in China a Sino- Japanese jointly 
worked arsenal. Japanese technical experts are to be 
employed and Japanese material to be purchased. 

" 'If China needs foreign capital to work mines, 
build railways and construct harbour work (includ- 
ing dock-yards) in the province of Fukien, Japan shall 
be first consulted.' 

"In making these demands Japan broke at least six 
solemn public promises. That she had forgotten 
neither the spirit nor the letter of these promises, and 
that she was ready to break one more, is a fact con- 
firmed by a statement issued on May 6, 1915, by Bryan : 

" *At the beginning of negotiations the Japanese Gov- 
ernment confidentially informed this Government (the 
United States) of the matters which were under dis- 
cussion, and accompanied the information with the 
assurance that Japan had no intention of interfering 
with either the political independence or territorial 
integrity of China and that nothing she proposed 
would discriminate against other Powers having 
treaties with China, or interfere with the 'open door' 



166 APPENDICES ] 

policy to which all the leading nations are com- ; 

mitted/ i 

"What are we to think of the pledged word of a i 

nation which could vouch for such assurances at a i 

time when its Government was attempting to wrench | 

from China the control of her own armament and i 

her own territory? j 

"Through just such stages did Korea slowly sue- \ 

cumb, that same Korea whose 'independence' was once ; 
as firmly guaranteed by Japan. , 

"This fact was clear to China and to all the world, i 

and an indignant public opinion in China, England ] 

and America prevented China's signing the articles ] 

under Groups IV and V. i 

"The position of Great Britain was made quite em- j 

barrassing by Japan's actions, both during the war i 

and at the Peace Conference, when dealing with the | 

Shantung question. ■ 

"Great Britain declared war against Germany on \ 

account of the latter's attack on France and viola- | 

tion of the neutrahty of Belgium ; yet she had to give ; 

tacit consent to Japan's violation of the neutrality of \ 

China when Japan declared war on Germany and i 

undertook to reduce the German hold at Kiao-chow. : 

"Instead of landing her forces within the leased ter- I 

ritory of Kiaochow, as the British did, she took them ; 

to Lungkow, a point two hundred miles to the north- j 

west of Tsingtao ; and again, instead of marching her i 

soldiers southeastward towards the point of attack, | 

namely, Tsingtao, they pushed southwestward towards i 

Tsinan, the capital of Shantung, which was then neu- ; 

tral territory. i 



APPENDICES 167 

"Great Britain was further embarrassed by the secret 
agreement entered into between herself and Japan on 
February 16, 1917, wherein she promised to support 
Japan on the Shantung question at the Peace Con- 
ference. 

"This promise was the price Great Britain had to 
pay in order to retain Japan's support in the prose- 
cution of the war; yet it was made at the time when 
China was being induced to join in the war on the 
side of the Allies, which she afterwards actually did. 

"The Chinese people learned with great pain of 
the existence of this secret agreement, when it was 
made known at the Peace Conference, knowing fully 
well its effect upon the Shantung question as Great 
Britain would feel in honour bound to maintain the 
agreement. 

"During the last two decades there has developed 
the practice among the Powers of treating China as a 
semi-dependent country. Instead of treating directly 
with China concerning her affairs and welfare, they 
treated among themselves as if China were a mere 
diplomatic appendage. The Chinese people cannot but 
regard such practice with apprehension and resent- 
ment, especially in the case where a certain Power 
assumes a paternal diplomatic relationship to China 
and pretends to exercise a right to intervene in the 
diplomatic intercourse between China and any other 
country. 

"Even the United States Government made the same 
mistake in the exchange of the Lansing-Ishii notes 
without consulting China. The Chinese Government 
had to file a protest against it. The United States of 



168 APPENDICES 

America has always maintained the most friendly atti- 
tude towards China, but we refuse to be treated except 
as an independent nation exercising full sovereign 
rights. 

"With the formal ratification by China of the Aus- 
trian Treaty (of Peace), which she signed with the 
Allied Powers on the one hand and Austria on the 
other, we became a full member of the League of 
Nations. 

"A renewal of the Anglo- Japanese alHance under 
the existing or similar terms, taken with the previous 
interpretation of the alliance in practice, will cause 
the Chinese strongly to suspect that, when China 
takes an appeal to the League of Nations for redress 
of her grievances. Great Britain and Japan will be 
found to have made a private agreement prejudicial 
to China's case, and which may adversely affect China's 
hope of obtaining justice from the League. 

"This has been amply borne out by the secret agree- 
ment made between Great Britain and Japan on Feb- 
ruary 16, 1917, which was one of the chief factors, 
if not the chief factor, in deciding the Shantung ques- 
tion in favour of Japan. China was obliged to refrain 
from signing the German Treat}/- as a protest against 
the injustice of the settlement. 

"We would wish to see that Great Britain will 
make no further entangling alliances which might tie 
her hands again on questions brought by China before 
the League of Nations. 

In presenting this memorandum to the British 
Government we merely voice the sentiment of the 
people. In our humble opinion the changed conditions 



APPENDICES 169 

of the world to-day do not call for any further re- 
newal of the Anglo- Japanese alliance. 

"The motives of the alliance, so far as they con- 
cern China, do not exist to-day. The aggressive and 
imperialistic policy of Russia and Germany has passed 
away and there is no further menace from any other 
Power. 

"The violation of the objects of the alliance by Japan 
has seriously embarrassed Great Britain. The renewal 
of the alliance, at least under the existing or similar 
terms, tends only to irritate China on the one hand 
and to cause Great Britain to share the distrust of 
the Chinese people so widely and deeply entertained 
towards Japan. 

"Besides, a renewal of the alliance will only cause 
the Chinese people strongly to suspect Great Britain's 
having some other motives, as the Covenant of the 
League of Nations covers the ground of the alliance, 
and China is an original member of the League." 



APPENDIX G 

london china association's letter to the british 
foreign office 

China Association, 

99, Cannon Street, E. C, 
London, June 21st, 1921. 
Sir: 

My Committee have the honour to lay before His 
Majesty's Government certain points likely to affect 
British interests in China, which they respectfully hope 
will be taken into consideration by His Majesty's Gov- 
ernment when dealing with the question of the renewal 
or modification of the Treaty of Alliance between 
Great Britain and Japan. 
The advantages of the alliance to both countries 
were clearly demonstrated in 1904 and 1914, and in 
view of the unsettled state of affairs still prevailing 
in so large a portion of Asia, we would lay great stress 
upon the importance of maintaining the cordial rela- 
tions between this country and Japan which have 
existed for so many years. 

According to the representations made to us from 
China, there can be little doubt that a strong feeling 
has arisen in that country that one at least of the 
stipulations of the Treaty has not been carried out 
in practice — the clause referred to is that for the 
preservation of the common interests of all Powers in 
China by ensuring the independence and integrity of 

170 



APPENDICES 171 

the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal oppor- 
tunities for the commerce and industry of all Nations 
in China. A concrete case in supporting this conten- 
tion is the Japanese action in Shantung to which my 
Committee called attention in detail on the 8th Febru- 
ary, 1920. We are informed that the situation there 
is still unsatisfactory. The Chinese view is that the 
terms of the Treaty have not been conscientiously car- 
ried out, and that a renewal of the Treaty upon the 
same terms, after this non-fulfilment, would be tanta- 
mount to recognition of the status quo, and could not 
therefore be looked upon as a friendly act on the part 
of Great Britain. It is reported that an important 
section of public opinion in Japan is inclined to regard 
the action of their Government in Shantung as ill- 
advised, and from an economic point of view, a failure. 
If therefore, His Majesty's Government could take 
any steps to bring about a friendly settlement of this 
question in accordance with the terms of the Anglo- 
Japanese alliance treaty, we believe their efforts 
would be appreciated by China and would be wel- 
comed by many in Japan. 

In any case my Committee hope that His Majesty's 
Government will give consideration to the feeling in 
China to which we have drawn attention. 

Another point about which the Chinese people are 
somewhat sensitive is that any Agreement affecting 
their country or their sovereign rights should be con- 
cluded by foreign Powers, otherwise than in con- 
sultation with them. 

As regards the situation generally my Committee is 
of opinion that Great Britain has no interest in China 



172 -APPENDICES 

which is not shared by the Dominions, by America, 
by France, and by Japan as laid down by her leading 
statesmen in public utterances. 

It would be idle to deny that there is a powerful 
party in Japan in favour of a policy in China which 
is entirely at variance with the spirit of the Anglo- 
Japanese Treaty, but we assume that the settled policy 
of the Japanese Government will conform to the terms 
of any Treaty to which it attaches its signature. 

If then the interests of the four great Powers in 
China are identical, if these interests consist as we 
believe they do, in promoting a reconstructive poHcy 
in China, in uniting to carry out in practice the terms 
of the Anglo- Japanese Treaty, in ensuring the inde- 
pendence and integrity of China and the principle of 
equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of 
all nations, and further in assisting China to estab- 
lish a stable Government capable of maintaining peace 
and order within her borders, we are of opinion that 
a development of the Japanese alliance into an agree- 
ment between the four great Powers would do much 
to consolidate and maintain the General peace of the 
Far East for many years to come. 

In the Consortium financial groups representing the 
four Powers have already come to an Agreement 
regarding some forms of industrial development in 
China. My Committee respectfully suggest that it is 
worthy of consideration whether the four Governments 
could not conclude an Agreement constituting a na- 
tional Consortium, in which China might be invited 
to join. We believe an Agreement of this kind would 
enlist the active sympathy and co-operation of a large 



APPENDICES 173 

and influential portion of the people of China, who 
would welcome an opportunity of re-establishing the 
stability of the country and promoting its prosperity 
and welfare. 

The course indicated would at the same time add 
to the prosperity of all' other nations' interests in the 
Far East, perhaps most of all to the prosperity of our 
Ally, Japan. 

My Committee recognise that there are other and 
wider interests involved in the question of a renewal 
of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, but they refrain from 
discussing these aspects of the question, being outside 
the scope of the activities of their Association. 
I have, etc., 

(Signed) F. Anderson, Chairman. 
H. M. Under Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs, 
Downing Street, 
S. W. I. 



APPENDIX H 

CHINESE OFFICIAL STATEMENT TO THE PRESS, 
JUNE 6, 1920 

"Three months ago the attention of the Chinese 
Government was drawn to statements appearing in 
the world's press regarding the renewal or termina- 
tion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Inasmuch as an 
important element in the text of both of the 1905 and 
1911 agreements was section B of the preamble, which 
treated of matters affecting China's international stand- 
ing and international relations without the prior con- 
sent of China having been obtained, and inasmuch as 
public opinion throughout the Republic had long shown 
deep resentment at this condition of affairs, the 
Chinese Government decided that the time has ar- 
rived to address representations to the British Gov- 
ernment. 

"Instructions were consequently sent to the Chinese 
Minister in London to make formal enquiries regard- 
ing the reports appearing in the press and to point 
out that while obviously the international arrange- 
ments of other Powers did not in the ordinary course 
of events concern others than the High Contracting 
Parties, the treatment of China merely as a territorial 
entity in the written text of any such agreements would 
no longer be tolerated by the public opinion of the 
country and would indeed be viewed by all as an un- 
friendly act. 

174 



APPENDICES 175 

"To these first enquiries China received the follow- 
ing verbal reply : first, that the question of the renewal 
or the termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance had 
not yet come up for consideration ; secondly, that inas- 
much as the successive agreements had been couched 
in the same language, it would naturally follow that 
if the alliance were renewed it must follow the same 
lines. 

"In consequence of this reply a Memorandum was 
prepared analysing the three successive Alliance in- 
struments and establishing clearly (A) that the orig- 
inal instrument of 1902 was radically different from 
the 1905 agreement in that the independence of Korea 
was specifically guaranteed in the first; (B) that the 
agreement of 1905 so far from being identical in- 
cluded India for the first time within its scope, 
whilst Korea was relegated to a subordinate position 
and clearly earmarked for annexation; and (C) that 
the agreement of 1911 introduced into the Preamble 
the definite statement 'having in view the important 
changes which have taken place in the situation, etc.,' 
and then definitely dropped all reference to the num- 
bered articles regarding either Korea or India, be- 
cause understandings entered into with Russia had 
made mutual pledges regarding them superfluous. 

"In view, then, of the fact that beneath the frame- 
work of what is on the surface a self-denying ordi- 
nance, vital and far-reaching changes have acquired 
the sanction of the High Contracting Parties, it is 
natural that Chinese public opinion becomes distrust- 
ful of any renewal of this agreement, from the opera- 



176 APPENDICES 

tion of which China had suffered enough during the 
World War, especially in the matter of Shantung. 

"Furthermore, as the ratification of the Austrian 
Treaty has made China a member of the League of 
Nations which she assumes was created in good faith, 
she is advised that a contract regarding her affairs 
between other members of the League cannot be en- 
tered into without her prior consent. Article X is 
a sufficient guarantee that her territorial integrity will 
be respected. 

"So far China has not received from Great Britain 
a reply to her memorandum. She is anxious, how- 
ever, to hear from Britain so that she may address 
an identical note to Japan and establish definitely the 
national attitude on a question vital to the peace and 
prosperity of her people." 




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